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LOYAL LIEUTENANT, ABLE ADVOCATE: THE ROLE OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON IN FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S
BATTLE WITH THE SUPREME COURT
Stephen R. Alton*
Before his appointment to the Supreme Court,Justice Robert H. Jackson
played a highly visible role in FranklinD. Roosevelt's failed "court packing
plan." Roosevelt's legislation would have increased the size of the Supreme
Court and could have dramatically altered the functioning of our government. Jackson supported the plan from his post as Assistant Attorney General. This Article uses a chronologicalnarrative to examine Jackson's role in
Roosevelt's court fight. The Article examines his role in light of the surrounding history and the tension between the backers of the New Deal and
the Supreme Court.
Jackson's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee was widely
viewed as the most effective representation which the plan received.
Roughly contemporaneously with his Senate testimony, Jackson gave five
public addresses, some before groups adamantly opposed to the plan. Despite the poor prospects for the court legislation and his own ambivalence
regarding the plan, Jackson worked loyally to sell Roosevelt's idea. This
Article examines Jackson's often overlooked support of the court packing
" Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law;
J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University School of Law. A.B., Harvard College, 1978;
J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1981; ED.M., Harvard University Graduate
School of Education, 1986; LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 1992. This
article was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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plan and provides considerable insight into the future Justice, illuminating
both his strong political instincts and his blossoming abilities as an advocate.

INTRODUCTION

In 1934, Robert H. Jackson, future Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, left his home in Jamestown, New York and, at the age of
forty-two, went to New Deal Washington to serve as general counsel of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.1 Jackson had established a successful law practice in Jamestown and was involved in Democratic Party politics at both the
local and state levels. 2 Two years after his arrival in the nation's capital, the
Western New Yorker transferred to the Department of Justice to become the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division.' In January 1937,
on the eve of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's announcement of his plan to
"reorganize" the federal judiciary, Assistant Attorney General Jackson was
asked to head the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.4 It was in this
role that Jackson participated in the 1937 battle over Roosevelt's so-called
"court packing plan." During the months that the fight raged (February to
July), Jackson's official position continued to be that of Assistant Attorney
General in charge of Antitrust. The Solicitor Generalship, the Attorney Generalship, and the Supreme Court Associate Justiceship all lay in Jackson's
future. He would serve in each of those capacities in turn, taking his seat on
the Court in 1941.'
Jackson's background distinguished him from many other New Dealers.
Forty-two years old when he first arrived in the nation's capital, Jackson
was neither an aging party hack nor one of the legion of Felix Frankfurter's
young Turks.6 Instead, Jackson was a seasoned, canny, and successful trial
attorney who, in the tradition of Louis D. Brandeis, had established his

EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 66-67 (1958).
2 Id. at 62-64.
3 Id. at 83-84.
4 Id. at 88; see Warner W. Gardner, Robert H. Jackson: 1892-1954--Government
Attorney, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 438 (1955); William L. Ransom, Associate Justice Robert
H. Jackson, 27 A.B.A. J. 478 (1941).
5 See GERHART, supra note 1, at 229-34.

As a professor at Harvard Law School during this period, Frankfurter sent many
of his brightest young students to Washington to work for the New Deal. WILLIAM E.
6

LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940, at 64

(1963). For more on Frankfurter's efforts in this regard, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 167-73 (1976).
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professional reputation by representing small businesses.7 Largely self-educated beyond the high school level, Jackson never attended college and
spent only one year at a night law school; 8 most of his legal training was
acquired through an apprenticeship in a Jamestown law office.9 In the
words of Warner Gardner, an attorney who worked closely with Jackson
during the latter's tenure as Solicitor General, Jackson was "the ablest advocate to be drawn to Washington, and the foremost of the 'Roosevelt lawyers,' . . . [yet he] never served a day except in 'old line' agencies .... A
lawyer he had been, and a lawyer he remained until he took his place on the
Supreme Court."1 Jackson was an advocate, not a policy-maker. It was as
reforming the
an advocate that he presented the administration's case for
1
United States Supreme Court to the public and to Congress. '
It is undeniable that Jackson's rise from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to the Supreme Court (accomplished in a span of slightly more than seven
years) was uncommonly rapid. Warner Gardner opined that "nobody in history has ever risen as rapidly as he."' 2 Jackson's remarkably rapid rise is

supra note 1, at 48-62.
8 Jackson attended Albany Law School. Id. at 34.
9 See Gardner, supra note 4, at 439; Ransom, supra note 4, at 480.
10 Gardner, supra note 4, at 438.
" Auerbach summed up the paradoxes embodied in Jackson, the New Dealer:
Robert H. Jackson was an unlikely New Deal lawyer. The prototypical New Dealer was an upwardly mobile urbanite, a second-generation member of an ethnic
minority group with superior academic credentials and, perhaps, some Wall Street
experience. Jackson was the obverse: an upstate Protestant New Yorker who
never attended college, attended but never graduated from Albany Law School,
served an apprenticeship in a Jamestown law office, and incessantly preached the
nineteenth-century virtues of the small-town practitioner: "hard work, long hours,
and thrift." . . . The consummate advocate, he defended the New Deal as special
counsel for the Securities and Exchange Commission, as assistant attorney general
in the tax and antitrust divisions of the Justice Department, and as solicitor general and attorney general. Regardless of office, Jackson remained the nineteenthcentury liberal in the twentieth century; his anachronistic liberalism was conspicuous, yet as a New Dealer he seemed to march in step with the times. This was
less paradoxical than might appear. His critique of the legal profession, a recurring theme in his public addresses, focused on the corporate lawyer as the personification of wrongdoing; for his was the animus of Main Street displaced professionally by Wall Street. Jackson's New Deal colleagues, who voiced similar complaints, fired at the same target for different reasons. Theirs was the cry of contemporary politics; his was the voice of nostalgic betrayal.
AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 174-75. See generally id. at 174-76. Jamestown, incidentally, is in Western New York-not, strictly speaking, "upstate." Such misdescription of
the town seems to be a common mistake.
12 Interview with Warner W. Gardner, Esquire, in Washington, D.C. (June 22,
1992). Gardner served in the Department of Justice from 1935 to 1941 and was the
Assistant to the Solicitor General while Robert H. Jackson held the post. Id.
7 GERHART,
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not, however, the primary subject of this Article. Rather, this Article focuses
on Jackson's role in the 1937 court fight-a role that unfolded in the space
of a few months' time. Still, Jackson's willingness to undertake important
work on behalf of such administration initiatives as the 1937 attempt to
reorganize the federal judiciary and the 1937-38 antitrust campaign was, in
large part, responsible for his speedy ascent in American government.
Jackson played an essential role in the 1937 court battle: he was "one of
the most effective public speakers on the topic."" He made five speeches
in favor of Roosevelt's proposal and delivered what generally was considered the most effective Senate testimony on its behalf. 4 He also served
occasionally behind-the-scenes as a presidential advisor during the course of
the battle.' Although his role in planning the battle was relatively small,
his role in fighting it was an important and highly visible one.
Despite the historical significance of Jackson's subsequent career at the
bar and the bench, and despite the prominence of his role in the court fight,
adequate examination of that role is lacking. This Article seeks to fill that
void by examining, in detail, the part that Jackson played in the court fight.
Robert H. Jackson, as a contributor to American Constitutional jurisprudence in the twentieth century, merits this undertaking.
This Article presents a chronological, narrative account of Jackson's
participation in the court fight. The larger history of that campaign and its
players also are presented in order to illuminate Jackson's role. Although a
number of secondary works-both old and new-review the history of the
fight, 6 the main purpose here is to relate Jackson's part in this larger history, drawing on.those secondary works only to the extent that they are helpful.
This Article first recounts the historical background of the tension between the New Deal and the Supreme Court as well as the Roosevelt
administration's proposed solution to the problem. An examination of
Jackson's initial efforts on behalf of the administration in its struggle with
the Court follows. Next, the Article presents an analysis of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the proposed legislation to reorganize the
federal judiciary, with particular emphasis placed on Jackson's testimony
before that body. A discussion of Jackson's post-hearings participation in
the combat over the Supreme Court follows, after which the Article continues with a brief look at the Court's surprising about-face and the death of
the President's plan. The Article concludes with comments about
Roosevelt's struggle with the Supreme Court and the importance of
Jackson's role in that struggle.

13

Id.

14See

infra Part 5.
'5 See infra text accompanying notes 249-54.
16 These sources are cited throughout this Article.
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I. THE OLD COURT V. THE NEW DEAL

The Hughes Court" was, in the words of one writer, the "Court that
Challenged the New Deal."'" Pronounced division within this United States
Supreme Court manifested itself during the 1933 Term. 9 Beginning with
that term and accelerating during the two succeeding terms, the Court, bitterly divided both philosophically and personally, struck down as unconstitutional a dozen acts of Congress and only narrowly upheld the constitutionality of several others.' Among the important federal statutes invalidated
during this period were the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,21 the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,' the Railroad Retirement Act of
1934,2 and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.24 Moreover,
this Court negated several important, progressive state statutes designed to
deal with the very real-indeed unprecedented-economic crisis confronting
the nation, and it sustained other such statutes only by close votes.' Given
the Court's narrow reading of federal powers under the Commerce Clause'
'

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes led the Supreme Court from 1930 to 1941.

IS

Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Court that Challenged the New Deal (1930-1936),

24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 65, 65 (1984).
19Id. at 81-82.
20

See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTrrunONAL REVOLUTION

IN RETROSPECT 10-16 (1957); see also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 181 tbl. (1941).
21 Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (invalidated in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935)). In a press conference held four days after the release of the
Schechter Poultry Co. opinion, an angry President Roosevelt decried the Court's majority for having "relegated [the nation] to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate
commerce." William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of FranklinD. Roosevelt's "CourtPacking" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 357 (quoting Roosevelt).
22 Ch. 25, Tit. I, §§ 1-22, 48 Stat. 31 (May 12, 1933) (invalidated in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)). The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 were the two cornerstones of the New Deal's economic recovery program and, together, were designed to aid farmers, labor, and industry.
FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEzVOuS WITH DESTINY 103-04
(1990).
In a bitter dissent in Butler, Justice Stone accused the conservative majority of
resorting to "a tortured construction of the Constitution." Butler, 297 U.S. at 87 (Stone,
J., dissenting). He admonished his brethren to remember that "[c]ourts are not the only
agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern." Id.
23Ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934) (invalidated in Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935)).
24 Ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1935) (invalidated in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S.
238 (1936)).
2 See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 181 tbl.
'6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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the Court's narrow reading of federal powers under the Commerce Clause'
and the General Welfare Clause27 and its expansive reading of the limiting
aspects of the Due Process Clauses' and the Tenth Amendment,29 momentum was building for a showdown between the Court and the two other
branches of the federal government.
The early decisions of the Hughes Court were relatively progressive, upholding a number of federal and state laws which provided for varying degrees of government intervention in economic affairs.3" These early decisions "engendered great hopes in the framers and champions of the New
Deal."31 How had the progressive promise of these early decisions by the
Hughes Court turned into the conservative juggernaut of the 1934 and 1935
Terms? One answer may be found in a philosophical change regarding the
scope of judicial review espoused by what had come to be a majority of the
Court. According to Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing
in Marbury v. Madison,32 propounded the view that the judicial role in reviewing legislation "was not unrestrained. The primary responsibility for
33
government was in the elected representatives of the people.
By the time of the New Deal's high-water mark, however, the Court
"had abandoned this restrained approach to its function of judicial review
and had come instead to conceive of itself as the Supreme Censor of all
legislation."' The Court was acting as a superlegislature, often vetoing federal and state acts that it deemed unwise while cloaking its actions under the
guise of the Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, or Tenth Amendment.
In fact, the Court had long since entered the realm of legislative politics on
the side of business interests; its numerous laissez faire decisions made it
increasingly difficult for both federal and state governments to regulate
business in the public's interest.35 Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, "judges and lawyers, but especially the Justices of the Supreme Court,
26 U.S. CONST.

U.S.
28 U.S.
29 U.S.
30 See,
27

art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
CONST. amend. X.
e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding New York's

maximum milk price regulation against substantive due process and equal protection
challenges); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law against a contract clause challenge).
31 LEO PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 296 (1965).
32
33

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 13.

34 Id.
31 See

generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 235-37 (1976) (discussing the Supreme
Court decisions of the 1890s and their relation to the "enshrinement of laissez-faire
philosophy in constitutional law").
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were conscious allies of the new private economic powers, and their constitutional doctrine was deliberately directed at defeating majoritarian movements in the state and federal legislatures intended to redress the imbalance
between civil society and the state."'
In addition to a philosophical change, the personalities and the voting
habits of the Supreme Court Justices during the first Roosevelt administration contributed to the marked conservative shift. The Court's nine members
during the 1933 to 1936 Terms were Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
and Associate Justices George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, James Clark McReynolds, Owen J. Roberts, Louis D. Brandeis, Harlan
Fiske Stone, and Benjamin N. Cardozo. Russell W. Galloway, Jr. statistically demonstrated a phenomenon long recognized by many: the Court of this
period broke neatly into three voting blocs-a conservative bloc (Sutherland,
Van Devanter, Butler, and McReynolds), a liberal bloc (Brandeis, Stone, and
Cardozo), and a centrist swing bloc (Hughes and Roberts).37 Galloway established that Hughes's voting record placed him "almost exactly in the
Court's statistical center. His disagreement rates with the Justices at the
Court's extremes were almost perfectly symmetrical . . . ."' Roberts, how-

ever, voted to the "right of center" during these terms, disagreeing with the
Court's liberal bloc almost twice as often as he disagreed with the conservative bloc.39 His voting pattern matched that of Hughes more closely than
that of any other Justice.4" Although Hughes gave "substantial support" to
the conservatives during the 1934 Term and especially the 1935 Term, it
was Roberts who firmly aligned himself with the conservative bloc, thereby
providing the crucial fifth vote against important social and economic legislation.41 Whereas Roberts often voted with the liberal bloc prior to 1934,
his alignment with the conservatives in the 1934 and 1935 Terms was largely responsible for the Court's shift to the right.42
The Justice's personalities also played a role in this history, for the tribunal was sharply divided personally as well as politically. The four conservatives, Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds (often collec-

36 Eben Moglen,

Holmes's Legacy and the New ConstitutionalHistory, 108 HARV.

L. REV. 2027, 2038 (1995) (reviewing OWEN M. Fiss, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-

1910 (1993)). The quoted text is Moglen's synopsis of the instrumentalist view of the

era attributed to progressive historians.
"' See Galloway, supra note 18, at 98.
38 Id. at 92-93.
39 Id. at 92.
40 Id. at 91-92.
"' Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Roosevelt Court: The Liberals Conquer (19371941) and Divide (1941-1946), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 491, 492 (1983).
42 Id.
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tively referred to as the "four horsemen"),43 were "immutable as dried con-

crete" in their narrow, strict-constructionist constitutional views.44 "Opinions delivered by any of these veterans were likely to be rasped at the waiting courtroom. Whether right or wrong, these bitter-enders displayed all the
symptoms of hardened arteries."45 The liberals Brandeis, Stone, and
Cardozo stood "[s]olidly against this rock wall."46 In the middle were Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts.
Joseph Rauh, a law clerk for Justice Cardozo during these years,47 ob-

served, from his insider's perch, that the Court of this era "was hopelessly
divided."48 The "hostility" between the Court's four conservatives and its
three liberals "was inevitable and open."49 Rauh recalled that the four
horsemen even traveled together in the same automobile to and from oral
arguments and the Court's Saturday conferences." In reaction, the three
liberals would meet at Brandeis's house' 51 on Friday evenings "to plan their

strategies for the Saturday conferences. "

See WESLEY MCCUNE, THE NINE YOUNG MEN 13 (1947).
Id.
45 Id.
43

44

46

Id.

47 Joseph

L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 213 (1990).
48 Id. at 213-14.
49 Id. at 214.
50

Id.

Id. Professor Herbert Wechsler, who was a law clerk for Justice Stone during the
first administration of Franklin Roosevelt, related a delightful anecdote that captures the
personal feelings that divided this Court.
One day, Wechsler was riding to the Supreme Court building in Stone's car with
5,

Stone and Stone's messenger, Edward. Mrs. Stone had asked the Justice to stop at
Magruder's Grocery Store, which he did on the way to the Court. While Stone was in
the store, Wechsler and Edward waited in the car. "All of a sudden," said Wechsler,
I noticed on the curb of Connecticut Avenue, Mr. Justice McReynolds, who was a
tall, powerfully built man, standing there waving, shaking a Malacca walking stick
that he always carried. And just shaking it as if he was going to bring the heavens
down.
I said to Edward, "I see Justice McReynolds over there. I think he's trying to
get a taxicab unsuccessfully. I assume he's going up to court. Don't you think it
would be nice to ask him if he'd like a lift?"
So Edward said, "Well, Mr. Wechsler, if you're telling me to do this, I'll be
glad to do it, of course. But if you're asking me whether Justice Stone would like
me to do it, I have to tell you that he would not."
"Well," I said, "forget it. Thank you, Edward."
And then when Stone came back, meanwhile McReynolds had gotten his cab,
and I told Stone this story, and Stone looked at me and he said, "well, it's perfectly clear, Wechsler, isn't it, that Edward has a lot more sense than you have."
Reminiscences of Herbert Wechsler 75-77 (1982) (Oral History Collection of Columbia
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Thus, by the end of the 1935 Term, the Supreme Court was divided
bitterly both personally and philosophically. The Court's four reactionaries
appeared to be in the ascendancy, aided by the crucial swing vote of Roberts (and, on occasion, that of Hughes). The conservative wing and its fellow travelers had played naysayer to the New Deal for two successive
terms. 52 Important New Deal legislation, such as the National Labor Relations Act,53 the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 54 and the Social
Security Act, 5' had yet to come before this hostile tribunal, and there was,
in administration circles, much fear regarding their fate, given the Court's
hostility toward New Deal social and economic legislation.56 Moreover,
Roosevelt's dream of wages and hours legislation seemed to be "out of the
question. 57
A few years later, Roosevelt reflected on his feelings about the situation
at the time:
By June, 1936, the Congressional program, which had pulled
the nation out of despair, had been fairly completely undermined. What was worse, the language and temper of the
decisions indicated little hope for the future. Apparently
Marshall's conception of our Constitution as a flexible instrument-adequate for all times, and, therefore, able to
adjust itself as the new needs of new generations arose-had
been repudiated.
But was it really the fault of our Constitution? Or was it
the fault of the human beings who, in our generation, were
torturing its meaning, twisting its purposes, to make it conform to the mold of their own outmoded economic beliefs?5"
The administration believed that something needed to be done about the
Court. The question was what?
University). Wechsler goes on to note that there was "no sense of camaraderie in the
Supreme Court" of this era. Id.
52 See Galloway, supra note 18, at 82-88.
53 29

U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1935).
- 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935).
55 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1935).

FDR:

56 NATHAN MILLER,

AN INTIMATE HISTORY 392 (1983); 6 FRANKLIN

D. ROO-

D. ROOSEVELT lix (Samuel
supra note 6, at 231.

SEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN

I. Rosenman ed., 1941);
57 LEUCHTENBURG,

LEUCHTENBURG,

supra note 6, at 231; see also Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at

381-82.

5' 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56,

at lviii.
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Before that question could be answered, Roosevelt's reelection needed to

be won. In the 1936 election, the Supreme Court became an issue.59 Roosevelt did not raise the Court as an issue during the campaign' but instead
"maintained a studied silence on the Court question despite counsel from
different sides that he urge action to alter the Court or that he assure the

country that he would not pack the Court., 61 Although Roosevelt resisted
Republican leaders' attempts to provoke a personal response on the court

issue, Democratic Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky repeatedly attacked
the Court in his one-hour keynote speech at the 1936 Democratic National

Convention.62
As Roosevelt remembered it, the campaign's single issue was the New
Deal, "its objectives, its methods, its future proposals, 6 3 and, he asserted,

the "opposition pointed to the Court as the only obstacle which had stood in
our way."' In fact, Republican supporters of Roosevelt's opponent, Kansas
Governor Alfred Landon, stressed the point that the man elected president in
1936 likely would appoint a considerable number of Justices to the Court;
Republicans asked the electorate whether it wanted that man to be Franklin
Roosevelt.65 The electorate soon responded in the affirmative.

" Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 379-80.
60 LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME

(1967).
Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 379.
BAKER, supra note 60, at 43-46. James M. Burns also noted that Roosevelt per-

COURT 43
6'

62

sonally dodged the court issue in the course of the campaign: "During the campaign
Hoover and others demanded that the President confirm or deny that he planned to pack
the Court. Roosevelt not only ignored the specific question-as a seasoned campaigner
would-but he skirted the whole problem of the Supreme Court." JAMES MACGREGOR
BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 296 (1956). Burns believed that
Roosevelt's silence in response to the question "meant that he had gained no explicit
mandate to act on the Court." Id. The fact that the Court was an important issue in the
election, coupled with the size of the Roosevelt landslide, has led many observers to a
different conclusion, however. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
63 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lviii.
64 Id.
65 BAKER, supra note 60, at 43-44. It may be helpful to bear in mind that Roosevelt
made no Supreme Court appointments during his first four-year term as president. Of
those prior presidents who had served at least one full term, only James Monroe made
no appointments to the Court during his first term in office (though he did make an appointment during his second term). Indeed, as of the time of his second inauguration,
Roosevelt could have claimed accurately that only he, William Henry Harrison, Zachary
Taylor, and Andrew Johnson had been unable to secure any appointments to the Court.
Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, The Statistics on the Supreme Court, in 4 THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
3187, 3192 (Leon Freidman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). Because the average age of
the Justices at the end of 1936 was almost seventy-two, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995 passim (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995), it
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Among those Democrats taking up the Republican-cast Court gauntlet in
the 1936 campaign was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Tax Division, Robert Jackson. In an article entitled Is
66 Jackson sought to turn the tables on Landon and
Landon Constitutional?,
his supporters. In the unabashedly partisan piece, Jackson implied that Governor Landon should not be hurling stones at the President on the issue of
the constitutionality of legislation. After accusing Landon of "perhaps rash' 67
ly" bringing the "constitutional issue" into the campaign's "limelight,"
Jackson detailed six occasions during Landon's four years as Kansas's governor-four years which coincided with Roosevelt's first term as president-in which the Kansas Supreme Court found state legislation to be
unconstitutional. 6' Though a closer examination of these Kansas cases reveals that most involved arcane matters regarding the relationship between
Kansas and its units of local government (issues which were hardly comparable to the New Deal), Jackson most likely scored a political point or two,
particularly in his enumeration of two separate instances in which the Kansas Supreme Court struck down state mortgage moratorium relief mea69
sures.
Nevertheless, Jackson's article was a bit disingenuous, even by partisan
political standards. According to Jackson, his purpose was "merely to read
the [Kansas] court reports and to assay [Landon's] claim that he knows how
to get along with the courts and how to get his program into constitutional
shape. 70 Jackson failed to point out that the Kansas Supreme Court presumably invalidated the Kansas laws on grounds that such acts were violative of the Kansas constitution-a far cry from the federal High Court's
invalidation of congressional acts under the United States Constitution.
Moreover, Jackson cited no evidence to indicate that the Landon administration had shepherded the invalidated legislation through the Kansas legislature in a way that was analogous to the Roosevelt administration's efforts
regarding the enactment of its policies by a cooperative Congress. Although
such an omission on Jackson's part was hardly surprising, it does mean that
a logical link in his argument was missing: Landon's personal involvement
in the invalidated Kansas legislation was not demonstrated; thus, Jackson's
point-that Landon's programs would fare better with the judiciary than had
did indeed appear likely, at the time of the 1936 election, that the next occupant of the
White House would make several appointments to the Court.
6 Robert H. Jackson, Is Landon Constitutional?, THE NATION, Oct. 24, 1936, at
474.
67

Id.

61

Id. at 474-76.

69

Id. at 475. The later of the two mortgage moratorium laws was apparently an

unsuccessful attempt to address the specific objections which the Kansas high court had
raised with respect to the earlier law. Id.
70 Id. at 474.
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FDR's-simply was not established.71
Despite the efforts made by Landon and his supporters to make the
Court an issue, Roosevelt won an unprecedented landslide victory in his bid
for a second term. "It was one of the greatest election sweeps in American
history. 7' 2 The President carried every state except Maine and Vermont,
piling up 523 electoral votes to Landon's eight.73 Roosevelt concluded that
the election results "left little room for doubt as to whether the people of the
'
United States wanted [the New Deal] fight to continue."74

II. THE ADMINISTRATION STRIKES BACK
With the political opposition "routed" and his policies "vindicated,"
Roosevelt "could now give full attention to the challenge posed by the Supreme Court."75 The problem remained: what course of action was advisable--or even possible-with respect to the Court?
One alternative simply was to do nothing, to wait and see if the Court
' After all, a shift of even one vote on
might "follow the election returns."76
the Court could spell the difference between victory and defeat for New
Deal programs.77 Attorney General Homer Cummings thought it at least
conceivable that the Court might begin to deliver "some more enlightened
opinions," though he confessed that he had "not much hope in that direction.

78

Significant problems existed, however, with a wait-and-see strategy.
The Court had behaved so arrogantly in the spring of 1936
that the prospects for a change of views seemed slim. Not
71

In his conclusion, Jackson nonetheless attempted to drive home his point about

the constitutional hypocrisy of the Republican foes of the New Deal:
The strange parallel in the experiences of these two Executives in attempting to
make economic, financial, and general-welfare policies meet the requirements of
the courts does pose a serious question as to whether the legalists are not intruding technical and obstructive rules of legal philosophy where they do not belong.
Both the Kansas record of Governor Landon and the speeches that he has made
during the campaign indicate clearly that he has nothing to contribute to the solution of this problem.
Id. at 476.
72 FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 207.
7 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 195-96.
'4 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lix.
72 Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 380.
76 Id. at 381.
77

Id.

Homer S. Cummings, Diary (Nov. 15, 1936) (The Papers of Homer S.
Cummings, Box 235, University of Virginia, Special Collections of Alderman Library)
[hereinafter Cummings Diary].
78
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only did the Court's line of reasoning in its last Term leave
little reason to suppose that the Court would not strike down
such landmarks as the Wagner Act and the Social Security
law, but it barred the way to new legislation. Returned to
office with a tremendous grant of power, Roosevelt might be
denied by the Court the opportunity to use that power. If he
waited to see what the Court did, he might find himself with
his past achievements obliterated and the momentum for
future change lost.79
Roosevelt later wrote that "there was no time left for that kind of inaction and waiting."80 He became convinced that the Court was hostile toward him on a personal level, and he "now sought a way not merely to
liberalize the Court but to chastise the Justices for their past behavior."'"
The President agreed with Cummings, who became Roosevelt's chief advisor on the Court situation immediately after the 1936 election,82 that the
Constitution itself was not the problem; instead, "the entire difficulty has
grown out of a reactionary misinterpretation" of the Constitution by the
Court's conservative majority.8
If waiting for a change in the judiciary's attitude was out of the question, the administration had two basic routes open to it: it could draft legislation to fix the court problem, or it could propose a constitutional amendment.' The amendment route, however, was fraught with problems.8 1 It
would be difficult to draft an amendment that would ameliorate the situation. 86 Moreover, for Roosevelt, time was of the essence, and the ratification process would take too long. 7 Further, the entire process could, all too
easily, be stymied: thirteen years after its ratification by Congress, the child
labor amendment had yet to be ratified by the states.8 Finally, even if

9 Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 381-82.
6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxi.
Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 382.
82 JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168
80
8

DAYS

24-25 (1938).

Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Nov. 15, 1936).
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 28-29.
' For Roosevelt's thoughts on the issue of a constitutional amendment, see generally 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxii-lxiv.
'

Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 384.
Id. at 384-85.
88 Id. Cummings told Roosevelt that "those who were most content with existing
conditions were most disposed to urge constitutional amendments because they welcomed that manner of dealing with the subject, hoping that time, money, propaganda,
and a minority made effective could block the changes." Cummings Diary, supra note
78 (Dec. 26, 1936). In a diary entry written in late December 1936, Cummings confided
that "the delays incident to amendments are rather appalling." Id. (Dec. 24, 1936).
6

87
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these obstacles could be surmounted quickly, an amendment (and any legislation enacted under it) would still be subject to judicial interpretation by the
very Court whose attitude necessitated the amendment in the first place. 9
Clearly, the amendment route was uninviting.9"
Two possible statutory schemes also were abandoned. Legislation limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (which was by no means
unprecedented)9" was deemed to be impracticable.92 Similarly, legislation
requiring the vote of more than five Justices in order to declare a congressional act unconstitutional was seen as an unworkable solution because the
Court likely would nullify such a measure on constitutional grounds.93

One route would pass constitutional, if not popular, muster: legislation
to increase the size of the Court, thereby enabling Roosevelt to appoint new
Justices.94 Such a plan had the advantage of precedent on its side.95 Increasingly, Roosevelt and Cummings warmed to this idea, despite the fact
that it "violated taboos and that some principle would have to be found to
justify it."96
Cummings and his assistant, Carl McFarland, soon hit upon what they
thought could serve as that justifying principle: the advanced age of the
current Justices.97 Sometime, most likely in January 1937, Cummings and
89

Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 386.

90 Id.; ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 28-29; 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56,
at lxii-lxiv.
91 See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
9 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 28-29; Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at

386-87.
93

ALSOP &

CATLEDGE,

supra note 82, at 28-29; Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at

386.
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 29-30.
956 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxiv. As both Jackson and Cummings later would
emphasize in their Senate Judiciary Committee appearances, the Court's size had varied
six times in the nation's history. Reorganization of the FederalJudiciary: Hearings of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81 CONG. REC. Pt. 9 app. at 604, 606 (1937)
(statement of Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States); id. at 523-27
(statement of Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States).
Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 390.
9 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 31-33; Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at
391-92. For Professor Edward S. Corwin's role in this matter, see id. at 388-91. Warner
Gardner, an Assistant Solicitor General at this time, had been given the task of researching possible legislative solutions to the court problem. He now was given the
additional task of drafting the proposed bill. Warner W. Gardner, Court Packing: The
Drafting Recalled, 1990 1. Sup. CT. HIST. 99, 99-100. After Gardner completed the
initial work on the bill, he dropped out of the drafting process, probably in early January 1937. Id. at 100. At that point, according to Gardner (and much to his "dismay"),
the entire rationale "of the bill was transformed into a measure to relieve the Justices of
their crushing burden of work, made especially difficult by their advanced age." Id.
Gardner believed that McFarland was responsible for this transformation of the
94
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McFarland devised the idea that the administration's bill should use, as a
model, a twenty-year-old plan espoused by a former Wilson administration
attorney general. That earlier plan called for federal judges to retire at age
seventy or face the appointment of additional judges to assist them.9" To
the great amusement of both Cummings and Roosevelt, that former attorney
general was none other than the arch-reactionary Justice James Clark
McReynolds.99 Although the McReynolds proposal never was adopted
(and, incidentally, did not include Supreme Court Justices within its purview), Cummings and his aides decided that there was no reason not to
apply the idea to the High Court as well."
Roosevelt insisted on absolute secrecy for the plan until it was ready to
be sprung on the Congress, the cabinet, and the country. 1 '
No one was to be warned. No one was to be permitted even
to seem to have participated in the great scheme. Message,
bill and letter, the whole thing was to be flung at Congress
and the country without advance notice, to be left or taken.
There was not the slightest doubt in the President's mind
that they would be taken. 2
There were several reasons for this secrecy. The President most likely
was motivated by a fear of premature disclosure of the plan" 3 and by his
usual flair for the dramatic." Moreover, his recent landslide reelection
had made him over-confident regarding his power over the Congress.0 5
Biographer Frank Freidel offered another hypothesis for why Roosevelt kept
Congressional leaders in the dark before announcing his plan: he simply was
becoming bored with them.' °6 Whatever his reasons, Roosevelt would pay
dearly for his secrecy.

legislation's rationale. Id. Cummings's diary noted that, on January 7, 1937, he met
with McFarland, Gardner, and Solicitor General Stanley Reed regarding the progress of
the drafting of the bill; earlier that day, Cummings had handed Roosevelt a draft of a
proposed bill on the federal judiciary. Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Jan. 7, 1937).
98 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 119-21 (1995); Leuchtenburg, supra

note 21, at 391-92.
99 ALsOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 33; Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Jan.
17, 1937).
100 Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 392.
101 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 48; see BURNS, supra note 62, at 297.
102 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 48-49.
103 Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 396. But see BURNS, supra note 62, at 297.
104 Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 396; BURNS, supra note 62, at 297.
105 FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 222-23.
106 Id. at 224.
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In the years since the winter of 1936 to 1937, there has been considerable debate and speculation regarding who-other than Roosevelt and
Cummings-was involved in devising (or was even privy to) what would
come to be called the court packing plan. Certainly McFarland, Gardner,
and Alexander Holtzoff, another Cummings assistant, were aware of the
plan's formulation and had varying roles in drafting the plan and conducting
preliminary research."° The same was also true of Solicitor General Stanley Reed.'0 8 Roosevelt later wrote that although he "discussed the objectives and the issues [regarding the court problem and its possible solutions]
with many people," he was joined "in the final determination of details" by
19
Cummings and Reed, "and ... nobody else.) '
107 For

a discussion of Holtzoff's knowledge of the proposal, see ALSOF &
CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 43; Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 392. For a discussion
of McFarland's and Gardner's participation see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying
text.
108 See generally LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 98, at 114-31. Cummings noted in his
diary that he told Roosevelt that he "had not discussed this matter with anyone except
Stanley Reed and that I called him in and explained it to him just to get his reaction
and under seal of strictest confidence." Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Dec. 26,
1936).
1096 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lx-lxi.
In late January 1937, presidential advisors Donald Richberg and Samuel Rosenman
were called to help Cummings and Reed prepare Roosevelt's message to Congress that
was to accompany the bill. There is no evidence, however, that either Richberg or
Rosenman was involved in the earlier stages of the plan's formulation. See ALSOP &
CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 45-46 (discussing Richberg's and Rosenman's involvement in drafting Roosevelt's message); Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 395-96 (same);
Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Jan. 30 & 31, 1937) (same).
One of the mysteries surrounding the birth of the court packing bill is how much
those ubiquitous presidential advisors, Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen, knew about the
plan. Alsop and Catledge stated flatly that Cohen and Corcoran had no role in formulating the plan. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 36-37. Joseph P. Lash said that the
pair "knew something was afoot after the election about the court situation" but that
"they too, were surprised when they finally learned of the Court-packing plan." JOSEPH
P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS: A NEW LOOK AT THE NEW DEAL 292 (1988).
Leuchtenburg and Lash indicated that Corcoran, at least, found out about the plan when
Rosenman, with Roosevelt's permission, asked Corcoran to go over the final draft of
the President's message to Congress. Roosevelt, however, specifically instructed
Rosenman not to let Cummings know that Corcoran was involved. Id. at 293;
Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 396. After the defeat of the court packing proposal in
July 1937, Corcoran told Interior Secretary Harold Ickes that Cummings alone was responsible for the plan and that he (Corcoran) and Cohen were never involved in its
formulation. 2 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES 177 (1954)
(Perhaps, with hindsight, Corcoran employed a selective memory). Jackson later wrote
that, after the proposal became public, Cummings personally told him that no one except Reed, Holtzoff, and McFarland knew about the plan in advance; Cummings specifically told Jackson that "neither Ben Cohen nor Tommy Corcoran knew anything about
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Assistant Attorney General Jackson had no role in the bill's planning.
Cummings's diary for this period makes no mention of any participation by
Jackson in the planning or drafting process prior to the legislation's announcement on February 5, 1937. Alsop and Catledge state that Jackson
first learned of the plan when he read about it in the newspapers."' Moreover, Jackson himself denied having any part in the planning process. 1 '
Further confirmation of Jackson's lack of knowledge comes from Warner
Gardner, who states categorically that Jackson had no part in the court pack-

it." Robert H. Jackson, Autobiography 115 (June 8, 1944) (unpublished manuscript,
Robert H. Jackson Papers, box 188, on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Jackson Autobiography].
It would appear, then, that Cohen and Corcoran did not receive advance notice of
the bill, except for a meeting during the course of the bill's drafting in which Gardner
and Cummings "spent a morning with" Cohen and Corcoran and found "that they were
in strong support and without suggestions for change." Gardner, supra note 97, at 100.
Gardner maintained that the meeting lasted about two hours. If this is so, then it is not
true that Cohen and Corcoran were ignorant of the bill's planning or that Cummings
desired as much. Interview with Warner W. Gardner, supra note 12.
After the bill's introduction, however, Cohen informed Justice Brandeis that neither
he nor Corcoran "'was. consulted in the formulation of the Court proposals which the
President .. .decide[d] to sponsor."' Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., A Personalized View of the
Court-PackingEpisode, 1990 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 93, 96 (quoting Letter from Benjamin
Cohen, attorney, to Justice Louis Brandeis (July 30, 1937) (Benjamin Cohen Papers,

Box 13, Library of Congress)). Moreover, Cummings's diary for this period (November
1936 to February 1937) contains no mention of any meetings or discussions that either
Cohen or Corcoran attended, though an entry for January 24, 1937, does note that Roosevelt told Cummings that "he had tried [the plan] on Tommy Corcoran [who] agreed it
would work." LASH, supra, at 293 (quoting Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Jan. 24,

1937)).
Joseph Rauh attempted to reconcile these seemingly contradictory accounts: "I sug-

gest that the apparent contradictions may be explained by Corcoran and Cohen's unawareness of the age-inadequacy rationale for the packing as opposed to the packing
itself." Rauh, supra, at 96. In other words, Rauh theorized that Corcoran and Cohen
generally were aware of the plan but not its old-age rationale. Unsatisfying though this
may be, it is likely that the truth will never be known about the extent of Cohen and
Corcoran's participation in the creation of the court bill.
110 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 36.
"' Jackson said that
[o]n the day that the President's message proposing reorganization of the judiciary
went to Congress, I had been in New York and was returning on the train. I
bought a Philadelphia paper and found the plan in the press. That was the first
that I had known of the proposal. I had a vague notion that something was generating along the line of dealing with the judiciary, but I had been in on none of the
conferences, knew nothing about the proposal and was as surprised as anybody at
its nature.
Reminiscences of Robert H. Jackson 433 (1952) (Oral History Collection of Columbia
University) [hereinafter Jackson Reminiscences].
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ing bill from the time of its inception until its introduction."'
Despite what, in hindsight, is clear evidence to the contrary, contemporary reports stating that Jackson was somehow involved in the formulation
of Roosevelt's proposal to reform the Court proliferated. According to Jackson, a January 29, 1937, speech that he gave to the New York State Bar
Association1 . was "thought by many to be the opening gun of the fight
against the judiciary which opened a few days later."1 4 Jackson, however,
claimed the speech "was not even cleared with the White House and was
not connected in any way with the court plan....5 Nevertheless, Paul
Mallon, in his February 8, 1937, column in the Washington Evening Star,
asserted that Jackson "had a hand in drafting the bill."'. 6 A week later, the
PhiladelphiaInquirer reported that "[t]here are many persons who assume
that Assistant Attorney General Jackson had a part in formulating the
President's plan for reorganizing the court."".7
While the finishing touches were being put on the court plan, Jackson
addressed the New York Bar Association at the Waldorf-Astoria in New
York City."' Jackson began by telling his audience that the legal profession could "scarcely boast of its popularity," in part because the public believed that there were too many lawyers and that lawyers lacked "convictions.""' 9 Jackson next launched into a discussion of the role of lawyers on
the Supreme Court and the influence of precedent on that Court. Although
the prestige of the legal profession "rests on judicial supremacy in govern-

112

Interview with Warner W. Gardner, supra note 12.

113See generally infra notes 118-134 and accompanying text.
114

Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 433.

Its Id.

Mallon, Roosevelt's Hand Forced in Court Move-Originally Planned to
Await Coming Decisions, WASH. EVE. STAR, Feb. 8, 1937. This article also erroneously
reported that Samuel Rosenman was "the man behind the Roosevelt repacking process"
and that Cohen and Corcoran, in addition to Jackson, had helped draft the bill. Id.
117 Jackson and Miss Perkins Mentioned for High Court, PHIL. INQUIRER, Feb. 15,
116Paul

1937 [hereinafter Jackson and Miss Perkins].

Robert H. Jackson, Address at the New York Bar Association Annual Dinner
(Jan. 29, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Jackson Address].
119 Id. at 2-3. Regarding the proliferation of attorneys, Jackson, with characteristic
11.

humor and a nod to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, remarked,

I have long advocated a New Deal law to pay the law schools for not producing
lawyers. The New Deal has performed a service to the Bar by keeping so many
law professors busy in Washington. They could do less harm making new laws
than at their usual task of making new lawyers .... Some think society would do
well to plow under the worst of us. Others think the worst of us do less harm to
society than the best of us. They point out that it takes good lawyers to kill great

measures for public betterment ....
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ment," he argued that only "public sufferance and tradition" permit "lawyer
control [of the High Court]," for nothing in the Constitution mandates that
the Justices be lawyers. 2 Because lawyer-judges have such reverence for
precedents, there is a natural tendency toward conservatism, which, in turn,
leads the judiciary into conflict with "progressive administration[s]..'.'
Jackson warned that, in the future, "some 'radical' administration" could,
without infringing the Constitution, "pack" the Supreme Court with nonlawyers."
Jackson spent a considerable amount of time discussing constitutional
interpretation and the legal profession's role in it. "The heaviest responsibility ever given by any nation to its bar is that of interpreting our Constitution," he averred.'23 The Constitution, however, is "not a legal document,"
but a relatively short, general outline establishing the framework for American government." The Framers "never thought, when they spared words
in the interest of simplicity, that we would reach a point where nothing is
lawful unless the Constitution had a word for it .... [W]e cannot outlaw
every action that can not show a precedent."'"5 What Jackson termed

at 3-4.
121 Id. at 4-5.
1
Id. at 4 ("Now suppose some 'radical' administration should propose to pack [the
Supreme Court] with men of other vocations. There is no constitutional protection for
120

Id.

our lawyer monopoly.").
Given his choice of the word "pack," it is easy to understand how some could
think, in light of subsequent events, that Jackson was hinting that an administration
attempt to pack the Court would follow. Further reflection on Jackson's words, howev-

er, make it clear that he was not floating a trial balloon. The Assistant Attorney General
would not have referred to the Roosevelt administration as "radical"; his reference,
doubtless, was to some hypothetical future administration. Indeed, had Jackson known
that the court packing bill was imminent, he likely would have avoided the entire reference to a "radical" administration "packing" the Court with non-lawyers. If one focuses
on Jackson's point that lawyers should not adhere slavishly (hence, conservatively) to
precedent instead of focusing on the word "pack," one realizes that Jackson merely was
calling on the legal profession (including judges) to be more liberal in its political outlook and constitutional philosophy. He was neither advocating court packing nor hinting
at its imminence.
23
124

12

Id. at 5.

Id.
Id. at 7. Jackson's statement is reminiscent of John Marshall's dictum in

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819):
[The Constitution was] intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means
by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have
been to change, entirely, the character of that instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and
which best can be provided for as they occur. To have declared, that the best
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"government by litigation ' 116 was immobilizing

the implementation of
public policy.' The American system of government is one that "must
function by compromise,"' and attorneys were standing in the way of
compromise:
27

Contending social forces came to rest and equilibrium, at
least temporarily, in such compromises as the N.R.A., the
Guffey Coal bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the minimum wage laws, the Labor Relations Act and Social Security Acts. We need as many constitutional powers and ways to

compromise these struggles as possible. Lawyers have been
closing the roads to political compromise of basic problems
which are the country's route to economic and social peace.
The detour may be rough!'29

Thus, Jackson criticized not only "government by litigation,"'"3 but also
specific, adverse decisions that were recently (or soon to be) rendered by the
Supreme Court. By deprecating the lawyer-generated constitutional litigation
that vexed the administration, Jackson implicitly was censuring the Supreme
Court's conservative majority for its reflexive adherence to outmoded precedents and its strict construction of the Constitution. According to Jackson,
such attitudes stymied both Congress and President in their efforts to deal

means shall not be used, but those alone, without which the power given would
be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail
itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to
circumstances. If we apply this principle of construction to any of the powers of
the government, we shall find it so pernicious in its operation that we shall be
compelled to discard it.
Id. at 415-16. Marshall reminded his audience that "we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding." Id. at 407.
2
Jackson Address, supra note 118, at 9.
27

Id. at 7-9. Jackson stated:

No administration can halt its policies dealing with such problems as a banking
emergency, unemployment, relief, or the currency to seek the judiciary's views.
The government can not learn the judges' views until after the law is passed and
then only after a lapse of years as the view is slowly made available in private
litigation. Moreover, the judicial contribution is only a negative. It may tell what
can not be done to right a wrong or solve a problem, but it never tells what can
be done.
Government by litigation has destroyed effective enforcement of public policy.
Id. at 8-9.
128 Id. at 9.
129

Id.

130

Id.
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effectively with the nation's severe social and economic problems.'
Given his critical tone, Jackson surely surprised his audience when he
concluded with a call for unity and fellowship within the profession. "We
play on opposing teams but we play the same game," he told his fellow bar
members.'3 2 The New York Bar Association speech was quintessential
Jackson, from the hard-hitting and well-reasoned points of attack replete
with nice turns of phrase to the conclusion that diplomatically attempted to
soothe those whose feathers were ruffled. 33 Jackson not only criticized the
legal profession on a number of counts in his speech but also took the Supreme Court to task in a way that, in hindsight, reasonably might have led
an observer to believe that Jackson was hinting at the administration's up-

coming court reorganization proposal.M
Predictably, Jackson's New York Bar Association speech drew considerable attention and criticism. A Philadelphia attorney berated Jackson, angrily
informing him that he found "such a lack of respect for the Supreme Court
and such narrow-minded views" both "disconcerting and regrettable."' 35

...Indeed, Jackson issued the following warning:
Our disorderly and inconclusive squabbles in lower courts over questions we
know the lower courts can not settle, our intolerable delay in settling questions on

which executives must act, and then our disposing of vast problems of statecraft,
such as defining "general welfare," "interstate commerce" or "due process" by

legal specialists guided by precedents and boastfully regardless of reason or wisdom are not portents of health for us lawyers nor for our country.
Id. at 10-11.
112Id. at 11.
'"3 Here one sees evidence of the style that would soon make Jackson one of the best

writers to serve on the United States Supreme Court.
'3' A careful examination of Jackson's speech tends to confirm his direct statement,
see supra text accompanying notes 114-115, that the address was not intended as a trial
balloon for Roosevelt's court plan and that, at the time of the speech, Jackson had no
knowledge of the plan. Jackson's address contained no reference to the twin theories of
old-age and over-work which Roosevelt and Cummings would use initially to justify the
plan. See infra text accompanying note 145. As a fast-rising assistant attorney general,
it seems unlikely that Jackson, had he known of the plan, would have made a reference
to it in this speech while totally ignoring the official rationale. This is so despite the
fact that Jackson disapproved of the old-age and over-work rationale for the legislation,
see infra text accompanying note 210, and was the first administration official to state,
publicly and candidly, the real motivation behind the proposal--disapproval of the kinds
of decisions the Court delivered. It would have been foolish to have undermined the
administration on this point in advance of the plan's official-and surprise-unveiling.
Jackson was both too loyal and too savvy to have intentionally made such a move.
"' Letter from Walter G. Dugger, Attorney, to Robert H. Jackson (Feb. 1, 1937)
(Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress). Dugger's letter continued,
Such weird ideas as you have expressed cannot come from sound thinking, and
the best thoughts of men in power. If you are unable to support our most honored
and illustrious institution, the Supreme Court of the United States, I invite you to
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The New York Times reported that the members of the New York Bar Asso-

ciation "made up an apparently unanimous chorus of adverse but informal
comment" on Jackson's address. 1" In an editorial of February 1, 1937, the
Times expressed interest in Jackson's assertion that the Constitution does not
mandate lawyer-judges. 3 7 Yet because of "'lawyer control' of the Supreme Court," the Times thought it unlikely that "[a] court of learned laymen" would ever come to pass. 38
On February 5, 1937, the administration's bill to reorganize the federal
judiciary was ready to be sent to Congress, as was a message from the President and a letter from the Attorney General to the President which were
intended to provide support and justification for the bill. The part that was
the real heart and soul of the proposed law and that immediately would
become a lightning rod for the opposition provided for presidential appointment of an additional judge for every federal judge who had served for ten
or more years but failed to retire within six months after reaching his seventieth birthday.'39 Six Supreme Court Justices met this criterion. 4 All
such appointments were to be permanent, although the bill capped the total
size of the resulting Supreme Court at fifteen Justices. 4 ' Significantly,
Cummings's letter which accompanied the bill purported to provide statistical evidence for the President's assertion that crowded federal court dockets necessitated this measure.4

consider resigning from the Government service and I anticipate that the Country
would profit by your act.
Id.
136

Narrow Viewpoint of Bar Is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1937, at 1.
Lawyers & Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1937, at 18. Although perhaps

137 Editorial,

incorrectly inferring that Jackson had actually advocated the appointment of non-lawyers to the Supreme Court, the Times opined that a "court of learned laymen, ignorant
of law, pleases the imagination, however much it may irk lawyers." Id. The Times admitted that "the Founding Fathers, were [they] where they could be polled, . .. might
be somewhat surprised by Mr. Jackson's suggestion." Id.
138 Id.
139 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at 63 (referencing the proposed bill to reorganize

the federal judiciary, § 1(a)).
140 See Leuchtenburg, supra note 21,
141 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at

at 392.

63 (referencing the proposed bill to reorganize

the federal judiciary, § 1(b)).
142Id. at 60-63 (referencing a letter from Homer S. Cummings to the President, Feb.
2, 1937). It is interesting to note that in October 1936, the average age of the nine Justices was almost 72, while in October 1996, the average age of the nine Justices was
slightly in excess of 62. Cushman, supra note 65, passim. Despite the youth of the

current Supreme Court relative to that of the 1936 Court, the current Court issued full
opinions in 75 cases during the 1995 Term while the 1936 Court issued full opinions in
146 cases during its last full Term. Compare Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The
Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARv. L.
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Roosevelt's message to Congress called for the bill's enactment in the
interest of justice. The President maintained that the legislation was necessary "because the personnel of the Federal Judiciary is insufficient to meet
the business before them;"' 43 the Supreme Court, in particular, was laboring under the heavy burden of its docket.'" According to Roosevelt, the
crux of the problem was the plethora of aged federal judges who were unable both to keep up with the increased workload and to respond to "modern complexities."'45 The legislation provided for the "constant and systematic addition of younger blood [which] would vitalize the courts and
better equip them to recognize and apply the essential concepts of justice in
the light of the needs and the facts of an ever-changing world."' 46 Roosevelt noted in passing that Congress had changed the number of Supreme
Court Justices several times before.'47 The legislation's twin grounds of
old-age and over-work were about to be sprung, without prior warning, on
the Congress, although the official rationale would fool no one.
The issue of timing remained. When should the bill and its supporting
documents be sent to the Congress and announced to the cabinet, the press,
and the nation? By the beginning of February 1937 word of the President's
plan was starting to leak, and he felt that he could wait no longer. 8 Oral
arguments before the Supreme Court in the National Labor Relations Act
cases were set for Monday, February 8, and FDR wanted to make his plan
public before then.'49 On February 2, however, Roosevelt was scheduled to
host his annual White House dinner for the federal judiciary, and he did not
want to spoil the occasion by announcing the plan in advance of the dinner. 5' Thus, Roosevelt chose Friday, February 5, 1937, to submit the plan
to Congress."
On that morning, at a White House cabinet meeting which the President

REV. 577, 580 (1938), with The Supreme Court 1995 Term, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1, 367,

tbl. I(A) (1996) (it should be noted that neither figure, 75 nor 146, includes per curiam
decisions). This comparison deflates the notion that a younger Court necessarily does
more work than an older one (to the extent that the amount of work accomplished by
the Court is measured in terms of the number of full opinions issued).
'"' 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at 52 (referencing President's message to the Congress on Feb. 5, 1937).
'4

Id. at 53.

145 Id. at 55; see id. at 53-55.
146

Id. at 55.

147

Id. at 52. This point was made in order to establish that a plan to increase the size

of the Supreme Court was neither unconstitutional nor unprecedented. See infra notes
313-16 and accompanying text.
148 Leuchtenburg, supra note 21, at 397-99.
149

150
151

Id. at 399.

Id.
Id.
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had called the day before, 15' Roosevelt announced his plan to reorganize
the federal judiciary to the assembled cabinet officers and to the Democratic
congressional leaders, who attended the meeting at Roosevelt's invitation. 153 As soon as the President finished announcing his plan, he went to
meet with the press, leaving the Cabinet (except Cummings) and the congressional leaders in stunned silence. 54 Roosevelt thereupon announced his
plan to the White House press correspondents, who thought the news conference had been called to address wages and hours legislation. 155 He
asked the reporters to hold the story until he delivered the legislation and
his message to Capitol Hill shortly after midday. 56 At about the same
time, the Supreme Court Justices would receive copies of the President's
plan as they sat in their courtroom.'57
Much to the administration's disappointment, initial congressional reaction was, at best, mixed. Moreover, opponents of the measure picked up
crucial support as the days and weeks passed. Both Vice President John
Nance Garner and House Judiciary Committee Chairman Hatton Sumners
opposed the legislation, with Sumners declaring, "Boys here's where I cash
in my chips," to fellow representatives in the car while returning to the
Capitol from Roosevelt's White House announcement. 5 Back in the halls
of the Capitol, Garner dramatized his views on the proposal to a group of
senators by "holding his nose with one hand and energetically making the
Roman gesture of the arena, thumbs down, with the other.' ' 159 As a conservative who disliked massive government spending and the
administration's support of big labor, the Vice President actually opposed
the New Deal: "[t]o him the Supreme Court was not the menace but the
savior."'' Sumners's opposition, coupled with House Majority Leader
Sam Rayburn's tepid support and House Speaker William Bankhead's resentment over Roosevelt's failure to consult congressional leaders, meant

152

Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Feb. 4, 1937).
supra note 60, at 3-14.

153 BAKER,

supra note 82, at 66-67;
TED MORGAN, FDR: A BIOGRAPHY 470-71 (1985).
114 ALSOP

&

CATLEDGE,

FREIDEL,

supra note 22, at 228-29;

FDR AND THE NEWS MEDIA 133 (1990).
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 66-68.
157 BAKER, supra note 60, at 33. As a special courtesy to Justice Brandeis, Tom
155 BETrY HOUCHIN WINFIELD,
156

Corcoran was dispatched to inform him of the plan earlier that day. Id. at 33-35.
Brandeis told Corcoran that he opposed the President's proposal and that he thought
Roosevelt was making a serious mistake. Id. at 35.
No member of the Supreme Court publicly supported the bill. Even the liberal
Cardozo, a New Deal stalwart, opposed the plan, commenting that "'no judge could do
otherwise."' Rauh, supra note 109, at 98 (quoting Justice Benjamin Cardozo).
1"8 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 67.
159

160

Id. at 69.
BAKER, supra note 60, at 13-14.
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that the Senate would consider the bill first.' Ominously for the administration, a number of conservative Democrats in that chamber immediately
lined up against the bill;'62 soon, every conservative Democratic senator,
as well as the entire Republican minority and, more significantly, a number
of moderate Democrats, sided with the opposition.'63 Congressional leaders
were dismayed that Roosevelt had failed to consult them before announcing
his plan. House Speaker Bankhead confided to a colleague that Roosevelt
avoided telling "'his own party leaders what he was going to do... because he knew that hell would break loose.'"' Senate Majority Leader
Joe Robinson, who would lead the fight for the measure in the Senate,
thought that the President probably made a mistake in failing "'to have
advised more frankly with his friends before precipitating this issue." 165
Shortly after the bill was sent to the Hill, Republican leaders in the
Senate made the decision to let dissatisfied Democrats lead the fight against
the administration.' Conservative Democratic opponents had a similar
brainstorm at an early strategy dinner, where they decided to let Senator
Burton K. Wheeler, the venerable liberal Montana Democrat, lead the opposition."' Wheeler's agreement to do so, coupled with the Republicans' decision to allow the Democrats to take the lead, ensured that the fight would
not merely be one between Democrats and Republicans or even liberals and
conservatives but instead would be fought across both party and ideological
lines.'68 Effectively, this fight would be a contest between the executive
and the legislative branch-more specifically, between Roosevelt and a
rebellious Senate.
The President sent Corcoran to sound out Wheeler's views on the legislation soon after its introduction. 69 Corcoran learned that the Senator considered the true combatants to be the President and Congress, particularly
the Senate. The real issue, according to Wheeler, was just how much power
Roosevelt's landslide reelection conveyed to him. 7 Other liberal senators,

161 ALSOP

&

CATLEDGE,

supra note 82, at 68, 88-89;

BAKER,

supra note 60, at 65-

66; William E. Leuchtenburg, FranklinD. Roosevelt's Supreme Court "Packing" Plan,
in ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 69, 78 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes
eds., 1969).
162 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 88.
163

Id. at 96.

16

BAKER, supra note 60, at 21 (quoting Rep. William Bankhead).

Id. at 22 (quoting Sen. Joseph Robinson).
166 ALsoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 97-100.
167 BAKER, supra note 60, at 97-99.
'u
Id.; see also ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 97-104.
169 LASH, supra note 109, at 297.
1

170 Id.

As Wheeler explained to Corcoran, "'Once he was only one of us who made

him. Now he means to make himself the boss of us all .... Well he's made the mistake we've been waiting for for a long time-and this is our chance to cut him down to
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such as Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming, George Norris of Nebraska, William Borah of Idaho, and Hiram Johnson of California, joined Wheeler in
opposing the bill.17' The legislation "frightened many liberals who feared
its use in the future by conservative or semi-Fascist administrations."''
Many American liberals viewed the Court as "the bulwark of American
liberties;" at a time when "European dictators were stripping populaces of
their liberties, they were especially sensitive to the danger that the United
States might suffer the same malign fate."' 73 To some congressional liberals, enactment of the legislation would mean a further erosion of congressional power in favor of an executive branch that, in the view of many, already
had accreted too much. 74
The reactions of congressional leaders mirrored those of the public,
which immediately reacted negatively to any administration efforts to tamper
with the Supreme Court. Letters and telegrams to Congress soon ran nine to
one against the plan. 75 Within a month after Roosevelt's announcement, a
poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Dr. George
Gallup's organization) revealed that only thirty-eight percent of the public

supported the legislation.'76 Tremendous press opposition to the plan existed, and the United States Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar
Association quickly aligned themselves with the plan's opponents.'" An
ABA poll of lawyers found that eighty-six percent of the member-respondents and seventy-seven percent of the non-member respondents opposed
increasing the size of the Court. 7

size."' Id. at 298 (quoting Burton Wheeler).
"'t BAKER, supra note 60, at 136-39. Borah and Johnson, though Republicans, were
progressives, as was Norris, who technically was an Independent.
172 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 76.
173 FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 230.
174 BAKER, supra note 60, at 139-43.
175 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 72.
176 WINFIELD, supra note 155, at 133. Seven weeks after the announcement, though,
Dr. Gallup reported that 47% of the populace supported the plan. George Gallup, Poll
Shows 27 States Against Roosevelt Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1937, at 9. It is unclear
whether this represents a true trend in public opinion in favor of the plan or merely
indicates that one (or both) of these polls was erroneous.
177 BAKER, supra note 60, at 84-85.
"
William L. Ransom, Members and Non-Members of American Bar Association
Take Same Stand on Court Issues, 23 A.B.A. J. 338, 338 (1937) [hereinafter Same
Stand]; William L. Ransom, Members of the American BarAssociation Decide Its Policies as to the Federal Courts, 23 A.B.A. J 271, 274 (1937) [hereinafter Decide Its Policies]. Sixty-three percent of the ABA's members responded to its poll regarding the
proposed increase in the size of the Supreme Court, Ransom, Decide Its Policies,supra,
at 271-72, 274; 36% of the nation's non-ABA-affiliated attorneys responded to the
question, Ransom, Same Stand, supra, at 338. The combined votes of all attorneys responding to this question yielded 20.3% in favor of the plan, id. at 338. In all, 41.1% of
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Powerful publisher Frank Gannett, the owner of the third largest newspaper chain in America, also aligned himself with the opponents, forming
the "National Committee to Uphold the Constitution," an ostensibly nonpartisan group dedicated to defeating the President's plan. 79 Gannett's com-

mittee sent out letters urging the recipients to use public demonstrations,
petitions, and direct pressure on representatives in their efforts against the
proposal."18
As churches, bar associations, and state legislatures flocked to the opposition, Roosevelt "was taken completely by surprise by the strength of the
national reaction.' 8 This "national reaction" included that of the press,
whose response to the plan was also immediate and overwhelmingly hostile.182 For example, the New York Times, in a February 7, 1937 editorial,
blasted the plan's old-age rationale by reminding its readers of the advanced
ages of the respected liberal Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D.
Brandeis.8 3 The Times further ridiculed the crushing workload rationale,
opining that adding Justices more likely would impair-rather than improve-the operation of the Court."M The Times's "fundamental objection"
to the legislation was that it "would make any President master of the Supreme Court, by the mere process of enlarging it ... [thus] impair[ing]
fundamentally the system of checks and balances on which the American
Government is founded and by which the essential liberties of the American
people have been preserved."' 85 The editorial concluded by declaring that
"those members of Congress who vote against [the proposed legislation]...

American lawyers responded to this poll question-a total of 70,486 respondents from
among the 29,616 ABA-members and the approximately 142,000 non-member attorneys. See Same Stand, supra, at 338.
For the ABA's and the corporate bar's negative response to the plan, see generally
AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 195-98. Auerbach concluded that the "Court fight offered
anti-New Deal lawyers a rare opportunity to express resentment against the Roosevelt
administration without incurring public censure." Id. at 196.
179 BAKER,
180
181
18

supra note 60, at 74-77;

FREIDEL,

supra note 22, at 276.

BAKER, supra note 60, at 74-77.
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 73.
Id. at 71-72. Harold Ickes noted in his diary that "[p]ractically all of the newspa-

pers are against [Roosevelt], even those in the Scripps-Howard chain which supported
him during [his] election." 2 IcKEs, supra note 109, at 74-75. After the friendly
Scripps-Howard newspapers came out against the plan, Roosevelt, through Corcoran
and Cohen, attempted to win over the chain's Washington bureau chief. This effort was
largely unsuccessful. WINFIELD, supra note 155, at 134.
183 Editorial, Tampering with the Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1937, § 4, at 8. Justice
Holmes served until age 90; Justice Brandeis retired at age 82. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 405 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
184
185

Id.
Id.
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will prove themselves friends of democratic government. '' 86
The administration also was disappointed by the less-than-enthusiastic
reception the proposal received from two groups on whose support it was
banking heavily: labor and farmers."8 7 Both groups were prominent recipients of New Deal favors and overwhelmingly had supported Roosevelt in
the 1936 election; he expected their continued support during the court
packing fight.' Farm leaders, however, became cool to the administration
after it refused their early demands for a commitment to certain pet projects
as a condition precedent to their support for the bill.'89 As for labor, Congress of Industriai Organizations President John L. Lewis also demanded
concessions from the administration in exchange for his blessings."
Not all reaction was hostile. Predictably, certain members of the
President's cabinet expressed their support of the plan. Ickes wrote in his
diary that the proposed reforms "are fully justified," although he added his
belief that "in the end we must have an amendment."'9 1 Cummings confided in his diary that Ickes and fellow cabinet secretaries Claude Swanson
(Navy), Henry Wallace (Agriculture), and Frances Perkins (Labor) all offered the Attorney General words of support and congratulations after
Roosevelt's announcement of the proposal.'92 Moreover, some Congressional leaders, such as Representative Maury Maverick, the liberal New Dealer
from Texas, quickly backed the legislation.'93 American Federation of Labor President William Green publicly advocated the plan but he was one of
the few labor leaders to do so."' Nevertheless, Ickes's early prediction that
Roosevelt "has a first class fight on his hands"'95 ultimately proved accurate.
Early in the fight, Roosevelt was confident of his ultimate success, notwithstanding the astonishing amount of opposition the plan had engendered.
The President believed that the American people supported him,'96 even
though events would prove him seriously mistaken. On the day that Roosevelt announced his proposal, Senate Majority Leader Robinson and House
Speaker Bankhead both predicted ultimate passage of the legislation."9
Despite the fact that the administration "had revealed surprising weaknesses"

186

Id.

187

BAKER,

supra note 60, at 86.

188 Id.
189

Id. at 86-87.

190 Id. at 88-89.
191 2

ICKES, supra note 109, at 64-65.

Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Feb. 5, 1937).
193 ALSoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 68.
194 BAKER, supra note 60, at 87-88.
192

196

2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 74.
ALSoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 78-79; MORGAN, supra note 154, at 472.
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ALsoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 70.
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and the opposition "had shown astonishing strengths," Alsop and Catledge
noted that "[t]wo great tactical advantages still helped the President-the
Democratic party tie, and the need for a solution to the court problem-and
it was pretty clear that unless the second advantage could somehow be taken
from him he would win in the end."' 98
After the legislation was sent to Congress, the press began to speculate
about whom the President might appoint in the event that he was successful
in increasing the Court's size by six Justices. Robert Jackson's name appeared on some of the lists. Almost immediately after the plan's announcement, the Washington Post mentioned Jackson as a potential appointee.'99
A week later, the PhiladelphiaInquirer reported that Jackson was among a
handful of persons who were "frequently mentioned in political and other
circles" in Washington when conversation turned to possible new appointments to the Court. 200
Even though Jackson was among those receiving attention as a potential
nominee to the Court, his own "initial impressions of the plan were not
particularly good.""' Referring, perhaps, more to the Cummings-inspired
rationale than to the legislation itself, Jackson expressed his belief that
[i]t didn't seem to deal with the problem that was in the
minds of most people-the kind of decision that the court
had been making. It dealt with the number of decisions ....
It was dry, statistical, rather uninspiring, and if I felt that
way about it, I thought most people would be even less interested.2°2
By his own account, Jackson consistently held to his early view that both
the proposal
and its rationale "seemed ...in many respects unsatisfacto20 3
P)
ry.

198 Id.

at

105.

9 Among Oft-Mentioned Possibilities for Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,

1937, at 28. Under this headline, the Post carried photographs of five men, including
Jackson. ld.;
see also The News of the Week Passes in Brief Review, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 1937, § 3, at 3 (also listing Jackson among those under consideration for an appointment to the Court).
Jackson and Miss Perkins, supra note 117.
201 Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 434.
2 Id.
Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 113.
13
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III. JACKSON JUMPS INTO THE FRAY

Robert Jackson was soon instrumental in helping the administration
develop a new, more honest rationale for the court legislation. Before then,
however, Jackson dutifully went to bat for the President's proposal by preparing an article for the Newspaper Enterprise Association Service ("NEA")
for distribution to its member newspapers."' The article was one in a series of three made available to NEA's member newspapers, and the series
was designed to appear on consecutive days in conjunction with a reader
poll on the proposed legislation. 5 Jackson devoted most of his article to a
theme that he had sounded recently in his New York Bar Association
speech: delays are inherent in a system of government by lawsuit, thus judicial reform is needed to make the government function properly.' Jackson concluded by reminding the public that Roosevelt's proposal merely
called for "a blood transfusion and a reform of procedure in the interest of

avoiding delay and stopping irresponsible use of process.

'

Soon after writing the NEA article, Jackson wrote to a friend and revealed some of his private thoughts about the President's plan." In his
letter, Jackson gave a strong indication of the more straight-forward rationale which he would soon advance in support of the proposal before both
the Senate (in his Judiciary Committee testimony on March 11, 1937) and
the public (in a series of public addresses in March 1937). To his correspondent, he defended the proposed bill as a legitimate method of addressing
court reform, one that was not only "left open by the Constitution" but was

Robert H. Jackson, Delays, Lack of Uniform Rules in Present FederalLaws Cited
(Feb. 10, 1937) (clipsheet) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 209, Library of Congress).
NEA was a feature service owned by the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain. For a
monthly fee, NEA made features available by mail to its members. Telephone Interview
with Mack Williams, former publisher of the Fort Worth News-Tribune (Aug. 5, 1992).
' Jackson, supra note 204. One of the other two articles providing background information on the plan was authored by NEA Staff Correspondent Willis Thornton. ABA
President Frederick H. Stinchfield was the author of the third article, which opposed the
plan. NEA suggested that Thornton's background article run on the first day of the
series, Jackson's piece run on the second day, and Stinchfield's run on the third. See id.
The Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, NEA's owner, supported Roosevelt's 1936 reelection bid, though the chain opposed the court packing plan. See, 2 ICKES, supra note
109, at 74-75.
26
207

Jackson, supra note 204.

Id. The ultimate use of this article is unclear, as are its origins. The applicable file
in the Jackson Papers contains no drafts of the article nor does it contain any newspaper
clippings or correspondence which would indicate whether the article was ever published. See Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 209 (Library of Congress).
208 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to John G. Curtis, Esquire (Feb. 22, 1937) (Robert
H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress).
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also "well authenticated by history." 2m Jackson noted, however, that he
thought "it [was] a mistake to discuss this question in terms of the number
of certiorari granted or the condition of the Court's calendar or the age of
the judges."21 Instead, he wrote that he supported the proposed legislation
as a means to counter the views of the four conservative Justices, who,
"while honest enough, are entirely closed to any argument that this age may
advance as to constitutional interpretations .... I think... they
are creat211
ing some damn bad precedents which will plague us for years.
In a letter to Roosevelt himself, Jackson candidly expressed these same
views. 212 The Ass
Assistant Attorney General told the President that the public
simply could not be expected to understand and warm to the argument that
Supreme Court reform was necessitated by the congested court calendar and
the number of writs of certiorari denied. 213 The remedy was to be more
honest with the public about the real need for the legislation-namely, the
Court majority's restrictive interpretation of the Constitution. 2 4' -"The people are unquestionably ready to support you to the finish if they understand
that this is a fight to make the court a contemporary and nonpartisan institution, ' 215 Jackson concluded.
Thus, within three weeks of the announcement of the legislation, Jackson had advocated abandoning the disingenuous original rationale asserted
by the administration. He urged the President to come clean as to the true
reason for the plan-the need to counter the constitutional view of the
Court's conservative majority. By now, Jackson certainly knew about the
participation of his boss, Attorney General Cummings, not only in formulating the proposal but in devising its less-than-honest rationale. It is unclear,
however, whether Jackson directly informed the Attorney General about
their difference of opinion. This difference would soon become obvious, as
the two men's upcoming Senate Judiciary Committee testimony would reveal. From the standpoint of his career at the Department of Justice,
Jackson's candor on this point was a bold move.
Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran, both loyal Roosevelt advisors, had, from
the outset, disagreed with the old-age and over-worked rationales for the
proposed legislation.2 6 According to Joseph Rauh, Jackson was the first

2_9 Id.
210
211

212

Id.
Id.
Letter from Jackson to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Feb. 22, 1937) (Robert

H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress).
213 Id. Jackson asserted that "nobody ever yet went into a fight over a set of statis-

tics." Id.

Id. "Instead of talking about cases the court would not take, let us talk about the
cases they did take," Jackson advised. Id.
215 Id.
216 Rauh, supra note 109, at 96; Interview with Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Esquire, in
214
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within the administration to agree with them on this important matter. 217
Rauh reported that Jackson met with Cohen and Corcoran in February or
early March 1937, possibly in anticipation of Jackson's Senate Judiciary
Committee testimony. 1 Rauh was present at this meeting, during which
Jackson expressed his agreement with Cohen and Corcoran on the need to
switch to a more honest justification for the President's plan. 219 Recalling
the fact that Cummings had not yet abandoned the old-age and over-worked
rationale, Rauh noted that "it's quite a thing to get the Assistant Attorney
General to disagree with the Attorney General. I mean, that's the kind of
thing Cohen and Corcoran were so good at; they talked Jackson into it." 2'
The names "Jackson," "Cohen," and "Corcoran" were linked on another
front in the court fight. According to several accounts, the three men were
among a small number of New Dealers who formed a strategy group to
advise the White House on its prosecution of the plan in Congress. Alsop
and Catledge reported that this group also included: Charles West, Under
Secretary of the Interior; Joseph Keenan, an assistant to Cummings; James
Roosevelt, the President's son and confidential secretary at this time; Stephen Early, the President's press secretary; Charlie Michelson, the publicity
director of the Democratic National Committee; and Edward Roddan,
Michelson's assistant.221 Alsop and Catledge also noted that Jackson
(whom they described as "the agreeable, mild-mannered upstate New Yorker
who brought to the assistant-attorney-generalship a remarkable intelligence
in a very hard head") was merely "an occasional adviser" to the group.'m
The "principal officers" of this "new general staff' were Corcoran, Keenan,
West, and James Roosevelt.223
At least three other writers have mentioned the existence of such a strategy group and have placed Jackson in that group. Joseph Lash stated that

Washington, D.C. (July 10, 1992).
217
28
219

220

Interview with Joseph L. Rauh, supra note 216.
Id. Rauh could not recall the date with certainty. Id.
Id.
Id. Rauh may have engaged in a bit of overstatement in asserting that "they talked

Jackson into it" because no written evidence indicates that Cohen and Corcoran did-or
had to-talk Jackson into rejecting the old-age and over-worked argument. Indeed,
Jackson's January 29, 1937, New York Bar Association speech, see supra notes 118-34

and accompanying text, already had sounded some of the themes that he would publicly
propound in support of the plan, and there is nothing to suggest that either Cohen or
Corcoran had any hand in that speech. Rather, Jackson likely arrived independently at
the same conclusions as Cohen and Corcoran. With Jackson as an ally, Cohen and
Corcoran (who were probably shut out of the bill's planning process), see supra note

109 and accompanying text, now had the opportunity to have the Senate hear views
much more compatible with their own.
221 ALsoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 81-86.
222
223

Id. at 85.
Id. at 84-85.
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the group consisted of Corcoran, Keenan, Jackson, West, Michelson,
Roddan, and James Roosevelt.2 ' Lash did not include either Cohen or
Early on his list, though he stated that Corcoran "spoke for" Cohen.' 8 In
his biography of President Roosevelt, Rexford Tugwell wrote that the daily
meetings of the White House strategy group included Corcoran, Keenan,
West, and Jackson.' Eugene C. Gerhart, in his biography of Jackson,
stated that Jackson, along with Corcoran, Cohen, West, Keenan, Michelson,
and James Roosevelt, were "selected to be on the President's 'general staff'
to support the plan."2''
Nevertheless, considerable evidence indicates that Jackson was not a
member--or at least not a regular member-of this White House strategy
group. The best evidence comes from Jackson himself. Years later, in his
unpublished autobiography, Jackson denied that he was a member of any
such group: "Michaelson [sic] says that I was a member of the board of
strategy. In the first place, I doubt that a strategy board ever existed by any
designation
of the President. And if such did exist, I was not a member of
228
it.
Three other sources support Jackson's assertion that he did not participate in the White House strategy group. Warner Gardner, who was intimately involved with the drafting of the original legislation, opined that "if Jack'
son said he had no part in the strategy or planning, it would be true."229

Rather, recalls Gardner, Jackson's role was that of an advocate supporting
the bill: he was "one of the most effective public speakers on the topic."23
Gardner thinks it unlikely that Jackson was part of a strategy team because
"he ran rather more to independent action than to teamwork ....

I doubt

that he would have fitted in very comfortably with the planning group of
Cohen, Corcoran, Keenan, and James Roosevelt." 1
LASH, supra note 109, at 296.
2

Id.

226 REXFORD

G. TUGWELL,

THE DEMOCRATIC ROOsEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY OF FRANK-

LIN D. ROOSEVELT 404 (1957).
17 GERHART, supra note 1, at 107. Gerhart does not cite his source for this statement. Gerhart's book is remarkably similar to Jackson's own unpublished autobiography. Compare id., with Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109. One might infer that
Jackson himself was the source but for Jackson's statement to the contrary. See infra
text accompanying note 228.
Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 113-14. Such a board did exist, albeit
without Jackson's formal or regular participation. See supra text accompanying notes
221-27. Jackson also stated that he "did not at any time engage in any lobbying for the
bill." Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 117.
2 Interview with Warner W. Gardner, supra note 12.
230Id.
"3 Id. Jackson appears to have "fitted in very comfortably" with Cohen and
Corcoran, particularly regarding their views towards the plan's rationale. See supra
notes 216-20 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 291.
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Another source which suggests that Jackson was not a member of such a
planning group is Attorney General Cummings's diary. 2 On two occasions, one in May 1937 and one the following month, Cummings recorded
in his diary that he attended lunches at the White House to discuss strategy
on the court packing legislation.233 Cummings, Keenan, Michelson, West,
Roddan, Corcoran, and the host, James Roosevelt, were present at the May
lunch.M Cummings, Solicitor General Stanley Reed, James Roosevelt,
Gardner, Cohen, and Corcoran attended the June lunch.235 Significantly,
Jackson's name is absent from both of Cummings's lists. On a third occasion, in July 1937, late in the fight over the court packing plan, Cummings
wrote that he had a "[1]ong conference" with Cohen, Corcoran, and Keenan
about the legislative situation.236 Once again, Jackson's name is not on the
list of those in attendance. Jackson's absence from these three meetings further supports, at least by way of negative inference, Jackson's and Gardner's
statements that the Assistant Attorney General was not a member of any
White House planning group on the court packing fight.237
Perhaps the strongest documentary evidence contraindicating any regular
participation by Jackson in the White House planning group is that found in
James Roosevelt's diary. The younger Roosevelt kept a diary during the
early course of the court packing fight (from February 1 to March 17,
1937), long enough to speak extensively about who was in the strategy
group. In an entry for February 10, Roosevelt noted that he had spoken with
Cummings about "our plans for a steering committee" for the legislation; he
also noted that Cummings expressed displeasure over news reports that

Cohen and Corcoran were involved in the authorship of the bill." He listed two separate steering committees: one consisting of himself, Corcoran,
West, Michelson, Roddan, Keenan, and Early (the very group that Alsop
and Catledge listed, minus Jackson and Cohen), and the other consisting of
James Landis, William 0. Douglas, David Niles, Ray Stevens, Judge Wil-

12

See Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (May 4 and June 22, 1937).

233

Id.
Id. (May 4, 1937).
Id. (June 22, 1937).

236 Id. (July 19, 1937).
17 Admittedly, Cummings's diary entries alone are rather slim evidence. Jackson
could conceivably have taken part in the strategy board activities generally but merely
have missed these three particular meetings. Alternatively, Jackson could have been a
group member earlier in the year but dropped out by this time. Certainly, as will become evident in the discussion below, Jackson had virtually ceased to participate in the
court fight by the time of the second of these meetings (June 22, 1937) and had, even
by the time of the first meeting (May 4, 1937), ceased his public efforts on behalf of
the plan. See infra notes 531-600 and accompanying text.
23 James Roosevelt, Diary (Feb. 10, 1937) (James Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library) [hereinafter James Roosevelt Diary].
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liam Denman,"9 Cohen, and Jackson."4°
During the following month, the President's son mentioned, on numerous occasions, meeting with what he variously termed the "board of strate-

gy," the "strategy board," the "steering committee," the "strategy committee," or simply the "strategy meeting."4 He never directly indicated who
attended the meetings. One might infer that these references were to the
first, rather than the second, steering committee listed by Roosevelt, based
on the relatively large number of times that he met with one or more individual members of the first group on or about the same date that he noted a
meeting of the committee." 2 The two persons most often mentioned in this
regard were Corcoran and West. u3 On only two occasions in February and
March 1937 did the younger Roosevelt note that he met with Jackson, and
on only one of those occasions did he expressly note that the court legislation was discussed.2' There is a similar dearth of specific reference to
other members of the second strategy committee during this time period;
indeed, other than Jackson, only Cohen and Niles are listed as having met
again with the younger Roosevelt." 5 All of this leads to the conclusion
that the second strategy committee did not exist-at least not beyond its
initial meeting- in any formal or organized sense and that Jackson was not
a member of the more formal first committee.

2 For more on the early, influential thinking of Judge William Denman on the
administration's court plan, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 98, at 112-14. Denman, a
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and an old friend of Roosevelt,
lobbied the President and the Attorney General for the creation of several new federal
judgeships at all levels. Denman's rationale was the crowded condition of the federal
docket-a rationale upon which Cummings would seize in justifying the addition of
associate Justices to the Supreme Court. Id.
o James Roosevelt Diary, supra note 238 (Feb. 10, 1937). Roosevelt noted that both
committees met that afternoon, but neglected to note what business the second committee (which included Jackson) considered at its meeting. By contrast, he wrote that the
first committee dealt with Cummings's upcoming radio address on the court packing
bill. Id.
"4 See id. (Feb. 10-Mar. 3, 1937) passim. The variety of names used by Roosevelt in
reference to the group suggests that it was unofficial.
22 See id.
See id. (Feb. 8-Mar. 3, 1937) passim.
Id. (Feb. 24, 1937) (noting a meeting at which Cohen and Jackson were present to
discuss dealing with wages and hours legislation); (Mar. 2, 1937) (noting a lunch with
Jackson and "Judge Wil Clark" to discuss the "court situation").
See id. (Feb. 10-17, 1937) passim.
246 The primary strategy group seems to have met far too frequently during this time
period for Jackson to have been a regular participant. Unlike Corcoran, West, Keenan,
and James Roosevelt, Jackson, as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, had many
duties in connection with his official position; these duties would have severely limited
his availability for frequent group meetings.
Because it appears that Jackson was not a member of any formal strategy team
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Group member or not, Jackson was among a number of New Dealers
who urged Roosevelt to break his early silence on the plan and directly go
to the public with the real reasons for it. After Roosevelt delivered his mes-

sage to Congress on February 5, 1937, he became strangely and uncharacteristically silent about the bill. Apparently, his strategy was to let the opposition vent and play itself out, after which time he hoped the legislation

would carry handily. 27 In fact, the opposition was gaining strength in
these early days. 8 Alarmed, Cohen, Corcoran, West, and Jackson, among
others, urged Roosevelt to break his silence with one or more "fighting
speeches" on the court packing plan. 9 As early as February 23, the more
formal White House strategy group discussed the possibility of the President

making a radio broadcast or addressing a Democratic Victory Dinner on the
assembled to advise the White House in the court fight, how is one to explain the fact
that Alsop and Catledge, Lash, Tugwell, and Gerhart all have stated that Jackson was a
member of such a team? The simplest and most obvious explanation is that all of these
accounts are erroneous. Alternatively, one could try to explain all but the Gerhart account in the following manner. (Because Gerhart was not a contemporary observer and
failed to disclose his source on this point, it is difficult to know whether this same explanation might apply to his account. The Gerhart matter is especially puzzling given
that his book is similar in so many respects to Jackson's autobiography. See supra note
227.). Jackson, on a number of occasions, in fact worked closely with Cohen and
Corcoran on matters pertaining to the court plan. See supra text accompanying notes
216-20; infra text accompanying note 291. Indeed, by the beginning of Roosevelt's
second term, Jackson had become "an intimate" of Cohen and Corcoran. LASH, supra
note 109, at 290. Moreover, according to Rauh, Jackson attended one or more court
packing strategy sessions in Cohen's office, the substance of which likely were conveyed to the White House strategy group through Corcoran. Interview with Joseph L.
Rauh, supra note 216. Jackson himself mentioned that he discussed his Senate testimony with Cohen and Corcoran in advance. See infra text accompanying note 291.
Furthermore, Jackson, Judge Wilbur Clark, and James Roosevelt had a conversation
about the court matter over lunch at the White House on March 2, 1937. See Letter
from Robert H. Jackson to James Roosevelt (Mar. 3, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers,
Box 29, Library of Congress); James Roosevelt Diary, supra note 238 (Mar. 2, 1937).
Based on facts such as these, as well as the fact that Jackson was a prominent spokesman for the court proposal, Alsop and Catledge, Lash, and Tugwell reasonably, but
erroneously, might have concluded that Jackson was a member of the White House
strategy board.
In deference to Alsop and Catledge, it should be recalled that they claimed that
Jackson was merely "an occasional adviser" to the group, ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra
note 82, at 85, although earlier in their account they stated that Jackson was among a
cluster of the President's "principaladvisers and the officers of his troops ... [who]
made a sort of general staff at the White House" in connection with the court bill. Id. at
81 (emphasis added).
247 See ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 109-10; FREIDEL, supra note 22, at
230.
248 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 109-10.

249

Id. at 109.
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subject of the Supreme Court." ° For their part, Cohen, Corcoran, and
Jackson took the position that, in any address, Roosevelt candidly should
admit that the Supreme Court was the true target of the bill."'
Jackson made his case personally to the President. Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Henry Ashurst had called the Assistant Attorney General to be an early witness in favor of the bill at the upcoming Senate Hearings, and Jackson wanted to clear the appearance with the White House. 2
On February 25, 1937, Jackson and Solicitor General Reed (who was the
acting Attorney General during Cummings's absence on vacation) lunched
with Roosevelt at the White House, seeking the President's approval for
Jackson's appearance 53 During the meeting, Jackson not only reiterated
his disagreement with the old-age and over-worked rationale and his hope of
testifying about the real reason for the bill, but also counseled Roosevelt to
break his silence and speak directly to the nation about the need for the

legislation." 4
Various White House insiders made suggestions on the content of

James Roosevelt Diary, supra note 238 (Feb. 23, 1937).
2' ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 108.
232 Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 114-15.
3 Id. at 115; FDR: Diary and Itineraries: Jan. 2-Dec. 31, 1937 (Feb. 25, 1937) (microfiche, card 6 of 14, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library) [hereinafter Roosevelt Diary].
' Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 115-17; see also supra notes 212-15
and accompanying text. Jackson later recalled this discussion with Roosevelt regarding

the importance of a presidential address:
I, in common with many others, felt that there was great danger that sentiment
[against the legislation] would crystallize ... and that if his speech had any influence it must be delivered promptly. In fact, there were indications that sentiment
was already tending to be solidified against the plan. Knowing that I had an appointment, Thomas Corcoran and Mr. Oliphant urged me to impress upon him the
necessity of speaking at once. I waded into it and told him I was afraid public
sentiment would form against him in his absence [during an upcoming vacation] .... I pointed out that his original message did very little to arm ... [his
supporters] for a discussion and that before he left he must put in the minds of
his lay followers the answers to the questions that were certain to be asked. He
made no commitment, but within a half hour after I left the White House it was
announced that he would speak on March 9.
Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 116-17. According to James Roosevelt's diary, it was actually the day after-not thirty minutes after-Roosevelt's February 25
lunch with Jackson and Reed that the White House announced that there would be a
March 9 fireside chat. James Roosevelt Diary, supra note 238 (Feb. 26, 1937).
Notably, Jackson referred only to Roosevelt's March 9 fireside chat and not to the
March 4 address which the President delivered at the Democratic Victory Dinner in

Washington. See infra notes 262-71 and accompanying text. Presumably, the fact that
Jackson, along with Cohen, Corcoran, West, and others, urged Roosevelt to speak out
generally about the court matter prompted the President to make both addresses, even
though Jackson mentioned only the fireside chat.
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Roosevelt's March 4 Democratic Victory Dinner address and his March 9
fireside chat dealing with the proposed court legislation. Jackson stated that
he "was among those who supplied suggestions" for the March 9 speech,
though he made no claim of involvement in the March 4 address."s Samuel Rosenman later claimed to be the drafter of both speeches.256 Alsop and
Catledge reported that it was Cohen and Corcoran who did the primary
work on these addresses.27 Ickes noted in his diary that Corcoran,
Richberg, and Rosenman had worked on the March 9 radio address."
Cummings wrote that he too discussed the contents of both addresses with
the President. 9 The facts indicate that a number of different persons contributed to these two works, though Corcoran (and through him, Cohen),
Rosenman, and Richberg most likely were the principal authors.2'
None of the primary sources, except for Jackson's own account, mention
any participation by Jackson in these efforts. Jackson may have "supplied
suggestions" for the fireside chat. Yet the dearth of evidence suggests that it
would be an overstatement to assert, as Gerhart did, that the Assistant Attorney General "had a large hand in" the March 9 address.2"
On March 4, 1937, Roosevelt gave the first of his two public addresses
concerning the court bill. The occasion was the Democratic Victory Dinner
at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, where some thirteen hundred assembled Democrats paid one hundred dollars per plate for the privilege of dining with the President. 26 2 Roosevelt's words also were heard, through a
telephonic link, by Democrats attending similar dinners that evening in more
than eleven hundred cities throughout America.263 Roosevelt publicly admitted, for the first time, the real impetus for the bill: "[T]he 'personal economic predilections' of a majority of the Court [dictate] that we live in a
Nation where there is no legal power anywhere to deal with its most difficult practical problems-a No Man's Land of final futility." 2' Given the
Court's attitude, Roosevelt challenged his audience to design specific legislative solutions for the nation's pressing problems (as he had attempted to
do) which the Supreme Court's conservative majority would uphold:

Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 117.
I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 160 (1952).
257 ALsoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 110.
258 See 2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 95.
259 See Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Mar. 4 and 8, 1937).
260 James Roosevelt Diary, supra note 238 (Feb. 26-28, Mar. 1-2 and 7, 1937). On
255

256 SAMUEL

these dates, James Roosevelt wrote that he worked with Corcoran, Rosenman, and
Richberg on one or both of the addresses; on some of these occasions, Harry Hopkins
or Franklin Roosevelt himself also met with the group. See id.
261 GERHART, supra note 1, at 107.
262 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 110.
263 Id. at 111.
264 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at 118 (referencing the address of Mar. 4, 1937).
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I defy anyone to read the opinions concerning AAA, the
Railroad Retirement Act, the National Recovery Act, the
Guffey Coal Act and the New York Minimum Wage Law,
and tell us exactly what, if anything, we can do for the industrial worker in this session of the Congress with any
reasonable certainty that what we do will not be nullified as
unconstitutional. 5
He concluded with a call for immediate action on his proposed legislation so
that such problems could promptly be addressed: "If we would keep faith
with those who had faith in us, if we would make democracy succeed, I say
we must act-NOW!"'
On March 9, 1937, Roosevelt gave the second of his two public addresses on the matter.2' In his fireside chat, the President again decried the
Court's intransigence regarding New Deal legislation, asserting that the
Court had upset the balance among the co-equal branches of the federal
government. 8 Roosevelt explained his reasons for preferring a legislative
solution to the problem (as opposed to a constitutional amendment) 9 and
denied that his proposed bill was an attempt to "pack" the Court with
"spineless puppets who would disregard the law and would decide specific
cases as I wished them to be decided."' He concluded by reiterating his

Id. at 119. He made the same point regarding other national problems such as

flood and drought control, the generation of electrical power, and aid to farmers. Id. at

117, 120.
Id. at 121.
267

This second address also happened to be the first fireside chat of his second term.

Id. at 122. The address is published in id. at 122-33.
Said Roosevelt:
The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial function has improperly
set itself up as a third House of the Congress-a super-legislature, as one of the
justices has called it-reading into the Constitution words and implications which
are not there, and which were never intended to be there.
We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take action
to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.... We want a

Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution-not over it. In our
Courts we want a government of laws and not of men.
Id. at 126. Rauh recalled that the sentence about saving "the Constitution from the

Court and the Court from itself' was Cohen's. Interview with Joseph L. Rauh, supra

note 216.
269

270

6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at 130-33.
Id. at 129. Roosevelt continued,

But if by that phrase ["packing the court"] the charge is made that I would
appoint and the Senate would confirm Justices worthy to sit beside present members of the Court who understand those modern conditions, that I will appoint
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purpose:
During the past half century the balance of power between
the three great branches of the Federal Government has been
tipped out of balance by the Courts in direct contradiction of
the high purposes of the framers of the Constitution. It is my
purpose to restore that balance. You who know me will
accept my solemn assurance that in a world in which democracy is under attack, I seek to make American democracy
succeed. You and I will do our part. 7'
Despite the effort represented by Roosevelt's two addresses, "there were

no signs that the speeches had changed the situation in any important fashion."272 Jackson later admitted that none of the speeches made during the
course of the fight did much to convince people to change their minds on
the proposal. 73
On the night of the Democratic Victory Dinner in Washington, Assistant
Attorney General Jackson was in Rochester, New York, where he was the

featured speaker at the local Democratic Victory Dinner. 74 While the
Justices who will not undertake to override the judgment of the Congress on legislative policy, that I will appoint Justices who will act as Justices and not as legislators-if the appointment of such Justices can be called "packing the Courts,"
then I say that I and with me the vast majority of the American people favor
doing just that thing-now.
Id.
271 Id. at 133. The statement about doing "our part" could have been a sly and ironic-or even unconscious-reference to the Court-nullified National Recovery Administration, whose slogan had been, "We Do Our Part."
272 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 113.
273 Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 444-45. Presumably, this opinion ex-

tended to Jackson's own speeches, as well.
On the other hand, Ickes believed that Roosevelt's Democratic Victory Dinner
address was "the greatest he has ever made, and I think that it will go down in history
as one of the outstanding speeches delivered by an American statesman." 2 ICKES,
supra note 109, at 88. Cummings was equally effusive in his praise for this speech,
calling it "gorgeous" and "tremendously effective." Cummings Diary, supra note 78
(Mar. 4, 1937). Historian Kenneth Davis's assessment of the speech corroborates the
observations of Ickes and Cummings: "[It] was among the very best of his fighting
speeches, and his delivery of it ...was superb." KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE
STORM, 1937-1940, A HISTORY 73 (1993).
Ickes believed the fireside chat was "very effective," although "it didn't rank with
the Victory Dinner effort." 2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 95. Davis agrees with the assessment of Jackson, Alsop and Catledge, and, indeed, with history itself, that
Roosevelt's public appeals on the court plan very "surprisingly ...failed to work."
DAVIS, supra, at 75.
274 Democrats Told Court Bars Trend, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle (N.Y.),

1997]

LOYAL LIEUTENANT, ABLE ADVOCATE

Washington dinner of that evening featured Roosevelt and cost one hundred
dollars per plate, the Rochester dinner provided merely a live broadcast of
the President's remarks. 275 For the price of the Rochester dinner (a mere
twenty-five dollars per plate), however, the diners had the opportunity to
hear Jackson praise Roosevelt and his proposed court reforms and upbraid
both the Republicans and the Supreme Court for their alleged transgressions. 6
Jackson told the assembled faithful that the massive Democratic victory
in November was a rebuke to the opposition press, to big business, to the
bar associations, and to the Supreme Court, all of whom had asserted that
Roosevelt "was not regardful of the Constitution." 2' Then, he sounded
two of the themes that he would repeat, at greater length, during his Senate
Judiciary Committee appearance the following week.27 First, Jackson reminded his audience that strong chief executives, such as Andrew Jackson,
Abraham Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt, had encountered problems with
the Supreme Courts of their day. 279 He suggested that Roosevelt's criticism
of the current Court was, by comparison, mild. 2 ' Next, Jackson touched
upon the theme of states' rights."' He criticized the fact that the Tenth
Amendment issue of "states' rights" had been raised in lawsuits challenging
New Deal legislation not by the states themselves but by "private interests
who use them to create a no man's land where they escape all govern,, 2
ment.
The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle correctly inferred that the
speeches by Jackson and Roosevelt "indicated that the ruling party was
unleashing an organized campaign to vindicate its leader's program of court
changes. ' " The Assistant Attorney General, who, until this time, was a
relatively minor, behind-the-scenes participant in the court fight, had now
stepped onto the national stage. During the month of March 1937, he would
become one of the administration's leading spokesmen in the debate, delivering a total of five speeches' (including the Rochester address) and giv-

Mar. 5, 1937, at 21 [hereinafter Democrats Told].
Id.
Id.
277 Id.
275

276

See infra Part IV.
9 Democrats Told, supra note 274, at 21.

278

2W Id.
281
282

Id.
Id.

•283 Id.

Gerhart incorrectly reports that Jackson made only two speeches, both in New
York City, during the course of the court fight. GERHART, supra note 1, at 114. Although Jackson did give the two New York speeches to which Gerhart refers, he also
made speeches in Boston and Pittsburgh, as well as the Rochester address. See infra
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ing important Senate testimony in favor of Roosevelt's plan.
IV. THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS
In response to a call from Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman

Ashurst, Robert Jackson agreed to appear before the Committee as the
administration's second witness in favor of the proposed judiciary bill."
Jackson's appearance would follow, by one day, the lead-off appearance by
the Attorney General. As discussed above,286 Jackson went to the White
House in order to clear the appearance with the President.287 According to
Jackson, Roosevelt gave his approval, even though Jackson candidly told the
President that he could not support the original old-age and over-worked
grounds for the plan 8 and that his testimony therefore might differ from
that of the Attorney General. 9 Jackson later recalled that Roosevelt
thought that this difference "didn't matter and that I should go and give the
plan whatever support I could.""29

Jackson discussed his testimony with Cohen, Corcoran, Oliphant, "and
some of the younger men in my own [Jackson's] organization." 29' Although his testimony was not submitted to the White House or to the Attorney General for pre-clearance,292 one might reasonably assume that the
blessings of Cohen and Corcoran carried great weight at the White House
(although, probably not at the Department of Justice).293 Jackson's testimony was the extent of his involvement with the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings: he neither aided anyone else in preparing Senate testimony nor
solicited others to testify before the Committee.'
The Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on the bill to reorganize the
federal judiciary opened on March 10, 1937. The first and only witness that
day was Attorney General Homer Cummings.
The Attorney General began his testimony by laying out the "four pillars" upon which, he claimed, the court bill rested: the "reckless use of
injunctions" against the operation of federal laws, the presence of "aged or

Part V.
285 Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 114; see also supra text accompanying
note 252.
286 See supra text accompanying note 252.
17 Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 115.
288

Id. at 115-16.

"-9 Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 437-38.
Id. at 438.
291 Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 118; Jackson Reminiscences, supra
290

note 111, at 440.
292 Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 118.
293 As to Cumming's jealousy of Cohen and Corcoran, see supra note 109.
294 Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 118.
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infirm judges" on the federal bench, the "crowded condition of the Federal
docket" with its concomitant delays in the lower courts and heavy burden
upon the Supreme Court, and the need for "an effective system for the infusion of new blood into the judiciary. ' It was clear that Cummings was
sticking to the emphasis upon old-age and over-work as justification for the
legislation. Indeed, early in his testimony, he cited statistics (at length) in an
effort to make these grounds appear credible.296 Still, in discussing the
need for "new blood" in the judiciary, Cummings came close to admitting
the real reason for the plan:2' "We are facing not a constitutional crisis
29 The legislation was not designed to "enslav[e]" the
but a judicial crisis.""
judiciary but merely "to rejuvenate the judicial machinery, to speed justice,
and to give the courts men of fresh outlook who will refrain from infringing
upon the powers of Congress." 2' Cummings rejected the claim that the
Court could be "packed" or that the President was in some way seeking
dictatorial powers." Finally, he firmly rejected any resort to a constitutional amendment as a solution to the problem for three reasons: first, the
proposed legislation was itself constitutional and necessitated no amendment; second, any amendment would be difficult to draft and might become
tied-up indefinitely in the ratification process; third, any amendment would
be subject to construction "by the same judges who have brought us to our
present pass. 30 '
After reading his statement, Cummings answered the committee
members' questions. A significant amount of the questioning was hostile.
Cummings was on the defensive much of the time on such matters as a
constitutional amendment" and the over-worked judges rationale.3 3 The
committee forced him to admit that, should the new appointees turn out to
be conservative in judicial philosophy, "we would be just where we are
now.)'
Cummings, however, consistently denied that the bill represented
an attempt to subvert the independence of the judiciary:3 5 "I do not want
a subservient judiciary. Nobody wants a subservient judiciary. We want an
independent judiciary, but we want a judiciary that will permit the country

Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1937) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Homer S. Cummings).
296 Id. at 5-7.
295

297 Id. at 8-11.
299

Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.

3

Id. at 11-12.

291

Id. at 12.
See id. at 13, 15-18, 21-25, 30.
See id. at 25-29.
Id. at 14. He also conceded that there were no absolute guarantees that this would
not come to pass. Id. at 30.
Io at 24, 31.
Id.
30'
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to move." 3" Cummings also expressed his insouciance regarding whether
the adoption of the President's plan would establish a precedent that could
be seized upon in the future by a conservative administration: "I am not so
much worried about precedents as I am about the present situation. I think
let future generations deal with their own problems in their own
we should
way . , , °
Cummings's committee appearance seems, at best, to have had very
limited success. He stuck to his increasingly discredited and disingenuous
rationale for the proposal, and he came under a barrage of hostile questioning. Kenneth Davis has concluded that many Senators "were angered, [and]
few [were] persuaded" by Cummings's testimony. 0 a There would be
markedly less hostility during Jackson's appearance the next day.
Jackson began his prepared statement by telling the Committee members
that his approach would be "a little different" from that of the Attorney
General.3 M Whereas Cummings had asserted that the Justices' advanced
ages and crushing case loads necessitated the legislation, Jackson cut to
what he saw as the heart of the matter: the judicial crisis stemmed from the
Court's assumption of a judicial veto over state and federal legislation and
from the serious division among the Justices, which impaired both the
Court's ability to function and its prestige.310
Jackson continued by noting that the Constitution grants to the legislative and executive branches significant responsibility for the Supreme
Court's operation: Congress determines the size and the jurisdiction of the
Court, the President and the Senate determine the Court's personnel, and
Congress and the President are responsible for carrying out the tribunal's
judgments and decrees. 31' Because the Constitution grants to Congress
"such conclusive powers over jurisdiction.., of the Court, and over appointment and behavior of its personnel, it is idle to contend ... that it was
the Supreme Court should become a
ever intended 31that
' 2
,
supergovernment.
Jackson next engaged in an extended analysis of the six occasions on
which Congress had altered the Supreme Court's size.313 He defended the

306
307

Id. at 31.
Id. at 35.

supra note 273, at 75.
Hearings,supra note 295, at 37 (statement of Robert H. Jackson).
310 See generally id. at 37-51.
311 Id. at 38-39.
312 Id. at 39.
13 Id. at 40-41. Actually, according to Jackson's testimony, there were seven instances when Congress changed the size of the Court (although the first instance appears to
have been unsuccessful): (1) in 1801, there was an attempt to reduce the size from six
to five; (2) in 1802, the size was restored to six; (3) in 1807, the size was increased to
seven; (4) in 1837, the size was increased to nine; (5) in 1863, the size was increased to
308

309

DAVIS,
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use of such changes in size "as a method of bringing the elective and non'
elective branches of the Government back into a proper coordination."3 14
"Changing the size of the Court has never deprived it of independence or
prestige," Jackson asserted.315 "It is just as constitutional to add members
to keep the Court up with the country as it is to add members to keep the
Court up with its business," he declared.316
Jackson went into greater detail than had his boss in attempting to explain why the administration's proposed bill was preferable to a constitutional amendment.3 17 Jackson, perhaps having taken a lesson from
Cummings's rather unsatisfactory experience before the committee, declared
that while he was not necessarily opposed to a constitutional amendment in
this matter, there were problems inhering in the amendment solution.3"'
Any amendment would be subject to interpretation, the effect of which
would be impossible to predict at the time of its drafting.3"9 Moreover, the
current crisis had arisen not over a single decision of the Court but, rather,
over a series of its decisions which indicated a certain mind-set on the part
of the Court's majority." "You cannot," said Jackson, "amend a state of
mind and mental attitude of hostility to exercise of governmental power and
of indifference to the demands which democracy attempting to survive in32 "Judges who resort to a tordustrialism makes upon its Government.""
tured construction of the Constitution may torture an amendment," he asserted.

322

Jackson next propounded the view that judicial power over federal legislation increasingly was assuming the nature of a veto.3 23 "The outstanding
development in recent constitutional history is the growing frequency with
which the Supreme Court refuses to enforce the acts of Congress on the
ground that such acts are beyond the constitutional powers of the Congress. 3' He produced a table to back this' claim. This table showed, by
ten; (6) in 1866, the size was decreased to eight; and, (7) in 1869, the size was again
increased to nine. Id.
314 Id. at 40.
315

Id.

Id. The previous day, Cummings briefly discussed the fact that the Court's size
had changed six times over the course of the nation's history, thus implying that
Roosevelt's proposal was neither an unprecedented nor a dangerous move. Id. at 11.
Jackson's statement on this point nicely implied the difference between his and the
Attorney General's rationale.
311 Compare id. at 42-43, with id. at 12.
318 Id. at 42.
319 Id. at 42-43.
320Id. at 43.
316

321

Id.

322 Id.

323Id.
324

Id.
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decade, the number of congressional acts held unconstitutional by the Court,
and it demonstrated that the rate of invalidation had accelerated and become
particularly marked during the New Deal, with the result that "[n]early every newly organized institution of the Government rests today under a legal
cloud."3" The earlier presumption of the constitutional validity of legislative enactments had been subtly transformed by the Court, and the power of
judicial review inexorably was being transformed into "a veto power over
legislation" 3 -a veto which, in contrast to that of the executive, could not
be overridden by a congressional vote.327
Jackson further asserted that the Court's increasing tendency to review
the wisdom of legislation was impairing the states' Tenth Amendment
rights.3" Had the Court allowed the states greater latitude in experimenting
with legislation to solve the social and economic problems confronting
them, there would be less need for federal action in these areas, Jackson
argued." Instead, the Court had used the Tenth Amendment to restrict
federal power, ostensibly in favor of the states, but then had proceeded to
use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "to cut down the
State power.""33 "The States have no rights which the courts have been
bound to respect," lamented Jackson; the states' rights argument "is heard
sympathetically only when pleaded by private interests in support of laissez
faire economics to create
a 'no man's land' beyond the reach of both Feder331
al and State power.,
The last major point Jackson made in his prepared statement was that
the Court's serious internal division necessitated the addition of new members in order to restore the Court's impaired functioning and prestige.332
Even though a conservative majority on the Court was in "implacable, although unquestionably sincere, opposition to the use of national power to
' neiaccomplish the policies so overwhelmingly endorsed by the voters,"333
ther Congress nor the President "in any manner sought to interfere with the
judicial function ... [nor] failed to obey any decision of the Court."3
Id. at 43-44. Jackson ignored the possibility that the increase in the number of
laws invalidated by the Court during the New Deal might have been, at least in part, a
result of an increase in the number of hastily and sloppily drafted statutes which Congress had passed at the administration's behest.
326 Id. at 45.
327

Id. at 44-45.

328Id. at 45-47.
329 Id. at 47.
330

Id.

331 Id.
Jackson's use here of the term "no man's land" echoed Roosevelt's use of the
same phrase during the Victory Dinner speech at the Mayflower the previous week. See

supra text accompanying note 264.
332 Hearings,supra note 295,
at 47.
333Id. at 48.
3M Id. at 47-48.
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The fate of governmental policy should not, he opined, turn on the vote of a
single Supreme Court Justice: "A state of the law which depends upon the
continuance of a single life or upon the assumption that no Justice will
change his mind is not a satisfactory basis on which the Government may
enter into new fields for the exercise of its power. ' 35 Furthermore, "there
is a serious lag between public opinion and the decisions of the Court," and
"sooner or later" every extremely controversial decision of the Court had

been overturned, either by war, by amendment, or by the Court's own decision.336 Jackson noted that even the current Supreme Court could reverse
itself, as had its predecessors.337 Nevertheless, he asserted, the Court's
slavish devotion to precedent and unduly restrictive interpretations of the

Constitution's General Welfare, Due Process, and Interstate Commerce
Clauses had made the likelihood of such a reversal doubtful, given the
Court's current composition.33 The addition of new members to the Court

Jackson's explicit refusal to question the sincerity of the conservative majority is
noteworthy. He later recalled that his testimony made "no attack on the integrity of the
court." Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 440.
In fact, the problem of the court was not lack of integrity, but was its stubborn
integrity in adhering to views which it honestly entertained. I had no feeling that
the four judges who were being described as the "four horsemen" were anything
but passionately sincere men. I had no personal grievance against the court. It had
treated me very well in the appearances I had made before it.
Id.
During his combined tenure as chief of the tax and antitrust divisions of the Justice
Department, Jackson successfully argued seven cases before the Supreme Court. These
were: McCaughn v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 297 U.S. 606 (1936); Landis v.
North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937);
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); and Electric
Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
115 Hearings, supra note 295, at 48. Once again, Jackson supported
his statements
with evidence in the form of a table showing "the persistent and dramatic split among
the Justices" with respect to the constitutionality of state and federal social and economic legislation enacted during the course of the New Deal. Id. at 48-49.
The "single life" to which Jackson referred was, doubtless, that of Justice Roberts,
who had become the swing vote against key New Deal legislation during the Court's
most recent terms. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
336 Hearings, supra note 292, at 50. For example, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), was overturned by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution, and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was overturned
by both the results of the Civil War and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
more recent example of this phenomenon is the case of Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), which effectively overruled the Court's earlier decision in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3" Hearings,supra note 295, at 50.
338 Id. at 50-51. The Court soon did reverse its course without the addition of any
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would help to ensure that "the Court could proceed to mark out a less ambitious course for itself" through the exercise of greater judicial restraint and
deference to legislative judgment, which would result in "greater harmony
339
within the Government.,
The Committee's questioning of Jackson, which immediately followed
his presentation, was less hostile than that which Cummings had encountered on the previous day. Democratic Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming, an eventual foe of the plan, began the substantive interrogation of
Jackson by complimenting the Assistant Attorney General on his presentation." O'Mahoney then secured an admission from Jackson that the
administration's bill could not guarantee the elimination of closely split
decisions by the Court, though Jackson rejoined that the bill would make
such decisions less likely "by bringing to the Court Justices who will have a
viewpoint much more nearly that of modern times."" Jackson also was
forced to admit that the proposed legislation did nothing to prevent the
Court from overruling acts of Congress and that, if Congress or the President desired such a result, "some other method" would have to be used.4 2
Jackson freely conceded that the bill contained nothing to prevent pursuit of
a relevant constitutional amendment and that he personally had no objection
to such an amendment as long as the administration's bill was not held up
during the amendment process. 43
As the committee's interrogation proceeded, Jackson disagreed with
Nevada Senator Pat McCarran's implication that the addition of six new
pro-administration Justices would undermine the public's confidence in the
Supreme Court's independence." Later, under questioning about his
views on states' rights and the Tenth Amendment, Jackson conceded "the
right of the people to create a 'no man's land,"' but questioned "the right to
create it by judicial construction."' 5 A question from Senator Edward
Burke, a Democrat from Nebraska and an opponent of the legislation, forced
Jackson to explain a view that he had first espoused in his New York Bar

new members, but Jackson would have had to have been clairvoyant to have foreseen
such a shift.
139 Id. at 51.
340 Id. at 52. O'Mahoney stated that Jackson "should be very much complimented
upon the presentation which he has made here this morning. As an analysis of the activities of the Court in usurping legislative functions, I think it would be difficult to imagine a better statement of the facts." Id.
341

Id.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 53, 60. Jackson quickly added that he was speaking only for himself on this
I3
point and not "for anyone connected with the administration, or even with the Department of Justice." Id. at 53.
342

344Id. at 54.
345 Id.

at 57.
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Association speech in January. 6 Jackson said, "I do not advocate and
never have advocated putting laymen on the Supreme Court. I have merely
pointed out that the Constitution of the United States does not restrict that
tribunal exclusively to lawyers.,1 7 Further, in response to a related question from Democratic Senator William King, Jackson denied that he made
any recommendation that the number of Supreme Court Justices or federal
judges be increased; according to Jackson: "It was never my province to
make such recommendations."' s
The Assistant Attorney General tried, with mixed success, to dodge a
number of attempts to force him to contradict the Attorney General on the
issue of the Supreme Court's workload. In his statement, Jackson, unlike
Cummings, had been silent on the issue of whether the number of denials of
writs of certiorari were evidence of an overwhelming burden on the Supreme Court and whether the number of writs denied constituted an adequate justification for an increase in the Court's size. Senator William
Dieterich, an Illinois Democrat and a supporter of the plan, asked Jackson
why he had not discussed the important issue of "whether the Supreme
Court and the Federal courts are sufficient in number to properly transact
the business before them?" 9 Perhaps Dieterich's question was designed to
let Jackson glide quickly over this sensitive matter, for Jackson's response
was that Cummings had covered the matter the day before, and "I am trying
35 In light of
to avoid duplication.""
Jackson's distaste for the over-worked
rationale, this reply seems less than candid. However, given the fact that this
rationale was originally asserted by the administration at the insistence of
Jackson's chief, Jackson's answer was an attempt to be suitably diplomatic.
But Senator Burke would not let Jackson off so easily. Burke persisted
in pressing Jackson on the old-age and over-worked rationale, forcing Jackson to adhere, somewhat cryptically ,and uncomfortably, to the
administration's line."' Continuing to beat this dead horse, Senator Warren
Austin, a Republican from Vermont, secured a concession from Jackson that
the Court, in exercising its discretion over the granting of writs of certiorari,
had attempted to do so fairly, in spite of its "rather unfettered discretion" in
this realm.352 When Senators Austin and Burke persisted,353 Jackson refused to concede any further points, particularly avoiding Burke's attempt to

36

Burke asked Jackson, "Do you feel that men who have had no training in the law

are qualified to sit upon the Supreme Court?" Id. at 57.
" Id. at 58; see supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text (discussing Jackson's

speech and the issue of nonlawyer Justices).
348 Hearings,supra note 295, at 60.
349
350

Id. at 59.
Id.

351

Id.
Id. at 60.

352

353

Id. at 60-62.
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characterize his answers as "tak[ing] away some of the force of the argu'
In the final analment of the distinguished Attorney General yesterday."354
ysis, the Assistant Attorney General was reasonably successful at avoiding
any significant conflict with his boss.
In additional verbal sparring with the Committee, Jackson deflected a
potentially damaging admission and attempted to turn it into a source of
strength. Texas Senator Tom Connally, another Democratic opponent of the
plan, tried to force Jackson to admit that the success of the plan "depends
on the kind of judges you are going to appoint under this new authori' Jackson responded, "We do not ask judges to commit themselves to
ty."355
us ....

I am willing to take the adverse decision of an open-minded judge

'
Immediately after the Connally-Jackson exchange, Comat any time."356
mittee Chairman Ashurst and Senator Dieterich jumped in to bolster Jackson
on the point that he merely desired six open-minded Justices from a younger
generation.357 Connally's tenacity in pursuing his point was matched both

114

Id. at 61.

...Id. at 62. Connally had had a lengthy exchange with Cummings on this point the
at 30day before, and the Senator appears to have bested the Attorney General. See id.
32.
356 Id. at 62. Connally's further pressing of his point resulted in the following exchange:
SENATOR CONNALLY: ...After all, whether this plan works or not will

depend upon the men who are selected.
MR. JACKSON: That is very largely true.
SENATOR CONNALLY: Is it not absolutely true?
MR. JACKSON: Yes; I think it is fair to say that it is absolutely true that it
will depend on the men appointed.
SENATOR CONNALLY: .. . [I]f we get six judges whose views on the
powers conferred by the Constitution are our way, then we can change the judicial interpretation or construction and get a favorable construction where we now
may get an unfavorable construction. Is not that true?
MR. JACKSON: Yes; in substance.
SENATOR CONNALLY: Is not that the purpose of it?
MR. JACKSON: If the Constitution is what the judges say it is, then we
should have something to say about who the judges are.
SENATOR CONNALLY: The thing that interests you is that the Court, as
now constituted, does not construe the Constitution like you think it should be
construed, and you believe by getting six new judges they might construe it in the
way it should be done.
MR. JACKSON: I think one of two things would happen. They would either
construe it as I think it should be construed, or I would know that fair judges of
my generation think I am wrong.
Id. at 62-63.
...Id. at 63. Ashurst asserted that Jackson's position was "that the Supreme Court
should not be ignorant of or blind to that which is transpiring in the world today," id.,
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by Jackson's refusal to duck the issue regarding the nature of potential court
appointments and by Jackson's skill in parrying Connally's verbal thrusts.
Thus, Jackson's appearance before the Committee ended on a positive
note, and he emerged relatively unscathed from the hearings. By maintaining
his poise, charm, and wit under fire, Jackson played his position more successfully than had Cummings the day before. In comparing the tenor of
Cummings's appearance with that of Jackson's, Warner Gardner stated that
"the Cummings statement, directed exclusively to the unfair burden cast on
these aged men, was a smoothly crafted bit of hokum, while the Jackson
statement, which never mentioned over-work but only judicial tyranny, was
a brilliantly effective demonstration of what the matter was really
about.""35 Historian Kenneth Davis opined that Jackson "undid some of the
damage [caused by Cummings the day before] with a powerful argument
frankly couched in terms of 'the real mischief."'359 Jackson's testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee represented the most effective advocacy of the administration's position.
Reaction to Jackson's appearance poured in during the following days.
Predictably, he received a number of letters of congratulation from both
congressional and administration figures involved in the fight. Immediately
after his appearance, Committee Chairman Ashurst sent Jackson a handwritten note which heartily congratulated the Assistant Attorney General on his
"superb argument. ' ' O The bill's House sponsor, Maury Maverick, commended Jackson, saying that his "was by far the best testimony that has
been given on the question of the Supreme Court ....You faced the issue
honestly and squarely-and did it in a very pleasant way." 36' Democratic
Senator Key Pittman of Nevada also sent his compliments, 2 and Senator
Claude Pepper, the staunch New Deal Democrat from Florida, asked Jackson for a copy of his statement for personal use. 3 Even Senator Arthur
Capper, a Kansas Republican who opposed the legislation, congratulated
Jackson on his presentation, writing that "I am on the other side of the question but I feel like telling you that you made a remarkably strong statement

and Dieterich reiterated that "[t]he purpose is to get open, fair-minded, qualified men
who will use their own judgment and independence in determining the constitutionality
of acts that may be passed by this Congress." Id.
38 Gardner, supra note 97, at 102.
359DAVIS, supra note 273, at 76.
3'
Letter from Senator Henry Ashurst to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 11, 1937) (Robert
H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress).
361 Letter from Representative Maury Maverick to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 12, 1937)
(Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
362 Letter from Senator Key Pittman to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 11, 1937) (Robert H.
Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
363 Letter from Senator Claude Pepper to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 16, 1937) (Robert
H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
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from your standpoint. I have heard many similar comments from others,
therefore, I venture to offer my congratulations. '
Administration officials proved at least as complimentary. Attorney
General Cummings wrote to Jackson immediately after the appearance,
noting that "I continue to hear fine reports of the splendid manner in which
you performed today. Your friends are very proud of you.""36 On the same
day, Cummings confided in his diary that "Assistant Attorney General Jackson appeared today before the Committee and made a very forceful state' Cummings gave no indication that he
ment and a profound impression."366
found Jackson's testimony contradictory to his own or that he was displeased with anything that Jackson said to the Committee. Democratic Party
stalwart Postmaster General Jim Farley also sent Jackson his congratulations
on "a splendid job., 367 Former National Recovery Administration Board
Chairman Donald Richberg told Jackson,

I have heard in many different places and from people not
altogether friendly that you made a very effective presentation, both in its content and in your manner of handling the

subject.
When a man is given a tough assignment, I think he is
entitled to hear from as many people as possible that he did
a good job, because he is sure to get plenty of criticism from
those who disagree with him.368
The Assistant Attorney General did "get plenty of criticism from those
who disagree[d] with him. 3 69 An individual from Buffalo, New York

'64 Letter from Senator Arthur Capper to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 16, 1937) (Robert
H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress). At the bottom of the typed letter,
Capper added, by hand, the following notation: "But I am still opposed to the increase
to 15 judges." Id.
Two days later, Jackson replied, saying that he appreciated Capper's letter "very
much." "The fact that you are not in agreement with my viewpoint," Jackson continued,
"does not detract in the least from the pleasure I received from your congratulations.
Regardless of how our views may conflict, I value your good opinion highly." Letter
from Robert H. Jackson to Senator Arthur Capper (Mar. 18, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson
Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
365 Letter from Attorney General Homer S. Cummings to Robert H. Jackson (Mar.
11, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
361 Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Mar. 11, 1937).
367 Letter from Postmaster General James Farley to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 12,
1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
36' Letter from Donald Richberg, former chairman of the NRA board, to Robert H.
Jackson (Mar. 25, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
369 Id.
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wrote that he would "far rather rely on the judgment of the 'nine old men'
than on that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jim Farley, your esteemed Chief
[Cummings] or yourself-or all of you. 3 7 Another man angrily informed
Jackson that
Mr. Roosevelt is trying to put something over on the
people. They did not ask for, and they do no want, his reforms. I defy him to put it to a national vote and I'll bet you
$100 that such a vote won't disclose that the people want his
court reforms. He is merely trying to cram something down
their throats, which is a type of Americanism worthy of such
characters as Benedict Arbold [sic] of the Revolution. THE
ON THE LEVEL. NEVER WAS.
NEW DEAL IS NOT
3 71
BE!
WILL
NEVER
Still, at the end of the month, Johnston Avery, the office manager of
Jackson's Antitrust Division, was able to inform his boss that the letters
received in response to Jackson's Senate appearance were running approximately twelve-to-one in favor of Roosevelt's plan.372
Further evidence of the positive reception and effects of Jackson's Senate Judiciary Committee testimony came from Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture. Years later, Wallace recalled that "the best argument for
the legislation was that put out by Robert Jackson ....He put out a beautiful argument. 3 73 Although Wallace would have preferred a constitutional
amendment to a mere change in the Court's personnel, he "supported the
President in the approach which he took, for loyalty reasons, and because
Solicitor General [sic] Robert Jackson had convinced [Wallace] to some
'
At first doubtful
extent by his presentation that it was a good approach. 374

Letter from J.B. McCreary to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 13, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
371 Letter from Thomas Elder to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 13, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress).
" Memorandum from Johnston Avery, office manager of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, to Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 28, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers,
Box 79, Library of Congress). Avery did note, though, that he had not "catalogue[d] the
crank letters." Id. One might well wonder just what constituted a "crank" letter in
Avery's mind-and whether the inclusion of such letters in Avery's tabulation would
have altered significantly the tally that he reported to Jackson.
3
" Reminiscences of Henry A. Wallace 461 (1951) (Oral History Collection of Columbia University).
370

"" Id. at 469. Wallace erroneously believed Jackson was the Solicitor General at the
time of the court fight. Stanley Reed held that position at that time; Jackson was not
confirmed as Reed's successor until March 1938, after Reed was appointed to the Supreme Court. See GERHART, supra note 1, at. 142-43.
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of the President's plan, Wallace found Jackson's arguments "so convincing
that I [Wallace] became quite sold on it and went down to Richmond, Vir'
ginia, and made a speech for it which was broadcast."375
Jackson's Senate appearance-indeed, all of Jackson's efforts in favor of
the court plan-was something more than a mere political act: as Wallace's
response indicates, Jackson's efforts were those of a capable advocate. Jackson was acting much as any skillful lawyer would act on behalf of a client.
In this particular matter, the client happened to be the Roosevelt administration.
Press coverage of Jackson's appearance before the Judiciary Committee
was widespread, and the reaction was largely favorable, even from some
newspapers which opposed the plan.376 Writing in the New York HeraldTribune, Joseph Alsop was complimentary:
Mr. Jackson's presentation of the Administration side in the
court controversy was both one of the ablest and most eloquent made to date, and the frankest in its statement of the
plan's basic aims. He spoke without equivocation of the
court's conservative majority's "implacable opposition to the
use of national power so overwhelmingly indorsed by the
voters" and made it clear that from his point of view the
main object of the President's court plan was to overcome
that opposition.377
3" Reminiscences of Henry A. Wallace, supra note 373, at 461.
376

The nation's daily newspapers generally opposed Roosevelt's court plan.

GRAHAM

FDR AND THE PRESS 91 (1979). Such major dailies as the New York Times,
the New York Herald-Tribune,the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, the Baltimore
Sun, the PhiladelphiaInquirer, the New York Sun, and the Washington Star all opposed
the proposal. Id. at 76-77 tbl. 1; Editorial, EditorialComment From Nation's Press on
Roosevelt Plan to Enlarge Supreme Court, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Feb. 10, 1937, at 10
[hereinafter Editorial Comment]; The Court Fight, WASH. STAR, Feb. 9, 1937; Not a
Partisan Issue, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 10, 1937. For a discussion of the New York Times's
editorial opposition, see supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
The opposition of the influential New York Times must have been particularly unpleasant for the administration, because the Times-unlike the New York Sun, the Chicago Tribune, and the Baltimore Sun-had supported the Democrats in the 1936 election. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 633-35 (1960);
WHITE, supra, at 76-77 tbl. 1. The PhiladelphiaRecord was virtually alone among the
major dailies discussed in this Article in its general support for Roosevelt's proposal to
increase the size of the Supreme Court. See Editorial Comment, supra, at 10.
"' Joseph Alsop, Jr., Congress's Duty to Keep Court "Up with Country," Senate
Hearing Is Told, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Mar. 12, 1937, at 1. In The 168 Days, his book
about the court fight published the following year, Alsop, writing with Turner Catledge,
was even stronger in his praise of Jackson's appearance, calling the presentation "the
most convincing defense of the bill offered during the whole court fight." ALSOP &
J. WHITE,

LOYAL LIEUTENANT, ABLE ADVOCATE

19971

In a column that was generally hostile to the plan, G. Gould Lincoln
also took a favorable view of Jackson's effectiveness, commenting that
Jackson "presented the most convincing statement that has yet been ad37 One revanced in any quarter in support of the President's court bill.""
porter noted that "it's even suggested that the young upstate New York
lawyer made out a more convincing case for the plan than his White House
'
boss himself."379

Other reporters also were laudatory. Robert S. Allen of the Philadelphia
Record reported that Jackson's "scintillating argument... drew open expressions of admiration from opposition members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee."' "So penetrating and conclusive was Jackson's presentation," continued Allen, "that the opposition sharpshooters displayed reluctance to badger him. It was apparent from their attitude that they felt they
had run up against an adversary who was too much for them. '381 Writing
for the New York Times, Turner Catledge observed that during the questioning following his statement, Jackson "rode calmly through the barrage, never conceding more than minor points to the opposition. 31 2 "Open clashes
which marked Attorney General Cummings' Wednesday brush with the
opposition were lacking, as the witness, adopting a conciliatory attitude,
parried questions lightly," reported Robert Albright in the Washington
383

Post.

Not all of the coverage was complimentary, for Jackson had not succeeded in charming all of the opposition press. Chesley Manly of the Chicago Tribune reported that Jackson had told the Senate Judiciary Committee
"that the Supreme Court must be 'brought into line with the people"' and
that this suggestion "supported the thesis of opposition senators that [the
court bill] will clear the road for dictatorship. ''31 Writing in the Philadelphia Inquirer, William Murphy characterized the Committee's response to
Jackson's testimony as "amazed" and theorized that the members "were

CATLEDGE,

supra note 82, at 123. Reflecting late in his life, Alsop remembered the

court fight as "the greatest single political drama I have witnessed in Washington in
over half a century of reporting." JOSEPH W. ALSOP & ADAM PLATT, "I'VE SEEN THE
BEST OF IT": MEMOIRS 115 (1992).
378 G. Gould Lincoln, The PoliticalMill, WASH. EVENING STAR, Mar. 12, 1937.
179

Frank W. Wile, WASH. EVENING STAR, Mar. 15, 1937.

"

Robert S. Allen, Jackson Refutes "Dangers" in Court Reform, PHILADELPHIA

REC., Mar. 12, 1937, at 1.
381

Id.

382 Turner Catledge, Jackson Urges Congress End Supreme Court Veto on Economic

Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1937, at 1.
38 Robert C. Albright, Supreme Court Majority Called Hostile, States Right Opposition Assailed at Hearing of Senate, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1937, at 1.
'" Chesley Manly, Tells of Hopes for High Court Change in View, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Mar. 12, 1937, at 1.
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caught so much off balance that opponents of the Roosevelt bill were unprepared to question Jackson as vigorously as had been anticipated.""3 5 In an
editorial, the New York Herald-Tribune, although acknowledging that
Jackson's pleas were "frank and calm and reasoned" and agreeing that there
was "nothing sacrosanct about" the Court's membership, took exception to
"[t]he idea that a majority of the [C]ourt [has] become increasingly conservative and [has] stretched their findings and the Constitution to halt the New
Deal. 38 6 Instead, the Herald-Tribune saw the problem resting not with any
"hardening of judicial arteries, but [with] the megalomania of a revolutionary administration," and it rhetorically asked how, "[u]nder Mr. Roosevelt,

hot for change and avid for power,.., could such a packing be anything
but fatal? 38 7 The Philadelphia Inquirer disdainfully opined that Jackson
and Cummings "added little of constructive merit to the momentous debate
' And the
when they appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee."388
Baltimore Sun suggested that

[i]f Mr. Jackson really means that he and his associates
would trust judicial decisions adverse to them if the majority
justices were young enough, it would appear that the class
war has shifted into a combat between youth and age, and
that, in the view of youths of 40-odd, even nonsense is acceptable if it proceeds out of the mouths of babes.8 9

Some of the most trenchant criticism of Jackson's Senate testimony
came from political pundit and columnist Walter Lippmann. Lippmann,
whose early lukewarm reaction to Franklin Roosevelt's presidential candidacy in 1932 included the now-famous judgment that the candidate was "a
pleasant man who, without any important qualifications for the office, would
very much like to be President,""39 had publicly supported Roosevelt
391
against Herbert Hoover, though "he was not happy with the choice.,
The President-elect's ideas and actions during the 1932-33 interregnum and
his decisive deeds of the First Hundred Days won Lippmann's fuller supWilliam C. Murphy, Jr., Shuffling Court Is Congress Duty, Jackson Asserts, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 12, 1937. A careful reading of the record of Jackson's appearance gives no indication that the Committee members were either "amazed" or
caught "off balance" and thus gave Jackson an easier time during the questioning.
" First Burn Down the House, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Mar. 13, 1937, at 14.
387 Id.
3

What About 8-to-7 Decisions?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 12, 1937.
Editorial, Youth Politics, BALT. SUN, Mar. 13, 1937.
390JOHN LUSKIN, LIPPMANN, LIBERTY, AND THE PRESS 94 (1972) (quoting
38
389

Lippmann).
391

RONALD STEEL, WALTER L1PPMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY

(1980).

295-96
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port, which lasted for more than two years.392
Lippmann, however, disliked "a planned society," believing it incompatible with political freedom.393 Thus, by the fall of 1935, with the Second
New Deal well under way,394 the columnist had begun to sour on Roosevelt and his programs.395 In the 1936 election, Lippmann broke ranks with
liberal colleagues and endorsed Republican candidate Alfred Landon for
President, though he admitted that the choice was merely the lesser of two
evils.396 In writing about Lippmann's ultimate perspective on the New
Deal, his biographer, Ronald Steel, states that the columnist's
qualifications about some measures and his later repudiation
of others were such that no New Dealer could have considered him a true believer. Yet his fears that a cavalier attitude
toward the law might play into the hands of an indigenous
American fascism were deeply felt and not without some
chilly European examples. Unlike many liberals, who were
willing to swallow some very questionable means to achieve
morally desirable ends, he abhorred dictatorship and demagoguery so much that he was less sensitive than he might
have been to economic injustice and inequality. He saw the
New Deal, not as a touch-and-go process of experimentation,
but as a step toward authoritarianism."
Given his increasing antipathy toward the New Deal and his support of
Landon in 1936, it should have come as no surprise that Lippmann strongly
opposed Roosevelt's court plan. Indeed, Lippmann "led the pack" in opposition. 3" Beginning in February 1937 and continuing for the next five
months, Lippmann wrote thirty-seven columns denouncing the plan, some of
which warned the reading public that if the administration succeeded in
mastering the Supreme Court, the free press would be its next target. 3" In
a June 1937 speech, Lippmann went so far as to label the court plan "a

39

Id. at 301-02, 310.
Id. at 309, 311-12. This view helps to explain Lippmann's criticism of the NRA,

whose 1935 death at the hands of the Supreme Court "was a boon in disguise" and a
relief to the administration, as far as Lippmann was concerned. Id. at 311.
3' The so-called "Second New Deal" was marked by the flurry of legislative enactments of 1935, which included the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the Public

Utilities Holding Company Act, the Wealth Tax Act, the Guffey Act, and rural electrification and banking legislation. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 150-62.
31 STEEL, supra note 391, at 315-17.
396id. at 317-19.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 319.
39 Id.
39
39

584

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:2

bloodless, deviously legalized coup d'etat."4" Although Lippmann's hostility toward the President's proposal placed him squarely within a large group
of liberal opponents, his position on this issue marked him "as an implacable reactionary in the eyes of New Deal loyalists. 40 1
In his March 16, 1937, Today and Tomorrow column, Lippmann challenged Robert Jackson's Senate testimony on a number of points. 4°
Lippmann began by conceding that Jackson was "surely one of the ablest
and most engaging" of "the younger men who have come to Washington
under President Roosevelt.,

43

Lippmann then signaled his disagreement

with the conclusion which Jackson had drawn from the fact that the Constitution makes Congress and the President responsible for maintaining the
Judiciary:4 "I cannot believe that Mr. Jackson really thinks that because
the Constitution makes Congress responsible for maintaining a judiciary, it
meant to make the judiciary responsible to Congress., 45
In fairness to Jackson, one should note that Lippmann's characterization

of Jackson's conclusion is inaccurate. Jackson never testified that the Constitution "meant to make the judiciary responsible to Congress. ''41 Instead,
Jackson had asserted that, in light of the Constitution's grant to Congress of
the power over the jurisdiction and (in conjunction with the President) the
personnel of the Supreme Court, "it is idle to contend ...

that it was ever

4
intended that the Supreme Court should become a supergovernment. 1
Jackson's assertion that there was no constitutional intent that the Supreme
Court "become a supergovernment" is not tantamount to the view that the
Constitution intended the judiciary to be "responsible to Congress." The
latter premise does not inevitably follow from the former.
Lippmann also mocked Jackson's assertion that a "state of law which
depends upon the continuance of a single life, or upon the assumption that
no justice will change his mind, is not a satisfactory basis" on which to run

the government.4 8 Jackson "wants to obviate ...

not close decisions but

decisions with which he does not agree," Lippmann rejoined.4" Jackson
had specifically responded to the grilling from Senator Connally on this
point by declaring, "I am willing to take the adverse decision of an open-

4o0

LUSKIN, supra note 390, at 105 (quoting Lippmann).
STEEL, supra note 391, at 320-21.

402

Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow: Another Official Defense, N.Y. HER-

400

ALD-TRIB., Mar. 16, 1937, at 23.
403

Id.

404

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 405.

405
416

408
409

Hearings,supra note 295, at 39; see supra text accompanying note 312.
Lippmann, supra note 402, at 23 (quoting Jackson).
Id.
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minded judge at any time."41 Lippmann failed to report fully Jackson's
testimony.on this point, but one hardly can argue with the notion that elimination of disagreeable court decisions was indeed the motivating force behind the administration's plan.
Lippmann made two additional points in connection with the "continuance of a single life" issue. First, he stated that "Jackson is living in a glass
house and should not throw stones at the Supreme Court" because so much
power depended on, and was already vested in, the life of one single individual, Franklin D. Roosevelt; thus, Jackson "ought to be a trifle embarrassed when he talks about how unsatisfactory it is that so much should
depend on one life and one opinion. ' This argument, although a bit of a
red herring, does serve to highlight Lippmann's strong antipathy not only to
the court plan but to the presidential pique that was a motivating force behind it. Second, Lippmann averred that close decisions by the Supreme
Court meant that there was reasonable doubt as to the proper interpretation
of the Constitution; the answer to such doubt was not "to pack the [C]ourt"
but instead "to submit the question to the people for a clarifying
' The wisdom of Lippmann's suggestion is debatable. If he
decision."412
meant that close constitutional questions should be put to a national vote or
otherwise be subjected to the amendment process, the impracticability of
such a suggestion is self-evident. 3
Lippmann's concluding point hit Jackson's argument at one of its most
vulnerable spots. The columnist suggested that the Assistant Attorney General was wrong to assert that conservative administrations would have no
need to pack the Supreme Court because such administrations would tend to
pass little legislation that would need protection from that tribunal. 14
Lippmann responded that conservative governments, when "aroused... can
pass more laws than Mr. Jackson can shake a stick at."4 5
[I]f liberals habituate the people to the idea that their "mandate" must be carried out rudely and ruthlessly
and-now-then still ruder and more ruthless movements
will be encouraged to carry out their mandates ever more
rudely and ruthlessly.
And then Mr. Jackson and those who think this is liberal-

412

Hearings,supra note 295, at 62; see supra text accompanying note 356.
Lippmann, supra note 402, at 23.
Id.

413

Lippmann had, for example, advocated amending the Constitution in order to

410
41

liberalize the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause. STEEL, supra note 391, at
319.
414 See Lippmann, supra note 402, at 23. Lippmann's characterization
of Jackson's
remark on this point is accurate. See Hearings, supra note 295, at 58.
415

Lippmann, supra note 402, at 23.
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ism will16 soon find that they have been hoist by their own
petard.
Clearly, one of the reasons Lippmann feared the administration's bill was
the precedent it could furnish to an unscrupulous future administration
which also desired to tamper with the make-up of the Supreme Court.
Jackson's assertion that the bill would not serve as such a precedent was
one of the most logically flawed aspects of his Committee testimony.417
Successfully packing the Court in 1937 would have served as an important
precedent. In fact, in his attempt to bolster his case, Jackson had cited the
six previous instances in which Congress had changed the size of the Supreme Court."'
A few days after his Judiciary Committee appearance, Jackson related
some of his hopes for the President's proposal, as well as some of his own
thoughts about his appearance, to his Jamestown friend, colleague, and frequent correspondent, attorney Ernest Cawcroft. "I have been much gratified
at the reception which the press, generally, has given to my effort, and the
cordial treatment that I had from members of the Committee on both sides
of the question," Jackson wrote.419 He postulated-perhaps wishfully-that
"there seems to be a breakdown of the intellectual side of the opposition,
leaving them nothing but an emotional persistence. That is indicated by the
cross examination of the Attorney General and myself, which served very
little purpose except to give us the chance to make additional speeches."4"
On the subject of liberal opposition to the court proposal, Jackson expressed confidence that "[m]ost of the liberals ...

will line up all right

eventually. As Bob LaFollette said, one of the chief benefits of the
' History was
President's plan is to find out who the liberals really are."421
to belie Jackson's confidence about the reemergence of liberal support for
the plan; the fact that a goodly number of Senate liberals remained opposed
to the plan proved fatal for the legislation.
For two weeks, the administration presented its case to the Senate Judiciary Committee, while the opposition sought to slow down the
testimony.422 Then, at a time when fewer than half of the administration's
416

Id.

It should be recalled that the committee had challenged Cummings, too, on this
issue. See supra text accompanying note 307.
418 See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
419 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Ernest Cawcroft, Esquire (Mar. 16, 1937) (Rob411

ert H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress).
420 Id.
421

42

Id.
ALsoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 124. Among the others testifying on be-

half of the legislation were political scientists Edward S. Corwin and Charles Grove
Haines, American Federation of Labor President William Green, and St. Louis Star-
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witnesses had appeared before the Committee, the opposition made the following proposal: the proponents should take another week, then give the

opponents two weeks, with the two sides thereafter alternating their presentations on a weekly basis.423 The opponents' goal was to drag out the hearings in an effort to let their side gather strength by exposing the bill as a

bald attempt by the President to secure a compliant judiciary.4" Administration aides, led by Corcoran and Keenan, refused to accept the opponents'
proposition.4" Instead, they unsuccessfully tried to persuade Committee
Chairman Ashurst to conclude the hearings quickly.4 26 When Ashurst re-

fused, telling the administration's operatives that there was nothing to fear
from full hearings,427 the administration made the tactical decision to rest
its case, even though it was incomplete, in order to avoid being trapped in a
filibuster. 4" The hearings were of minimal value to the administration, for

"[n]o new friends" were won as a result. 29'
The opposition immediately began the presentation of its case, parading
almost seventy witnesses before the Committee in a show that lasted four
weeks-twice as long as the administration's presentation.43 Senator
Wheeler led off this parade, presenting to a stunned audience a letter from
Chief Justice Hughes which convincingly refuted the administration's charges that the Court was overworked and could not keep abreast of its cas-

es.431 Hughes, who had been willing to appear in person before the Committee until Justice Brandeis opposed the idea, wrote that the addition of
more Justices actually would make the Court less efficient.432 The letter's
concluding paragraph implied that the other Justices completely agreed with
Hughes.433

Times Editor Irving Brant. BURNS, supra note 62 at 301.
423 ALsop & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 124.

"' BAKER, supra note 60, at 150-51.
Id. at 149; ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 124.
426 BAKER, supra note 60, at 152.
421

427

Id.

ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 124. Ashurst was a secret opponent of the
legislation and believed that time was its enemy. BAKER, supra note 60, at 152.
429 BAKER, supra note 60, at 149.
430 Id.
431 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 124-27; BAKER, supra note 60, at 153-59;
42

MILLER, supra note 56, at 400.
432 BAKER, supra note 60, at 153-54, 158.
433 Hughes wrote:
On account of the shortness of time I have not been able to consult- with the
members of the Court generally with respect to the foregoing statement, but I am
confident that it is in accord with the views of the justices. I should say, however,
that I have been able to consult with Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice
Brandeis, and I am at liberty to say that the statement is approved by them.
Id. at 159 (quoting Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes). The wording of this last para-
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The Hughes letter provided a great boost to the opposition. 4" Jackson
believed that the letter "pretty much turned the tide" against the President's
proposal.435 Never "within memory had a chief justice taken an active role
'
in a public controversy."436
Roosevelt was furious with Hughes, who, the
President believed, had unforgivably played politics in the matter, and had
outfoxed the administration to boot.4 37 Nothing else which transpired dur-

ing the four weeks of opposition testimony approached the Hughes letter in
either drama or impact.
V. JACKSON RETURNS TO THE STUMP

On March 17, 1937, while the administration was still presenting its
case to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Robert Jackson returned to the hustings, flying to Boston to deliver another address in favor of the bill.
Jackson's appearance at a dinner given by the Charitable Irish Society of
Boston was not planned; originally, Harold Ickes was slated to make a proadministration pitch to the group, but illness prevented his attendance.438
Also speaking that night was Martin Conboy, whom Ickes described as "an
old friend of the President's who was supposed to speak along [a]dministra' 9 Surprisingly, Conboy attacked the
tion lines."43
President's plan. '

graph may have been intended to lead observers to conclude that all of the Justices
concurred in Hughes's statements. Id. Only Brandeis and Van Devanter, however, had
been consulted about the letter beforehand; Brandeis was instrumental in helping Senator Wheeler secure it. Id. at 153-56. Baker notes that not all of the Justices fully agreed
with the content of the letter; Justice Stone later said that he opposed portions of it. Id.
at 160-62.
434 Id. at 159-60. According to Alsop and Catledge, the letter's effect "was to show
up for good and all as utterly hollow the smooth propositions with which the President
had offered his bill." ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 127.
431 Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 441.
436 MILLER, supra note 56, at 400.
431 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 127; BAKER, supra note 60, at 162; MILLER, supra note 56, at 401. Roosevelt largely had himself to blame for much of the effectiveness of the Hughes letter. According to Harold Ickes, the letter pointed up the
weakness of the original old-age and over-worked rationale for the bill, which, though
since abandoned, allowed Hughes to "fight his skirmish where we were the weakest." 2
ICKEs, supra note 109, at 104. Even Ickes admitted that the letter represented "good
tactics" on the part of the opposition. Id. at 103-04.
438 2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 75, 97-98. The group had originally asked FDR to
speak at the dinner, which was to commemorate its 200th anniversary, but the President
asked Ickes to appear in his place. Id. at 75.
419 Id. at 97.
440 Id. The Boston Herald reported that Conboy, "once a Roosevelt intimate, delivered a scathing attack on the national administration." Conboy Blast Against Roosevelt
Stirs Banquet of Irish Society, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 18, 1937, at 1.
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Given such a turn of events, Jackson's defense of the court plan received a
"mixed reception" at the Boston banquet.44 ' Ickes noted that Jackson was
"given a pretty rough time" and that there was even "subdued booing at
times.""
Because he had not expected to attend the dinner, Jackson had not prepared a speech; thus, his remarks were extemporaneous." 3 Judging from
the report in the Boston Globe (which contained only limited excerpts of the
remarks), Jackson largely drew upon the themes he had developed during
his Senate appearance and his New York Bar Association address. '
"What we have now is only the old struggle that democracy may live free
from the dead hand of the past," he told his audience, concluding that
"[w]e're going to keep a rendezvous with destiny.""' In light of the adverse circumstances surrounding the appearance, Jackson's performance in
Boston was the best that could be expected; he dutifully represented the
administration under difficult conditions.
One week later, Jackson traveled to New York City, where, on March
24, 1937, he spoke in favor of the court plan before two different audiences.
Addressing the New York Economic Club at the Hotel Astor, Jackson defended the proposal against an assault from Senator Burke, who made the
case for the opposition that evening. 446 Later that night, Jackson joined

Senators Robert LaFollette and Hugo Black in speaking in support of the
plan before a mass meeting of the American Labor Party at Carnegie
Hall." 7 Local newspapers covered both events.448
The New York Economic Club address was delivered to a conservative
group, most of whom, no doubt, opposed the President's proposal to alter
the size of the Supreme Court." 9 Jackson began his case by attempting to
paint Roosevelt's proposal as a moderate one, calling for no modification of
41

442

FDR PraisesDeeds of Irish, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1937, at 1.
2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 97. Ickes wrote that "this was the reception that had

been prepared for me" and, "considering the state of my nerves, it was just as well that
I didn't go to Boston." Id. at 97-98.
"' Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Philip J. O'Connell (Mar. 22, 1937) (Robert H.
Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress).
' FDR PraisesDeeds of Irish, supra note 441, at 1.
"5

Id.

46

Burke Assails Court Plan as Blow at People, N.Y.

HERALD-TRIB.,

Mar. 25, 1937,

at 7.
"47

Id.

48 See, e.g., Burke Attacks Court Change, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 25, 1937, at 3; Labor
Strife Laid to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1937, at 21.
441 Jackson acknowledged this fact in his opening sentence by forthrightly declaring,
"I shall address you as conservatives, who will probably disagree with most that I say."

Robert H. Jackson, Address to the New York Economic Club 1 (Mar. 24, 1937) (Robert
H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Jackson, New York Economic Club Address].
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the Court's powers or independence; Jackson asserted that the plan rested
between what he characterized as the liberal "extreme" of a constitutional
amendment to abolish judicial review and the laissez-faire conservative
extreme, which "want[s] nothing done to the Court" which "stand[s] as a
buffer" against the New Deal.45
Jackson explained how the President's plan would work, saying that
"[t]o us citizens of New York, whose Constitution has long retired all state
judges at 70 years," the appointment of a new Justice for every one who
failed to retire on reaching the age of seventy "is no shock." '' Launching
into a critical history of recent Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence,
Jackson asserted that there existed an "almost complete absence of public
defense of the most controverted of the Court's decisions. Those who say
'
the President's plan is wrong rarely say the Court's attitude is right."452
The Court, he continued, had abused the doctrine of judicial review by resorting, with increasing frequency, to consideration of the wisdom of the
statutes before it.453 As a result, the high tribunal had become the "wailing

wall" for "[p]owerful interests, whose causes are lost in election or in Congress," and, in the process, the Court also had become "hopelessly divid' Legal challenges affected most new federal agencies and threatened
ed."454
both state and federal laws "of such widespread interest as old age benefits,
unemployment compensation,...

relief acts, the labor relations act, the

' Particularly in the
Utility Holding Company Act, and several tax acts."455
field of labor relations, said Jackson, the Court's decisions during the past
generation had hindered or foreclosed both federal and state legislative action on such important matters as collective bargaining, minimum wages,
maximum hours, retirement benefits, child labor, and restrictions on the use
of injunctions.456
The Court "can not permanently be used as a [conservative] veto power," Jackson proclaimed.457 Government by litigation was inefficient,

Id. By labeling the constitutional amendment option the liberal "extreme," Jackson
created a rhetorical straw person. Certainly, some liberal opponents of the plan, such as
Senator Wheeler, favored a constitutional amendment to deal with the Court. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 179-80. Yet most of the plan's supporters were political liberals
who saw no need to resort to an amendment. Moreover, many of the legislation's most
reactionary opponents at least paid lip service to one of the various proposed constitutional amendments, though such support often was given for the sole purpose of delaying and defeating the President's proposal.
451 Jackson, New York Economic Club Address, supra note 449, at 2.
452 Id. at 4.
453 See id.
454 Id. at 5.

Id.
Id. at 5-7.
41IId. at 8.
455

456
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causing delay and uncertainty.45 Jackson opined that the judges' "almost
oriental devotion to precedent" obviated their "need to reason" and restricted
the actions not only of the legislative and the executive branches, but of the
courts themselves.45 9 The United States' "complicated governmental system," steeped in federalism, required compromise and understanding from
all sides in order to solve "basic problems arising out of the depression and
out of troubled industrial relations," but "[t]he Courts have lately been closing the ways to political compromise.""46 The Assistant Attorney General
concluded by declaring that Roosevelt sought "in his policy and in his Court
proposal to open the highway to economic and social peace" and by warning that "[t]he closed road may mean a rough detour."46'
Later that night, before a somewhat friendlier labor audience, Jackson
touched upon many of the same themes, but with a different emphasis. He
told the Carnegie Hall crowd that the liberals who sought a constitutional
amendment on judicial review were the ones who would "destroy the power
of the Court,"46 2 yet, incongruously, those persons asked that nothing be
done to the Court in the interim.463 Jackson did not deny that a constitutional amendment might be needed as well, but noted that that route posed
the problem of considerable delay and risked the vagaries of judicial interpretation.' On the other hand, claimed Jackson, the President's proposal
was moderate,465 and "there is no reason why we should reject the modreach in order to follow the amendment rainbow
erate remedy now in our
466
years.'
through dreary
Reiterating a theme he had stressed in his Rochester speech earlier in
the month,4 67 Jackson reminded his audience that strong chief executives
of the past, such as Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln, had experienced diffi-

458

Id. at 8-10.

411Id.

at 10-11. "Each such adverse decision goes ringing down legal history as a
probable restriction for all time upon the power of future Congresses and future generations-at least until some majority of the Court has the courage to throw overboard the
doctrine that precedents rule constitutional decisions." Id.
460Id. at 11.
41 Id.
462 Robert H. Jackson, Address at Carnegie Hall 1 (Mar. 24, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Jackson, Carnegie Address].
46

See id

Id. With regard to the delays inherent in amending the Constitution, Jackson was
following Roosevelt's lead. See supra text accompanying note 269.
4

Jackson, Carnegie Address, supra note 462, at 8.
Id. at 10. Jackson had, by now, developed the rhetorical strategy of placing
Roosevelt's plan in the middle of an imagined spectrum which ranged from a hands-off
46

41

attitude toward the Court (the right) to a constitutional amendment (the left). Jackson's
characterization of the amendment option as "liberal" is questionable. See supra note
450 and accompanying text.
467

See supra text accompanying note 279.
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culties with the Supreme Court; indeed, unlike some of those earlier presidents, the current administration "has accepted every decision ... [and]
obeyed every mandate, and yet it is accused of bad sportsmanship."4"'
When the Republican administrations of the previous decade frankly appointed conservative Justices who used the Court to protect property rights,
"we heard nothing from the bar associations or the great newspapers about
' Jackson
the immorality of 'packing' the Court."469
declared that his inten-

tion was not to asperse "the sincerity or the integrity of the justices of the
Supreme Court"-even the conservative ones.470 Indeed, Jackson admitted
that courts tended to be conservative institutions by nature, but this inherent
conservatism caused trouble to the extent that judges refused "to see the real
and living problems which men are trying to solve when they set up indus'
trial relations acts, or social security acts, or minimum wage acts."471
Much of the remainder of Jackson's speech was identical to his New
York Economic Club address. Jackson surveyed the Court's recent record in
the realm of labor relations,472 telling his labor listeners that in no other
area had "the effects of the reactionary personal views of individual Supreme Court justices been more disastrous., 473 It was against this background that Roosevelt's proposal must be judged, Jackson said. 74
Jackson began his conclusion with the assertion that the Republican
opponents of the administration had made the Court an issue in the 1936
election.4 71 "The morning after the election," he continued, "the opposition
to the President openly counted on the Supreme Court to check the New

468

Jackson, Carnegie Address, supra note 462, at 2. Jackson was alluding to a re-

mark reportedly made by Justice McReynolds to the effect that the administration was
guilty of "bad sportsmanship" because, having lost numerous contests before the Court,
it now endeavored to alter that outcome indirectly by means of a personnel change. See
BAKER, supra note 60, at 164. Taking a further swipe at McReynolds (without mentioning the Justice by name), Jackson countered that "we are unable to regard advocacy in
the courts of the rights of the people's government, to legislate a solution of our problems, as a sport." Jackson, Carnegie Address, supra note 462, at 2.
469 Jackson, Carnegie Address, supra note 462, at 3-4. In effect, Jackson was accusing recent Republican presidents of court packing through their appointments of conservative ideologues to the bench. Perhaps the appointments of Stone and Cardozo by
Coolidge and Hoover, respectively, temporarily had slipped his mind.

Id. at 8.
at 10.
472 See generally id. at 4-8.
473 Id. at 4.
474See id. at 8.
470

411Id.

471 "The

,

opposition told you that President Roosevelt was following unconstitutional
ends, proposing unconstitutional legislation, and as a witness they always called' the
Supreme Court. They lost no opportunity to identify the Court with themselves and
themselves with the Court." Id. On the matter of the Court as an issue in the 1936 presidential campaign, see supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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Deal., 476 He finished with a plea to support the President's proposal so
that the federal government might regain its "freedom to solve our problems
in our own life time and pass a new freedom to our children."4"
Jackson delivered his fifth speech about the plan at a Democratic Victory Dinner held in Pittsburgh on March 27, 1937. Based on the extensive
excerpts of Jackson's Pittsburgh speech as reported in the PittsburghPress,
the address was drawn largely from Jackson's Carnegie Hall speech,478
though some of the prefatory remarks came directly from the Rochester
victory dinner talk.479 In short, the New Yorker broke no new ground in
his fifth, and final, public address on the court legislation.48
During March 1937, Jackson made five speeches in support of the
administration's proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court. He also gave effective Senate testimony in favor of the plan. A number of themes ran throughout his presentations. The United States Constitution established a flexible
framework for the federal government, and that framework accorded the
government wide latitude in fashioning responses to changing economic and
social conditions. The federal government's efforts in this regard, however,
were being thwarted both by a conservative-but increasingly divided-judiciary which slavishly adhered to precedent and which entertained
disingenuous claims of states' rights, and by opponents of the New Deal
' The Tenth Amendment
who were resorting to "government by lawsuit."481
claims often were being used as a ruse in attempts to restrict the federal
government's actions in the challenged areas while, at the same time, the

47,Jackson, Carnegie
477Id. at 12.

Address, supra note 462, at 11.

I have arrived at this conclusion by comparing the remarks as reported in Foes
Remain In Dark About Election, Jackson Says, PiTT. PRESS, Mar. 28, 1937, at 10, with
478

the text of the Carnegie Hall address, Jackson, Carnegie Address, supra note 462.
471See generally Foes Remain in DarkAbout Election, Jackson Says, supra note 478,
at 10; Democrats Told, supra note 274, at 21.
41 One scheduled appearance which Jackson was unable to keep was a return bout
between him and Senator Burke set for April 8, 1937, before the Chicago Economics
Club. Although Jackson originally accepted the club's invitation to appear on the platform with Senator Burke, Letter from Guy A. Richardson, Chicago Economics Club
President, to Robert H. Jackson, confirming Jackson's acceptance (Mar. 15, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress), he was forced to cancel when he
learned that the oral arguments in the Social Security cases had been set for April 7 or
8. Telegram from Robert H. Jackson to Joseph H. Dion, Executive Secretary of the
Chicago Economics Club (Mar. 29, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library
of Congress). Thurman Arnold (who would soon succeed Jackson as Assistant Attorney
General in charge of Antitrust upon Jackson's promotion to Solicitor General) stood in

for Jackson in Chicago and "did a very fine job in presenting and defending his side of
the question." Letter from Joseph H. Dion to Robert H. Jackson (Apr. 13, 1937) (Robert
H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress).
481

See supra text accompanying note 458.
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state governments' freedom to act also was being judicially circumscribed.
The increasing use of what amounted to a judicial veto was upsetting the
delicate balance of federalism, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of both
federal and state governments. The gravity of this situation justified executive and congressional action in order, once again, to set right the system of
checks and balances among the three branches of the federal government-a
system that had been thrown out of kilter by the judicial branch. Roosevelt
was by no means the first chief executive to have his troubles with the Supreme Court. Indeed, the size of the Court had been altered before. The
President's proposal was actually moderate in nature, for it would leave the

Constitution unamended. These were the themes which Jackson repeatedly
sounded. Jackson had assumed the role of an advocate presenting the case
for the legislation on behalf of the Roosevelt administration.
In spite of his efforts, the tangible political results flowing from
Jackson's five public addresses were negligible, at least in terms of arousing
support for the bill. It is unlikely that he won many (if any) converts among
the conservative membership of the New York Economic Club or, judging
from his mixed reception, among Boston's Charitable Irish. Organized
labor's lukewarm backing for the bill did not appear to undergo any major

movement in the administration's direction following Jackson's appearance
at Carnegie Hall. The remarks at the Rochester and Pittsburgh Democratic
Victory Dinners were aimed at audiences that were already friendly; in both
instances, the Assistant Attorney General largely was preaching to the choir.
Still, the five speeches Jackson delivered in support of the plan during
March 1937, in conjunction with his Senate testimony that same month,
marked him as a loyal, able, and indefatigable proponent of the
administration's case. He had done his best to pitch an increasingly unpopular proposal.
From the standpoint of his personal reputation and standing within the
Democratic party, Jackson's efforts did have some noticeable effects. United
States News featured him as one of its "People of the Week," reporting that
Jackson's rise "both in public attention and [in] prestige in inner councils of
' Pittsburgh
the New Deal [was] particularly rapid during the past year."482
Press columnist John Townley expressed his belief that the Assistant Attorney General "should go places in public life. '483 And Newsweek reported

in its "For Your Information" column that the "[y]outhful, alert, and personable" Jackson would "be a sure bet for the Supreme Court if high New

482

People of the Week: Robert H. Jackson, Plays Major Legal Role in Supreme

Court Drama, U.S. NEWS, Mar. 22, 1937. The article erroneously went on to attribute
to Jackson "an important part in drafting plans for the change of the Supreme Court."
Id.
483 John B. Townley, Lewis' Boom for Kennedy Excites Politicians;Bitter Fightfor
Nomination is Now Possible, PITt. PRESS, Apr. 4, 1937.
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Dealers weren't grooming him for the [New York] Governorship--to be
followed by the Presidency [in] 1944. "484 Unquestionably, his participation
in the court battle convinced many observers that Jackson, the Roosevelt
administration's loyal lieutenant and able advocate, was indeed "going places."

VI. THE COURT'S ABOUT-FACE AND THE DEATH OF THE PLAN
Roosevelt's court bill, however, was not going places, despite the efforts
of Jackson and others on its behalf. A series of astonishing Supreme Court
rulings was beginning to seal the fate of the legislation. On March 29, 1937,
the Court upheld the state of Washington's minimum wage law in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish." On the same day, a day Jackson later
dubbed "White Monday,""4 6 the Court upheld the amended Railway Labor
Act487 and the amended Frazier-Lemke Act" against Fifth Amendment
substantive due process challenges and, in the case of the Railway Labor
Act, against a Commerce Clause challenge as well.489 Although it may
have appeared that the Court was acting under the stimulus of the
President's bill, the tribunal probably was responding belatedly to the 1936
election results, for the original conference vote in the Parrish case-the
vote at which Justice Roberts had switched to the liberal side-was taken
before Roosevelt announced his plan.49 °
The President seemed pleased with the Court's conversion to a new
interpretation of the substantive due process/freedom of contract doctrine

"s

For Your Information: Jackson-for-President,NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1937, at 41.

485 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
486

JACKSON, supra note 20, at 207. The name "White Monday," by way of contrast,

recalled "Black Monday"--May 27, 1935-the day on which the Court had announced
its decision in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), invalidating
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (June 16, 1993). See
FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 160-61; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 145.
487 Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (May 20, 1926), as amended by 45 U.S.C. §§
151-88
(1988).
488 Ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (June 28, 1934).
489 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Wright v.
Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
490 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 139-40; BAKER, supra note 60, at 176-77.
In Rethinking the New Deal Court, Barry Cushman views the question of whether
the court plan influenced the Court's early 1937 decisions as being somewhat wide of
-the mark. Cushman asserts that the Court's apparent "switch in time" was a result of an
evolutionary (rather than a revolutionary) change in the constitutional philosophy of
governmental powers. This change resulted from many forces; least among them, according to Cushman, was Roosevelt's bill. See generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the
New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994). See also infra note 632.
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which the Parrish holding represented.49 Harold Ickes believed that, had
the Court earlier adopted and consistently followed this attitude, the
"strained relationship that [existed] between the Supreme Court on the one
side and the legislative and executive branches on the other" probably would
not have arisen;49 2 to Ickes, the Court's switch was an admission that its
conservative majority formerly had been following its own social and economic predilections rather than the dictates of the Constitution. 93 To Roosevelt, though, the margin of victory effected by Roberts's switch was
alarmingly narrow: "Here was one man-not elected by the people-who by
a nod of the head could apparently nullify or uphold the will of the over'
whelming majority of a nation of 130,000,000 people."494
On April 12, 1937, the week after Robert Jackson and Charles Wyzanski
represented the government in the Social Security cases before the Supreme
Court,495 the Court handed down its long-awaited decisions in the National
Labor Relations Act496 (NLRA) cases,4" upholding the Act as within
Congress's interstate commerce power and rejecting the employers' substantive due process claims. Speaking for a five-Justice majority in the Jones &
Laughlin case, Chief Justice Hughes asserted that Congress's
power to regulate commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for "its protection and advancement"; to
adopt measures "to promote its 'growth and insure its safety";
"to foster, protect, control and restrain." That power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no
matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it."
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exer-

491 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at
4922 ICKES, supra note 109, at 106.
493Id. at 106-07.

lxvii.

" 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxvii.

Reminiscences of Charles E. Wyzanski, at 275-76 (1954) (Oral History Collection
of Columbia University); see also PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 290-92
(1982). Despite his position at Antitrust, Jackson, along with Wyzanski, argued the
Social Security cases before the Supreme Court. Jackson's involvement in these cases
dated from his prior Justice Department post-that of Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Tax Division.
4- 29 U.S.C. § 151-69 (1935).
4' The leading case was National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4'
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cise that control.498
Had the tribunal accepted such a broad view of the Commerce Clause during its two previous Terms-as Justices Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis had
urged-the entire court fight would have been unnecessary. Justice
McReynolds tacitly admitted as much when, in a dissent in the case which
was joined by the other three horsemen, he accused the majority of departing from the "well-established principles" that were followed in the
Schechter and Carter decisions. 499 The rulings were an "amazing thing," in
the words of a delighted Attorney General Cummings." ° The President
called them "further evidence that the Court was in full retreat,""5 1 and expressed his own satisfaction with the rulings.5" 2 "Today is a very, very
happy day," he told reporters.5 3
Yet the Court's emerging five-Justice liberal majority was indeed the
slimmest of margins, and the administration believed that the gains could be
lost all too easily.5" Roosevelt wryly observed that "the 'No Man's Land'
has been eliminated but ... [w]e are now in 'Roberts' Land.' 55 He worried about the fate of the Social Security Act,5" still pending before the
Court. 5°' For his part, Harold Ickes thought that Roberts and Hughes were
simply "playing politics in order to defeat the President's proposal. 5' 08 Privately, Roosevelt also believed that the Court's switch in direction was a
purely political effort designed to defeat his legislation."° Whatever the
reason, the NLRA decision, in hindsight, marked "the turning point of the
court fight," in the opinion of Alsop and Catledge; "after it everything that
the Court did, even the announcement of the Social Security Act's validity,
was the purest, weariest anticlimax."' 510
Anticlimax or not, the Court's May 24, 1937, decisions upholding the
constitutionality of the Social Security Act were "the coup de grace" in the
fight.511 The Social Security Act cases512 sustained both the unemploy" Id. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
Id. at 76 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). McReynolds was correct: the Court indeed
was departing from recent precedent.
Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (Apr. 12, 1937).
51 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxvii.
502 FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 234-35.
49

Id. at 234 (quoting Roosevelt).
BAKER, supra note 60, at 180-81.
...Id. at 181 (quoting Roosevelt).
Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (Aug. 14, 1935).
7 Id.; FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 235; 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxix.
508 2 IcKEs, supra note 109, at 137. This view was relatively widely held at the time.
See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 143.
'19

ALsop & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 153-54.

Id. at 147.
511 Id. at 214.
510
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ment compensation and the old-age pension provisions of the Act. Although

the vote was once again an uncomfortable five-to-four (with the four irreconcilable conservatives dissenting), the administration had won both cases.
"The blunt fact, therefore, is that by this time the Supreme Court fight had
actually been won, so far as its immediate objectives were concerned," Roosevelt later wrote." 3 He explained, perhaps defensively, that the "legislative fight was not discontinued immediately, however, because it was not
certain whether this victory was permanent or temporary."5 In other
words, Roosevelt still was concerned about both the solidity and the margin
of the Court's new majority.
Jackson initially agreed with Roosevelt's assessment of the situation.
Jackson told a friendly reporter that, in pleading the Social Security cases,
his entire argument was directed at Roberts; "'I was. arguing to a one-man

court.""'5 5 In a May 26, 1937, letter, Jackson wrote that the Court's newfound liberalism "proves the justification of the President's criticism of the
Court," and he disparaged suggestions1 6that the recent decisions obviated the
necessity of the legislation's passage.
Less than a week later, though, Jackson proclaimed to his friend Ernest
Cawcroft that "the President has won his fight. It is even better than to have
a new court reverse the old decisions."5 7 The Court's rulings left no doubt
in Jackson's mind that the tribunal had begun "to beat its retreat."5 8 After
the Social Security decisions came down, Jackson "became convinced that
the court plan as originally proposed was at an end because the court's action took care of the great multitude of the people," and, as a result, the
plan had lost its "popular appeal."51 9
The week before the Court issued its decisions in the Social Security
cases, two events occurred that further undermined the administration's position. On May 18, 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted ten-to-eight
to issue an unfavorable report on the bill.52 On the same day, Justice Van
Devanter submitted to Roosevelt a letter of retirement, effective at the end
of the current Court Term. The President immediately acknowledged receipt

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding old-age pensions); Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding unemployment compensation).
513 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxx.
512

514

Id.

515

MORGAN, supra note 154, at 475 (quoting Robert H. Jackson); see also supra text

accompanying note 494.
516 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Harry P. Lawther (May 26, 1937) (Robert H.
Jackson Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
117 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Ernest Cawcroft (June 1, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 10, Library of Congress).
518 Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 450.
519 Id. at 486.
520 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 209.
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of the letter.5 2' Van Devanter's retirement, timed to coincide with the
Committee's vote on the bill,"2 seemed to eliminate one of the main arguments in favor of the legislation: that conservative Justices were holding on
to their seats in order to frustrate Roosevelt's desire to appoint liberal suc523

cessors.

Roosevelt was now in an awkward position. To the public, it seemed
that he could shore up the emerging five-member liberal majority simply
through his appointment of Van Devanter's successor; he no longer appeared to have any need to resort to legislation in order to deal with the
Court.5" Unfortunately for Roosevelt, he had promised this first appointment to Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson, a conservative Southern
Democrat, as a reward for captaining the fight for the bill in the Senate, and
Roosevelt could not, as a practical matter, retract his promise.5" Given
Robinson's age526 and political philosophy, his appointment would have
made a mockery of the original old-age and over-worked rationale for the
court legislation. As a result, Roosevelt was, in Ickes's opinion, "in a
hole."527 On May 21, the President met with Cummings, James Farley, and
James Roosevelt and discussed Robinson's "availability" for the Van
Devanter seat.52
The public and the press, unaware of Roosevelt's private commitment to
Robinson, immediately began to speculate on Van Devanter's successor. In
a story printed the day after the Justice's letter to the President became
public, the New York Times listed Jackson's name among the candidates for
the seat. 29 The next day, however, Turner Catledge reported that Robinson
was the leading contender for the court post and that Assistant Attorney
General Jackson stated that he did not wish to be considered for the seat
and would not accept it if offered.53 It is unclear whether Jackson truly
did not desire the seat at this time, or whether his reluctance stemmed primarily from knowledge that he might have possessed about Roosevelt's
promise to Robinson.
By the time of Van Devanter's letter, Jackson had been out of the public
eye with respect to the court fight since his last speech on the issue in Pitts-

521Id. at 208.
"22MORGAN, supra note 154, at 475.

"3

BAKER,

supra note 60, at 226.

524ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 209.
51
526

Id.; FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 236; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 98, at 145.
Robinson was sixty-five years old at the time of the court fight. ALSOP &

supra note 82, at 219.
2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 144.
"' Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (May 21, 1937).

CATLEDGE,
527

529 Capital Guessing on
'a'

the New Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1937, at 18.
Turner Catledge, Robinson Leads for Court Place; Compromise Seen, N.Y.

TIMES, May 20, 1937, at 1.
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burgh (a period of almost two months). As Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, Jackson turned his
public attention from the court fight to the problem of monopolies. In midMarch, Jackson had accepted an invitation from the Georgia Bar Association
to speak at its annual convention at Sea Island, Georgia, in May.531 Senator Walter George, a Democratic foe of the court bill, had urged Jackson to
accept the invitation, despite their differing views on the bill.532 At the
time of his acceptance, Jackson intended to speak about the court matter; by
the end of April, however, he had changed his mind and had decided to
speak about the administration's new move against monopolies.5 33 He told
the Bar Association's Secretary that he believed that the court fight, as a
topic,,534of address, had "worn thin and might any day become a settled issue.
Jackson later recalled that the impetus for his shift in topic was his initial reluctance "to go down there and attack George in his home territory. 535 Perhaps that was the real reason for the change, and perhaps
Jackson's letter to the Association's Secretary predicting the imminent settlement of the court issue was merely diplomatic window-dressing designed
for public consumption. Alternatively, the astute Jackson may have seen
which way the court fight was going and decided no longer to be publicly
identified with it. Certainly, he thought that popular support for the
President's plan was undercut by the decisions in the Social Security cases. 36 The truth may well contain elements of both explanations. In any
event, Jackson's Georgia speech dealt with the subject of monopolies rather
than that of the judiciary, 537 and he increasingly turned his attention to-

531

Letter from Alexander W. Smith, Jr., President of the Georgia Bar Association, to

Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 13, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress).
532 Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 463. George was one of the conservative Democrats whose opposition to Roosevelt on the court packing plan and other New
Deal measures inspired Roosevelt's largely unsuccessful "purge" in the 1938 party primaries. George withstood the President's personal efforts against the Senator's renomination. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 267.
133 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to John B. Harris, Secretary of the Georgia Bar
Association (Apr. 29, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress).
For a discussion of the administration's 1937 to 1938 antitrust policies and Jackson's
role therein, see generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 55-136 (1995); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 24648.
...Letter from Robert H. Jackson to John B. Harris, supra note 533.
...Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 464.
536 See supra text accompanying note 519; Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at
486.
131 See Robert H. Jackson, Address to the Georgia Bat Association (May 28, 1937)
(Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress).
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ward a campaign denouncing the profits of large corporations. 3
Eventually, circumstances forced Roosevelt to accept the introduction of
a compromise bill on the reorganization of the federal judiciary. Initially, the
President opposed any compromise. As early as April 13, 1937, the day
after the decisions in the NLRA cases were announced, Senator Robinson
urged Keenan to prevail upon Roosevelt to accept a compromise-the addition of perhaps only two Justices-in light of the Court's apparent change in
attitude.5 39 After discussing the matter with Cummings and White House
aides, Roosevelt rejected the notion: he wanted an overwhelmingly liberal
Supreme Court, and his promise to appoint Robinson to the first vacancy
would neutralize the effectiveness of any liberal appointment made under a
two-Justice compromise.54 Moreover, Roosevelt could not be certain that
the current Court would continue along its new, "enlightened" path. 4'
Jackson also believed that the timing was not right for a compromise at this
point; instead, he felt that the administration ought to "wait and see, that the
time for compromise would be at hand when the Court had plainly demon'
strated there was meaning in the promise of the Wagner Act decisions. 542
Although Jackson stopped speaking in public on behalf of the court bill,
Alsop and Catledge indicated that he still had a role (though perhaps a small
one) in the behind-the-scenes planning on the project.543 Working with Cohen and Corcoran in early May, the three men developed the idea that the
administration ought to put the bill on hold temporarily and, instead, concentrate on enactment of the rest of the legislative program.544 Realizing
that it might be a mistake to hold up the remainder of the President's program in order to push through the court legislation, Jackson, Cohen, and
Corcoran believed that moving forward with other portions of the
administration's agenda might pay off in the form of new support for the
court bill from the heretofore unenthusiastic labor and agriculture constituencies.545 Furthermore, delaying the bill might weaken the opposition, as
would any adverse decision that the Court might issue in the then-pending
Social Security cases.546 Robinson, however, opposed any suggestion that
the bill be put on hold, and his opposition settled the matter for the time-be-

See FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 251. This campaign was carried out amid a severe
recession, caused largely by Roosevelt's 1937 attempt to cut federal spending and to
balance the federal budget. See generally id. at 248-57.
131 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at
152-53.
538

Id. at 153-61.

FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 235.
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 160.
143 Id. at 198-99.
544 Id.
541

542

141
546

Id. at 198.

Id. at 198-99.

602

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:2

ing.547

By mid-May, a split was developing among White House advisors regarding a compromise plan, with Cummings and Keenan in favor of compromise and the Jackson-Cohen-Corcoran group opposed.548 The latter
three were beginning to believe that having no legislation at all would be
preferable if the only alternative was a "pork barrel compromise.' '549 With
Jackson as an occasional participant in their discussions, Cohen and
Corcoran formulated a new strategy: Congress should take no further action
on the bill during the current session, and the bill should be held over until
the next session. 5" This delay not only would give the administration
plenty of time to rally its supporters, but it also would give the President a
face-saving way out of the matter, should he conclude that the Court's
switch had eliminated the necessity for legislation.55' Finally, the reintroduction of the bill at a later date could be held out as a threat against any
backsliding on the part of the Court. 5
While the President was away on a fishing trip in early May, Robinson
and several other senators met with James Roosevelt and urged him to convince his father that they should be allowed to secure the best possible compromise for the administration.553 On May 4, in the President's absence,
Cummings, Keenan, Michelson, West, Roddan, Corcoran, and James Roosevelt met for lunch at the White House to discuss the matter.5 4 Alsop and
Catledge reported that the group (which they said included press secretary
Stephen Early) agreed that James Roosevelt should pass along Robinson's
message directly to the President upon his return. On May 14, Roosevelt
once again rejected the renewed suggestions of a compromise. 6 Nor did
the Van Devanter resignation a few days later prompt the President to
change his mind.55 7 By May 22, however, Ickes observed that the President seemed to be seriously considering the possibility.55
On the night of June 3, 1937, the President changed his mind. After an
evening swim and a family dinner at the White House, Roosevelt met with
Robinson for two hours,5 59 and the Majority Leader finally prevailed upon

541
548

Id. at 199.
Id. at 197-98.

549 Id.
550 id.
551
552
551
554
555
556
557
558

51

Id.
Id.
Id. at 202-03.
Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (May 4, 1937).
ALSoP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 203-04.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 210-14.
2 IcKEs, supra note 109, at 145.

FDR: White House Usher Books (June 3, 1937) (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)
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the President to accept a compromise." The deciding factor seemed to be
the President's pride: he simply "could not bear the public humiliation
which a resort to the Cohen-Corcoran-Jackson scheme would have brought
upon him. 561

[hereinafter, Usher Books].
560 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 215-16. Alsop and Catledge
said that
Cummings and Reed were also instrumental in persuading Roosevelt to accept the compromise. Id. at 235.
561 Id. at 216.
The "Cohen-Corcoran-Jackson scheme" to which Alsop and Catledge referred was
to refuse a compromise and press ahead with the plan as originally conceived, making
the defeat of the proposal an issue in the 1938 elections. Id. at 214-16. The authors
claimed that. Jackson and Corcoran presented this plan to Roosevelt on the evening of
June 3, 1937, immediately before Robinson's meeting with the President. Id. at 215.
The problem with this version of the story is that there is no evidence that either
Corcoran or Jackson (or Cohen, for that matter) met with Roosevelt immediately before
Robinson---or at any time on June 3, 1937. In fact, there is nothing to indicate that any
of the three met with the President at any time between May 29 and June 4, 1937: the
White House Usher Books and the President's Diary and Itineraries for this period
show that he was away at Hyde Park from Saturday, May 29, through Wednesday
morning, June 2. Although he was in the White House from Wednesday, June 2,
through Friday, June 4, these records do not reflect that either Jackson, Corcoran, or
Cohen saw the President on any of those days, though Robinson's June 3 meeting is
clearly reflected. Indeed, these sources indicate that Jackson's only White House meetings with Roosevelt during the entire court fight were those which took place on February 25 and June 29, 1937. See Roosevelt Diary, supra note 253 (Jan. 2 to Dec. 31,
1937); Usher Books, supra note 559 (Feb. 7 to May 15, 1937 and May 16 to Aug. 21,
1937). Both Jackson's Autobiography and his Columbia Oral History Collection interview refer only to two White House meetings between Roosevelt and Jackson during
this time frame (though Jackson failed to mention any dates). See Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, passim; Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, passim.
One is led to conclude, therefore, that the June 3, 1937, meeting of Roosevelt,
Jackson, and Corcoran reported by Alsop and Catledge never occurred. A less plausible
alternative is that this June 3 meeting took place, but was off-the-record. Such an alternative seems unlikely in light of the fact that there was indeed a June 29, 1937, White
House meeting of Roosevelt, Jackson, and Corcoran, the contents of which appear to
coincide in a number of respects with those of the alleged June 3 meeting as reported
by Alsop and Catledge. Thus, it appears that these two reporters simply got their
dates-and some of their facts- wrong. See generally infra notes 580-83 and accompanying text.
Jackson conceivably could have made his pitch directly to Roosevelt while the two
were on an overnight cruise aboard the USS Potomac on Saturday, June 5, and Sunday,
June 6, 1937. However, any extended, on-board discussion of political matters is doubtful, given Roosevelt's guest list for the cruise, which included Jackson and his wife,
Irene, Mr. and Mrs. Harry Hopkins, and Marguerite (Missy) LeHand, the President's
personal secretary and close companion. Usher Books, supra note 559 (June 4-5, 1937).
The cruise largely was a pleasure trip, with Saturday afternoon spent "visiting and fishing" and Saturday evening featuring "gay conversation on general topics," GERHART,
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In early June, Jackson was back in front of a congressional committee,
this time testifying in favor of the administration's proposed wages and
hours legislation.562 Jackson's appearance before the committee initially
was opposed by the Attorney General, who was concerned that conservative
opposition to legislation on wages and hours might make passage of the
court bill more difficult.5 63 Despite Cummings's hesitation, Jackson was
the first witness called. 5" According to Joseph Lash, Jackson performed
well: "His statement on the bill's constitutionality was hailed as 'a brilliant

summation." 565
On June 14, 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee released its negative
report on the President's original plan to enlarge the Supreme Court.5"
The report was scathing: it called for "the rejection of [the] bill as a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional principal,"
and concluded that the proposed legislation "is a measure which should be
so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to the
free representatives of the free people of America. 5 67 Harold Ickes sarcastically observed that if Roosevelt was "guilty of what this report says, then
he should be impeached. 568
The administration seriously considered calling for a minority report
from the Committee. Robinson thought that such a report should be written,

supra note 1, at 94, though a bit of politics would inevitably intrude upon any sojourn
with a sitting president. However purely social the activities may have appeared, one
cannot escape the conclusion that Jackson's invitation to join the party was an important

occasion in the career of the fast-rising Assistant Attorney General-an occasion which
provided his chief the opportunity to look over and size up the younger New Yorker
(and his wife) in a setting that was (at least for Roosevelt) relatively relaxed.
562

563

Jackson Reminiscences, supra note 111, at 466.
Id. at 466, 471-72. Jackson recalled that "the Attorney General, who was a very

good estimator of political things, [feared] that [the wages and hours legislation] would
complicate the court measure, and perhaps it did." Id. at 472.
51 Id. at 466; LASH, supra note 109, at 336.
565 LASH, supra note 109, at 336. Lash reported that when Labor Secretary Frances
Perkins appeared before the joint Senate-House committee conducting the wages and
hours hearings, the Secretary, who "rarely was at a loss for words," told the committee
that "I do not believe that I could add anything of value to the thorough and scholarly
testimony of Mr. Jackson on the constitutional problems with which this legislation is

confronted." Id. at 337.
During the first part of 1937, Jackson worked with Cohen and Corcoran on the
administration's draft of the Fair Labor Standards Act, notwithstanding what Lash
called "their preoccupation with the Court-packing measure." Id. at 335.
566 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 235; SENATE COMMITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 75-711 (1937)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
567 SENATE REPORT, supra note 566, at 23.
568 2 ICKES, supra note 109, at 152.
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though Senate Judiciary Chairman Ashurst told Corcoran that the move
would be a mistake. 6 9 Still, Ashurst told Joe Keenan that if Robinson insisted on a minority report, he (Ashurst) would go along; Ashurst added his
opinion that Jackson should be the author of any such report. 7 ° Alsop and
Catledge stated that Corcoran and Keenan actually drafted a minority report,
which mainly embodied the arguments that Jackson had made in his Judiciary Committee appearance; nevertheless, Ashurst's opposition ultimately
prevented the draft from seeing the light of day. 7' No evidence indicates
that Jackson had any hand in drafting the proposed minority report (if one
was prepared) or that Jackson even knew of Ashurst's suggestion. That
Ashurst suggested that Jackson prepare any minority report can be taken as
an indication of the esteem in which the Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman held the Assistant Attorney General, as well as, perhaps, the wariness
with which the Arizonan viewed Corcoran and Keenan. According to Alsop
and Catledge, the failed attempt to secure a minority report from the Committee was the last "important participation of ...the White House general
572
staff in the court fight.
In mid-June, Vice President Garner left Washington for an extended
vacation in Texas. His departure, coupled with his refusal to aid the President in the court fight, "seemed to be notice that he was disassociating himself from his President and his President's program. 573 An angry Roosevelt demanded to know "[w]hy in hell did Jack have to leave at this
time?"574 Things appeared to be moving from bad to worse for the administration.
"To many observers," wrote William Leuchtenburg, "it seemed improb'
able that Roosevelt could salvage anything from the debris."575
Nevertheless, "at precisely this point, when his fortunes had sunk to their lowest,
Roosevelt brought about an astonishing recovery that breathed new life into
'
the apparently moribund idea of Court packing."576
Having already agreed
to a compromise, Roosevelt, on June 16, invited all 407 Democratic members of Congress to meet with him during the weekend of June 25 at the
Jefferson Island Club off the Maryland coast in an effort to restore party

Memorandum from Joseph B. Keenan to File 1, 3 (May 22, 1937) (James Roosevelt Papers, File: Secretary to the President-Judicial, 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library).
570 Id. at 3.
569

571 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 234-35.

Id. at 235. Regarding Jackson's limited participation in any "White House general
staff in the court fight," see supra notes 221-46 and accompanying text.

supra note 60, at 220-21.
" Id. at 221 (quoting Roosevelt).

5' BAKER,

575William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-PackingPlan: A Second Life, A Second
Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 677.
576 Id.
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harmony. 5" According to Leuchtenburg, the "Jefferson Island frolic
'
Alsop and Catledge thought differently,
proved to be an inspired idea."578
reporting that "no one was conciliated, no one was charmed out of rebellion,
and the net result of the whole business was a public spectacle in which the
'
scoffers took infinite pleasure."579
The week after the Jefferson Island "frolic," Jackson and Corcoran met
with the President in a last-ditch effort to head off a compromise on the
court legislation.58 In his unpublished autobiography, Jackson recalled his
pitch:
I had a long discussion with the President in his study in the
evening. I advised him strongly against accepting the compromise of adding two judges to the Court, but urged him
instead to avoid a vote by a message pointing out that the
Court reconsidered its attitude on many of the questions
which had concerned him so greatly, had announced new
doctrine in accordance with the contentions of the Administration, and that he withdrew his recommendation for the
time being at least. I pointed out to him that he was in a
position to claim the victory in the Court if not to claim one
over the Court and that bitterness which was developing
dangerously could be terminated. The President told me that
he thought that would be the wiser thing to do, but that he
could not do it at that time. He said candidly that he had
promised to appoint Joe Robinson to the Court and that he
had committed himself to accepting the proposition of two
additional Justices. I argued even further against the plan. I
pointed out that if he added Robinson and one other who, I
assumed, would be of a more liberal school of thought, the
two appointments would offset each other and he would have
made no change in the balance of power on the Court. I told
him bluntly that the only excuse that history would accept
for packing the Court was that a packing was needed and
that it was successfully done and that to have the odium of
packing it and have it fail was, I feared, the outcome of
"'
accepting two additional Justices.58

ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 241-42; Leuchtenburg, supra note 575, at
677-79.
S78 Leuchtenburg, supra note 575, at 679.
579 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 242.
5" This is evidently the meeting which Alsop and Catledge erroneously reported to
have taken place on June 3, 1937. See supra note 561.
"' Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 119-20.
577
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Jackson and Corcoran reiterated that the entire bill should either be put on
hold or pursued as originally conceived, even if the latter course meant
outright defeat, because a defeat could be made an issue in the 1938 elections." 2 Despite their efforts, the President stuck to his agreement to seek
a compromise on his court proposal." 3
Jackson was now out of the loop in the court fight, and his active service in the matter had come to an end.5" He increasingly was turning his
attention to the monopoly situation; he was, after all, the head of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division. During the recession in the fall and winter

& CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 214-15; see supra note 561.
Alsop and Catledge reported that the President had not decided on a course of

582 ALSOP
58

action even at this late hour, and that the decision to accept the compromise "must have
been made during his talk with Robinson" on June 3, 1937, which they inaccurately
placed immediately after the meeting with Jackson and Corcoran. ALsoP & CATLEDGE,
supra note 82, at 215. Indeed, the two reporters stated that Roosevelt "had met
[Jackson's and Corcoran's] arguments in such fashion that when they left him they had
hopes." Id Jackson's autobiography makes no reference to any such "hopes"; on the
contrary, one infers from Jackson's account that Roosevelt had already made up his
mind to accept a compromise in advance of his audience with Jackson and Corcoran.
See Jackson Autobiography, supra note 109, at 119-21. All of this provides further
proof that Alsop and Catledge were wrong in stating that Jackson and Corcoran had met
with Roosevelt on June 3 immediately before the latter's meeting with Robinson on that
date.
Jackson, at least in private, held fast to his belief that compromise was a mistake.
Overnight, on July 13, 1937, Senator Robinson died. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note
82, at 266-67. In the wake of the Senator's sudden death, Jackson wrote to Henry
Edgerton, confiding that he would still "rather see the President defeated than to see a
compromise which would give him the appearance of victory without its substance."
Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Henry Edgerton (July 15, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson
Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress). In the letter, Jackson also observed that
Robinson's recent death "may change the course of events here substantially." Id.
Jackson's prognostication proved accurate as to the latter point, and in regard to the
former, Jackson got his wish: the compromise legislation was resoundingly recommitted
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See infra text accompanying note 597.
" As early as June 12, 1937, he informed a correspondent that he was "completely
out of touch with the strategy in connection with the Court plan." Letter from Robert H.
Jackson to Judge Wilbur Clark (June 12, 1937) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 79,
Library of Congress). Clark wrote Jackson several letters during the course of the court
fight and had by this time perhaps become something of a pest. James Roosevelt found
the judge to be "eccentric." James Roosevelt Diary, supra note 238 (Mar. 2, 1937).
Jackson's statement to Clark appears to have been a white lie-a diplomatic way of
brushing the judge off. For the series of letters between Jackson and Clark, see generally Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 79, Library of Congress. Jackson's pronouncement,
however, was two and one-half weeks premature: most likely, Jackson's last participation of any consequence in connection with the fight came on the evening of June 29,
1937, when he and Corcoran met with Roosevelt in the unsuccessful attempt to head off
a compromise. See supra notes 580-83 and accompanying text.
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of 1937-1938, Jackson became "the most eloquent" proponent of the
administration's neo-Brandeisian anti-monopoly policies.5"5
In the wake of the Jefferson Island gathering, and in spite of Jackson's
and Corcoran's counsel, Robinson and the administration drafted a compromise bill, which was formally submitted to Congress on July 2.586 The new
bill would have permitted the President, once each calendar year, to name
one additional Justice for every Justice over the age of seventy-five who
failed to retire; at the time, there were four Court members over seventyfive.587 If the legislation was enacted, Roosevelt immediately could name
two additional Justices-one under the new law and one to replace Van
Devanter-and he could make another appointment under the bill on January 1, 1938, if no other aged Justices retired in the meantime.588 At the
time of its introduction, the prospects for the bill seemed good.589
The Senate began its floor debate on the bill on July 6, 1937, in the
midst of a Washington heat wave.59 ° During Robinson's presentation of
the administration's case to the Senate, the debate became increasingly rancorous.59 ' Then fate intervened: Robinson, whose health had deteriorated

throughout the debate, was found dead on the floor of his apartment on the
morning of July 14, 1937, the victim of a heart attack.592 The President's
'
allies in the Senate now "were leaderless and without morale."593
Amid accusations from some opposition senators that Robinson's death
was Roosevelt's fault,594 Senate supporters "who had been tenuously com-

mitted to the court plan only by ties to Senator Robinson concluded that the
'
There "was no man left among the few entime had come to bail out."595
thusiastic faithful with sufficient force to beat the waverers back into
'
The Senate, on July 22, voted to recommit the bill to the Judiciary
line."596

Committee, which reported out an "emasculated and meaningless substitute"
the following week.5" Leuchtenburg believes that Robinson's death sealed
...FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 251.
386 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 247; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 98, at
148-49.
587

588

Leuchtenburg, supra note 575, at 680.
Id.

589 Id.
590ALSOP

&

CATLEDGE,

Id. at 254-65.
192 Id. at 260-63, 266-67.

supra note 82, at 252-54.

59

593Id.

at 268.
" Leuchtenburg, supra note 575, at 686.
591Id. at 687.
596 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at 268.
" Id. at 288-94 (quotation at 294). Roosevelt flirted, at least briefly, with the idea of
vetoing the revised bill. Cummings Diary, supra note 78 (July 30, 1937). Even more
astonishingly, as late as July 26, 1937, the President improbably entertained the notion
that a face-saving compromise on the judiciary bill might still be salvageable-a com-
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the fate of the Court bill.5 98
In early August 1937, Congress enacted the revised Judiciary Act,5 99
which made certain reforms in the lower federal courts, but left the Supreme
Court untouched.i' The bitter battle over the Supreme Court had finally
come to an end. By its conclusion, more than a month had passed since
Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson had been a participant in the
struggle.
VII. CONCLUSION

Franklin Roosevelt ultimately could not escape responsibility for the
court fiasco. Still, engaging in an early form of spin control, he later
claimed, with a certain amount of accuracy, that "the Supreme Court fight
had actually been won" when the Court reversed its position and began to
take a broader view of the Constitution and the constitutionality of New
Deal social and economic legislation.6"' Robert Jackson shared Roosevelt's
view on this point.6" Nevertheless, the President's original goal of increasing the size of the Court had failed miserably.

promise which would have included additional members of the Supreme Court. Id. (July
26, 1937). On that date, Cummings, at the President's behest, canvassed two Democratic members of the House regarding the chances for such a compromise. Memoranda (1)
and (2) from Homer S. Cummings to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 26, 1937 (President's
Secretary's File, Justice Department-Homer Cummings, 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library). Both men told the Attorney General that, in the words of one, there would not
"be any chance of doing anything if it contained any reference to the Supreme Court."
Id. (Memorandum (1)) at 1. Exactly how long the President held his unrealistic belief
and when he abandoned it are unknown; however, abandon it he soon did, for Roosevelt neither vetoed the "emasculated and meaningless substitute" nor sought a new compromise on the matter of additional Justices. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 82, at
294.
In light of his resounding July 22 defeat in the Senate, the fact that Roosevelt even
entertained the thought of attempting further legislation on the Supreme Court is additional evidence of how important Roosevelt deemed the plan and how little faith he had
in the Court's new-found Constitutional philosophy. It is also evidence that the misjudgment behind the President's defeat in the court fight was not immediately dissipated by
the Senate's July 22 recommittal vote: the master politician had just received the greatest political thrashing of his career but he failed to realize it. Roosevelt, however, would
soon understand the wide scope and consequences of his defeat in the court fight.
Though to the outside world he continued to appear to be in high spirits, Corcoran
recalled that the President was depressed for months after the set-back. FREIDEL, supra
note 22, at 239.
...Leuchtenburg, supra note 575, at 687.
Ch. 754, 50 Stat. 751 (Aug. 24, 1937).
o FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 238.
601 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxx.
599

602

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 517-18.
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More significantly, the court fight had split the Democratic party wide
open. Leuchtenburg believes that "Roosevelt lost the war" in this larger
sense. 60 3 "The Court fracas destroyed the unity of the Democratic party
and greatly strengthened the bipartisan anti-New Deal coalition. The new
Court might be willing to uphold new laws, but an angry and divided Con6
gress would pass few of them for the justices to consider.", 1
The President's legislative agenda suffered from his strategy of placing
65
it on hold while pursuing the reorganization of the federal judiciary.
Freidel concurred in the judgment that Roosevelt had paid a high political
price for the battle:
Roosevelt had suffered a staggering setback from a Congress
top-heavy with Democrats. He had expended a large part of
his political capital on a failed enterprise. Hc had given a
winning cause to conservatives long opposed to him, and had
seen former allies, even some of the strongest progressives,
join them. What he doubtless intended to be political showmanship, drama to enlist the interest of the electorate, appeared to his opponents and even a considerable part of the
public to be a dangerous deviousness, smacking of dictatorial
ways. The suspicions the court fight engendered carried over
into struggles over other domestic issues, and ominously
colored the growing debate over foreign policy. It was,
Corcoran mused long afterward, as though one had a million
dollars in the bank and suddenly received notice one was
overdrawn.6"
In 1938, Roosevelt struck back in a largely futile attempt to purge the Democratic party of some of his most conservative office-holding opponents. °7
Such was the legacy of the 1937 battle over the Supreme Court.
There are many reasons why the administration's court plan was unsuc-

supra note 6, at 238.
Id. at 238-39. Recently, Leuchtenburg has gone further, noting that the Court fight
"'provided a rallying point around which so much latent opposition [to Roosevelt] could
coalesce.' . ... [T]o attempt to explain the erosion [of Roosevelt's popularity and power]
of 1937 and ignore the Supreme Court donnybrook is like accounting for the coming of
the Civil War without reference to slavery." LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 98, at 156-57
(quoting Robert J. Maddox, Roosevelt vs. The Court, AM. HIST. ILLUSTRATED 4, Nov.
1969, at 10-11).
o BURNS, supra note 62, at 311.
6o6 FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 239.
60 LEUCHTENBURG,

6

LEUCHTENBURG,

at 280-88.

supra note 6, at 266-72. See generally FREIDEL, supra note 22,
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cessful: the initial secrecy surrounding the proposal," 8 including the failure
to consult congressional leaders;6" the legislation's original and disingenuous old-age and over-worked rationales,610 which allowed the Chief Justice
to score easy tactical points in his letter to the Judiciary Committee;61' the
revolt of Democratic conservatives, as well as many party moderates and
liberals, against the bill;612 Van Devanter's retirement;6 3 and the death of
Senate Majority Leader Robinson." 4 Each of these played its part in the
President's defeat. Perhaps the biggest factor in the proposal's defeat was
the Court's own about-face in its constitutional philosophy; Parrish, the
National Labor Relations Act decisions, and the Social Security Act decisions seemed to obviate the necessity for any alteration of the Court's structure. The switch in time did indeed save nine.6"5
Beginning shortly after Reconstruction, the Supreme Court acted increasingly like a super-president, exercising what amounted to a judicial veto
over the acts not only of the federal and state legislatures but of the president, as well. "After 1900," wrote Grant Gilmore, "the Supreme Court withdrew from the decision of private law questions and became a forum for the
resolution of political controversies dressed up as issues of constitutional
law." 6 The targets of the Court's judicial vetoes often were legislative
and executive actions (both federal and state) designed to regulate or otherwise limit increasingly powerful concentrations of industrial wealth.6 7
The Supreme Court was becoming a body that used its judicial power to
serve entrenched propertied interests. In the process, the Court had begun to
step out of its judicial role and into a political one. Writing three decades
later, Alexander Bickel recognized the danger in such a state of affairs:
[T]he Supreme Court touches and should touch many aspects

supra note 62, at 297; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 233-34.
supra note 56, at 396; MORGAN, supra note 154, at 479.
610 FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 231. The single mistake which Roosevelt later admitted having made was the failure, when originally presenting the plan, to "place enough
608

BURNS,

9 MILLER,

emphasis upon the real mischief-the kind of decisions which ...

had been coming

down from the Supreme Court." 6 ROOSEVELT, supra note 56, at lxv.
611 For a discussion of Jackson's belief that the Hughes letter "turned the tide" in the
entire battle, see supra text accompanying note 435. See also ALsOP & CATLEDGE,
supra note 82, at 127; BAKER, supra note 60, at 159-60; MILLER, supra note 56, at

400-01.
612

LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 234-36.

613

Leuchtenburg, supra note 161, at 96-97.
Leuchtenburg, supra note 575, at 687.
See Leuchtenburg, supra note 161, at 93-97. But see generally Cushman, supra

614
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note 490, passim.
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Id. at 62-64.

61 (1977).
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of American public life. But it would be intolerable for the
Court finally to govern all that it touches, for that would turn
us into a Platonic kingdom contrary to the morality of selfgovernment; and in this world at least, it would not work. If
one takes the rule of law to mean the full and unrelenting
dominion of the Court's principles wherever and whenever
applicable, then the problem becomes one of limiting, and
limiting with extreme severity, the kind and thus the number
of principles the Court is permitted to evolve and apply.618
This dangerous trend reached its climax during Franklin Roosevelt's first
term as president.
In the 1932 election, the American people clearly indicated that they
wanted change-change to deal with the unprecedented economic crisis
facing the nation." 9 The President and Congress responded with a broad
range of legislation designed to address the massive social and economic
problems caused by the Great Depression. In the process, both the welfare
state and the strong federal government (complete with a powerful executive
branch) were born in modern America. In 1934 and 1936, the American
electorate signaled its approval of these developments through its overwhelming endorsement of the New Deal. 62" No one can claim that all of
the actions taken by the federal government in those years were successful;
some were poorly planned or poorly executed (or both). But the people
needed-and demanded-action, and they received it from the Roosevelt
administration.62' They also received something they craved at least as
much: hope and leadership.622 There were some notable successes, such as
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Act,
and the Social Security Act, but there were also some notable failures, including the National Recovery Administration. Yet, as the editors of The
Economist opined in 1937, "Mr. Roosevelt may have given the wrong answers to many of his problems,

. .

. [b]ut he is at least the first President of

623
modern America who has asked the right questions.,
By the time of Roosevelt's second inauguration in 1937, the New Deal

618 ALEXANDER

M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT

AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 199-200 (1962). Bickel's warning seems particularly apt in
matters such as the judicially-created constitutional doctrine of substantive economic
due process.

supra note 6, at 17.

619

LEUCHTENBURG,

620

Id. at 146, 195-96.

621
622

See generally id. at 330-33.
Id.

623

Id.

(1937)).

at 326 (quoting THE EDITORS OF THE ECONOMIST, THE NEW DEAL 149
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had restored most Americans' faith in themselves and in their system of
government. 62 Admittedly, some New Deal programs (most prominently
the NRA, with its corporatist tenor of business-government cooperation and
the suspension of antitrust laws) bore a faintly fascist odor. Other programs
(such as the AAA) seemed ominously to engage in the kind of centralized
planning then used in Soviet Russia. But Roosevelt was neither a fascist nor
a Marxist. He was a masterful, self-assured democrat (and Democrat) with a
deep sense of American history and tradition and of his place therein. His
bold experimental actions helped to ensure continued American democracy
and capitalism by restoring Americans' self-confidence at a time when these
institutions were under unprecedented pressure. 6' The New Deal's experimentation, at the very least, bought invaluable time during which American
democracy "had survived its severest test; it was to have a second
chance. 626
But, the Supreme Court-or, more specifically, its activist, conservative
four and their sometime-companions (most particularly Roberts)-had assumed for itself the task of thwarting many of the New Deal's boldest experiments, such as the NRA and the AAA, the New Deal's original cornerstones of industrial and agricultural recovery.62 Through a broad reading
of the Tenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
and through cramped readings of Article I's Commerce and General Welfare
Clauses, the Tribunal was severely constricting the realm of federal action.
At the same time, through a similarly broad reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court was limiting greatly the scope
of permissible action on the part of state governments. The Court had indeed created the "no-man's land" about which Roosevelt had complained
and, in so doing, had heightened its political role. The conservative Justices'
Court had entered into a spitting contest with an activist President.
More than a decade before Roosevelt assumed the presidency, Benjamin
Cardozo, then the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, recognized the tension, inherent in a judge's role, between the need to adhere to
precedent and the need to reform outdated legal rules-in effect, to engage
in judicial legislation:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and
little more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and
the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which

See generally id. at 330-33.
Id. at 337-39.
626 George Wolfskill, New Deal Critics: Did They Miss the Pjint?, in "ESSAYS ON
THE NEW DEAL 49, 68 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969).
627 The NRA decision was unanimous, with even the Court's liberal triumvirate
(Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo) joining in the program's demise.
62

625
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singly or in combination shape the progress of the law.
Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of
the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired. One of the most fundamental social interests is that
law shall be uniform and impartial . . . . Therefore in the
main there shall be adherence to precedent. There shall be
symmetrical development, consistently with history or custom when history or custom has been the motive force, or
the chief one, in giving shape to existing rules, and with
logic or philosophy when the motive power has been
theirs.628
Cardozo recognized, however, that symmetrical development may be too
costly:
Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity
of oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or
certainty must then be balanced against the social interest
served by equity and fairness or other elements of social
welfare. These may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line at another angle, of staking the path along new
courses, of marking a new point of departure from which
others who come after him will set out upon their
journey.629
Cardozo was anything but a reactionary, as his judicial record demonstrated. When he wrote of judges acting in a quasi-legislative capacity and
rejecting precedent when necessary, he had in mind the social and economic
needs of the times. These needs should guide a judge in reaching an appropriate and equitable decision in a given case even if that might require the
rejection of precedent. Although Cardozo was speaking about the common
law process, much of what he said was (and is) equally applicable to the
process of constitutional adjudication-particularly as that process had come
to be dominated by a narrow and conservative constitutional (hence, political) outlook on the part of the Supreme Court's majority in the mid-1930s.
Roosevelt was not one to back away from a brawl. His response to the
Court's intransigence was to fight fire with fire, and, as a result, he propounded the so-called court packing plan. Roosevelt's acceptance of the
political challenge laid down by the Court, and his response in the. form of
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his Act to Reorganize the Federal Judiciary, amounted to a game of political
chicken.* One way or another, Roosevelt would have a Supreme Court
whose majority was more in tune with the conditions facing 1930s America.6 The Court would either change its cramped readings of the Constitution or it would face the addition of new Justices of Roosevelt's choosing.
The Court blinked first in this game, and, to the delight of the administration, the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act survived.
So, too, would other New Deal
legislation survive when it came before the
31
Court in succeeding terms.

Both sides could claim victory-or at least partial victory-in this fight.
The Court (particularly Roberts and, to a lesser extent, Hughes) beat a swift
retreat from its earlier anti-New Deal decisions, but it did so without suffering the humiliation of an alteration to its size. Indeed, its initial retreat in the
spring of 1937 was undertaken without any change in personnel, though the
Four Horsemen were pained noticeably by the turn of events. The Supreme
Court returned to its proper constitutional role-that of engaging in limited
judicial review-and its size remained unchanged.632

630

As George Wolfskill commented in regard to Roosevelt's constitutional philoso-

phy:
It was not that Roosevelt was flagrantly unconcerned about the supreme law of
the land, that he rejected constitutional methods, that he deliberately sought to
flout the Constitution, circumvent it, and, when the moon was right, murder it. He
recognized, however, that it was capable of many interpretations (at least it always had been in the past). And he did not intend to stand idly by if it meant
letting people starve by strict constitutional methods. If honest men who stood in
awe of the Bible could differ, sometimes vehemently, over its meaning, so other
men equally honest could dispute the meanings of the Constitution, which, after
all, was not Holy Writ.
Wolfskill, supra note 626, at 59.
631 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered the opinion of
the Court in the latter case, which is based on what is arguably the broadest reading of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause ever undertaken in American Constitutional History.
632 Barry Cushman has challenged this conventionally held view of the fight between
Roosevelt and the Supreme Court. See generally Cushman, supra note 490. In his wellwritten article, Cushman asserts that "[t]he history of the Supreme Court during the
New Deal is not a simple tale of the unmediated interplay of judicial purposes, external
political events, and case outcomes." Id. at 257. The conventional wisdom regarding the
court plan and the plan's impact on the Court's decisions of early 1937 is largely erroneous, according to Cushman. Id. at 260. On the contrary, the story of the New Deal
Court
is instead the more complex story of how a structurally interdependent system of
thought gradually unraveled over the first forty years of the twentieth century and
how, after it had unraveled so far as to become completely unserviceable, it was
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America doubtless is better off as a result of these developments. If
Roosevelt had succeeded in his attempt to increase the Court's size, it would
have established a precedent for future administrations to employ as a weapon with which to intimidate the judiciary in its role as a co-equal branch of
the federal government. In the years leading up to 1937, the delicate balance
among the three branches of government had begun to tip in the direction of
the judiciary. Had Roosevelt prevailed in 1937, that balance might have
tipped too far away from the judiciary and too far toward the executive. The
events of 1937, though bitter, political, and even tragic, served roughly to
restore the proper equilibrium among the three branches of government.
Those events, however, left a bitter legacy which resulted largely from
Roosevelt's uncharacteristic political ineptitude in the presentation and prosecution of his court plan. Roosevelt may have transformed the Court, but he
lost his Congress in the bargain. After that hot, acrimonious summer of
1937, the New Deal slowed to a snail's pace. Over the next year, Congress
did give the President a new housing bill, a new farm bill, wages and hours
legislation, and legislation to reorganize the executive branch of the federal
government, but nothing more. Furthermore, Roosevelt had to pry these
measures with great difficulty from a recalcitrant Congress, accepting much
less than he initially had requested in each instance.633
The main purpose of this Article has been to examine the role played in
the court fight by the fast-rising Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson. Admittedly, the court fight would have proceeded without him, and
Jackson's participation in the battle did not change its outcome. The legislation to alter the size of the Supreme Court died in the end, and hindsight
indicates that it would have done so irrespective of Jackson's participation.6" Nevertheless, his role in the battle was an important one. He made

abandoned by a generation of jurists with no stake in salvaging its remains. The
surface plausibility of the conventional wisdom has for too long obscured our
view of this important dimension of constitutional history.
Id.
Although Cushman has constructed a forceful argument in support of his thesis, I
am not entirely persuaded. Even if the court plan came only after the Court (or, more
accurately, after Roberts, and to some extent, Hughes) had already secretly made up its
mind to reject substantive economic due process and to adopt a very broad reading of
the Commerce Clause, the Justices' shift in thinking certainly had been influenced by
the results of the 1936 presidential election. The election's results, in turn, had emboldened Roosevelt and Cummings to the point where the court plan seemed to be a practicable solution to the impasse with the Court. Hence, the 1936 election, the court plan,
and the about-face of Roberts and Hughes, were all parts of a piece.
633

See FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 273-82; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 250-63.

In 1939, he received an unwelcome gift from Congress-the Hatch Act, which, in the
wake of the unsuccessful purge of 1938, prohibited federal employees from taking part
in political activities. FREIDEL, supra note 22, at 287-88.
634 Whether Barry Cushman's view of the court fight or the conventional view of the
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five speeches in support of the plan; he delivered widely publicized and
widely praised Senate testimony in its favor which succeeded in placing
before the public, for the first time, the true reasons for the legislation (and
did so in a way that minimized the negative impact of the original, disingenuous rationale); and he occasionally acted as a White House strategist and
advisor in the fight.
Jackson's embrace of the administration's ill-fated effort to "reorganize"
the Supreme Court might, at first blush, appear somewhat enigmatic. At a
time when the overwhelming majority of his colleagues were vehemently
denouncing the plan, Jackson publicly and outspokenly swam against the
tide. One might chalk up his support to loyalty, to a sense of political duty,
or, more cynically, to political ambition. There was, however, more to it
than that.
For the quarter-century during which he had been an attorney, Jackson
had seen an increasingly conservative and activist United States Supreme
Court strike down important federal and state social legislation. He doubtless felt much of the same frustration in this regard that his political patron,
Franklin Roosevelt, felt. Moreover, the instrumentalist philosophy of the
Legal Realists was in ascendancy in the nation's most elite law schools at
this time. Indeed, Legal Realists such as William 0. Douglas, Jerome Frank,
and Thurman Arnold had come to Washington to participate in the New
Deal and to put their academic theories into practice.635 Jackson worked
with many of these individuals, and he was exposed to their ideas. These
ideas coalesced in Jackson's thinking at the time of the court fight, and
Jackson signed on as a supporter of the administration's plan, although not
without some misgivings. With the benefit of more than a decade of hindsight, and with the rather lofty view from the bench, Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson would attempt to distance himself somewhat from the court
packing plan,636 but Assistant Attorney General Jackson was, by no means,
as cool to the notion. Given the Assistant Attorney General's very real service to Roosevelt in connection with the court battle, Justice Jackson had
little cause to be embarrassed by his participation in the affair.
By late 1937, the career of Jackson, the New Dealer from Western New

fight is correct ultimately matters little, if at all, to the story of Jackson's participation
in the affair. Jackson could not have known about much of the behind-the-scenes politics and deliberations of the Court which Cushman has described. Nor could Jackson
have known anything of the constitutional course on which the Court was about to
embark. Jackson's role in the matter, then, must be examined in light of what he knew
or could have known in the winter and early spring of 1937. The fact that Roosevelt's
court packing plan might have been unnecessary, irrelevant, or doomed from the outset
does not change the part that Jackson played on its behalf, nor does it change what he
later thought about the matter.
635 See AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 179.
636

See supra text accompanying note 228.
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York, was very much alive and on the move. In January 1938, Roosevelt
tapped Jackson to succeed Stanley Reed as the Solicitor General, upon the
latter's elevation to the nation's highest bench. In March, Jackson was confirmed as the Solicitor General of the United States. Soon there was talk in
administration circles about a Jackson bid for New York's governorship in
1938, although this did not come to pass.6 37 In January 1940, Jackson became the Attorney General at a crucial moment in American history, with
the world at war. At the opening of the United States Supreme Court's 1941
Term, Jackson took his seat as the junior associate Justice on the high
bench. He held his seat on the Court for the remaining thirteen years of his
63
life.

To claim that Jackson's meteoric rise was solely or even primarily the
result of his service in support of the Roosevelt administration's 1937 court
packing plan would be an overstatement. His colleagues and superiors, however, did not overlook his extensive service in the matter. Jackson's willingness to undertake highly visible roles in such matters as the court fight sped
his ascent within the administration. His career was also advanced by the
very qualities which Jackson exhibited during the court fight-intelligence,

loyalty, stamina, tact, and consummate advocacy skills.
Robert H. Jackson played a significant part in American political, legal,
and constitutional history during the years 1938 to 1954. Jackson's subsequent judicial philosophy, which called for judicial deference to federal
legislative judgment in matters of economic regulation, may be seen as
stemming, in no small part, from the experience he gleaned during his time
in the Roosevelt administration as it battled the nation's High Court. Indeed,
the high watermark of the Court's expansive reading of federal powers un639 was
der the Commerce Clause, the 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,
a Jackson-authored opinion. Jackson's often-overlooked role in the 1937

court fight thus deserves consideration alongside the other important events
in his career as an advocate and a jurist."0

See generally GERHART, supra note 1, at 122-32.
638 In 1945 and 1946, Jackson took time away from his duties at the Court in order
to serve as the chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. See
GERHART, supra note 1, at 21-25, 253-57.
639 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
640 In a future article, I plan to discuss the continued significance of the court fight in
Jackson's subsequent career and in his later thinking regarding the proper role of the
637

federal judiciary.

